Philip J. Grossman

Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments

Research in social sciences other than economics indicates substantial differences in behavior between men and women. The general conclusion drawn from this work is that women will be more socially-orientated (selfless) and men more individually-orientated (selfish). This paper reports the results of a double-anonymous dictator experiment designed to permit the emergence of basic gender differences in economic behavior. The authors results are intended to provide a baseline for further research. They find that women, on average, donate twice as much as men to their anonymous partners when any factors that might confound cooperation are eliminated.

A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants

This paper formulates a political theory of intergovernmental grants. A model of vote-maximizing federal politicians is developed. Grants are assumed to buy the support of state voters and the ‘political capital or resources’ of state politicians and interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters for the federal politician. The model is tested for 49 states. Similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians and the size of the Democrat majority in the state legislature increases the per capita dollar amount of grants made to a state. Likewise, increases in both the size of the state bureaucracy and union membership lead to greater grants for a state. Over time, the importance of interest groups (bureaucracy and unions) has increased relative to political groups (state politicians).

Federalism and the Growth of Government Revisited

Recent research in public economics has been testing for a relationship in federal states between the decentralization of governments and the total and individual size of government shares in GNP. According to one view, economic theory offers no unambiguous empirical predictions. Provided there is a competitive political environment at each government level, the rivalry between political parties will result in an outcome that conforms approximately to the preferences of the citizens, as interpreted in the conventional median-voter model. Under this scenario, it is not certain what differences might be caused by more decentralization (Oates, 1985). To determine any difference we would have to possess considerable knowledge about the distribution of tastes and the location of the populace. It has been hypothesized, nevertheless, that increased decentralization could result in a higher level of government expenditure. Quoting the economic historian John Wallis, Oates(1985: 749) suggests that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the local than at the state or national level, they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and responsibility where these activities are carried out at more localizedlevels of government.