Eirini Karamouzi

Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979

Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979 explores the history of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the turbulent decade of the 1970s and especially the Communitys response to the fall of the Greek dictatorship and the countrys application for EEC membership. The book constitutes the first multi-archival study on the second enlargement of the EEC, drawing on British, French, German, Irish, American, EEC and Greek sources. Thanks to its novel Community-centred approach, Eirini Karamouzis work reveals the rationale behind the Nines acceptance of the Greek application and details the dynamics of the accession negotiations in the evolving environment of detente and the rise of the Left in Southern Europe.

Enlargement and the Historical Origins of the European Community's Democratic Identity, 1961–1978

This article examines how and when democracy entered the discursive politics of the European Community to become one of the fundamental tenets of European political identity – and in the process influenced how decision-makers approached the question of enlargement. Building on multiple archival sources, the article traces how all three Community institutions (Commission, Council and European Parliament) legitimised the expansion and continuation of the process of European integration through the discursive construction of democracy. It focuses on the debates elicited by the attempts of southern European countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s.

Troublemaker or peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, the Euromissile Crisis, and the policy of peace, 1981–86

ABSTRACT The article sheds light on a neglected piece of the Euromissile Crisis puzzle, namely Greece’s policy of peace. The article examines the interaction of Andreas Papandreou’s socialist government’s foreign policy, developments in the country’s political culture and national frames of reference, and the unfolding drama of the nuclear crisis of the 1980s. While subscribing to an international cause, papandreou framed the policy of peace in ardent nationalist terms that involved renegotiation of the american bases on greek soil, relations with nato, balkan regional schemes for nuclear-weapons-free zones, and international initiatives with the third world.

Consumption and Gender in Southern Europe since the Long 1960s

A plethora of studies on consumption and gender have complicated our picture of the post-1945 European recovery, providing a meta narrative of the period following the end of the Second World war o...

The Balkans in the Cold War

Positioned on the fault line between two competing Cold War ideological and military alliances, and entangled in ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, the Balkan region offers a particularly interesting case for the study of the global Cold War system. This book explores the origins, unfolding and impact of the Cold War on the Balkans on the one hand, and the importance of regional realities and pressures on the other. Fifteen contributors from history, international relations, and political science address a series of complex issues rarely covered in one volume, namely the Balkans and the creation of the Cold War order; Military alliances and the Balkans; uneasy relations with the Superpowers; Balkan dilemmas in the 1970s and 1980s and the ‘significant other’ – the EEC; and identity, culture and ideology. The book’s particular contribution to the scholarship of the Cold War is that it draws on extensive multi-archival research of both regional and American, ex-Soviet and Western European archives.

The Only Game in Town? EEC, Southern Europe and the Greek Crisis of the 1970s

On 28 May 1979, Greece—against all odds and five years ahead of Spain and Portugal—signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in Athens.1 It was the culmination of an effort that had commenced in the late 1950s when Greece had become the first country to be granted association status on 9 July 1961.2 In 1975, the then Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis who oversaw Greece’s transition to democracy, applied for EEC membership as a long-lasting measure to protect the country’s nascent democratic institutions, secure its social cohesion and economic modernization, and ultimately guarantee enduring integration in the West. Greece had experienced a dictatorship since 1967, a period that abruptly ended in 1974 with a Greek-sponsored coup d’etat against the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This was neither the first nor the last time since the inception of the Greek state that the political and intellectual elites turned to Europe.3 Greece had a tradition of participation in numerous alliances throughout its modern history because of its small size, economic backwardness and unstable geopolitical neighborhood. Such alliances had enabled Greece to strengthen its national security and advance its economic development. Often, however, such a reliance on external allies subjected Greece’s domestic politics and policies to foreign influence and in lack of Greek ownership allowed several political elites and their followers to view these alliances, including EEC membership, either as a panacea that would cure all the country’s problems or as a plague to be blamed for the country’s ills.4

The German Presidency: The Race against Time

While progress in the first half of 1978 had been positive, the EEC/Greece negotiations had completely left out thus far the agricultural dossier and the social chapter. Now, with the Iberian applications looming, no party could risk creating a precedent in areas that were so crucial to Community budgeting. Negotiations towards the end of the year were fractious to the point of nearing breakdown, yet the crucial roles played by many actors succeeded finally in achieving agreement. The French reaffirmed their political willingness to support the Greeks; the German presidency was able to broker an agreement with the applicant and the Commission adopted a positive and fresh approach towards helping the Greek application. Finally, the Greeks now had a better understanding of the complex dynamics of internal Community bargaining. Without the convergence of all of these factors it is doubtful whether the difficult hurdles of the final months of 1978 would have been overcome.

And the Talks Kick Off

The Greek application to join the Community was endorsed by the Council of Ministers on 9 February 1976. The Council rejected the Commission’s notion of a preaccession period and instructed it to prepare the way, together with COREPER, for the opening of negotiations as soon as possible. The formal opening of talks took place on 27 July 1976, nearly six months later. The main reasons for the Community’s procrastination arose from internal Community concerns about the practicalities of integrating Greece into existing institutional and financial arrangements, coupled with geopolitical worries over the repercussions on Turkey. During the first half of 1976 the EEC strove to meet Turkish demands while honouring its promises to the Greeks. Although the Council of Ministers had disagreed with the Commission’s decision to include a reference to the Greek-Turkish dispute in its Opinion, the reality was that Turkey was a very important factor that could not be ignored. In order to maintain some form of balance between the two countries, the Nine tried hard to compensate Turkey for the prospect of Greek accession. Only once the Community had decided that it had failed to clear the Turkish hurdle did it decide to move along, halfheartedly, with the Greek talks so that the second half of 1976 was taken up with creating the procedures that would govern the Greek negotiations with the EEC.

Democracy and European Integration: Greece’s Strategy of Democratisation

Early in the morning of 12 June 1975, just a few days after the ratification of the new Greek constitution, Constantinos Karamanlis’ government submitted a formal application for Greece to join the EEC. The Greek ambassador to the EEC, Stephanos Stathatos, sent the formal request to the president of the Council of Ministers, the Irish minister of foreign affairs, Gareth Fitzgerald. On the same day, Karamanlis informed the ambassadors of the nine member states of the Community that Greece belongs and desires to belong in Europe, with which it has been connected for a long time in many ways — politically, economically and historically. Today’s initiative constitutes a natural continuity of the policy I inaugurated 15 years ago & Greece does not desire full membership solely on economic grounds. The reasons are mainly political and refer to the consolidation of democracy and the future of the nation.1

Why Did the Nine Say ‘Yes’?

Early European reactions to the news of the Greek application were overwhelmingly positive. Harold Wilson, Britain’s prime minister, expressed satisfaction at the Greek government’s European choice.1 The French president, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, commented: ‘we were the first to openly support the membership of Greece, entry of which would contribute positively to the development of the European construction’.2 The Bonn government followed suit, describing Greece’s decision to seek full membership of the EEC ‘as a further demonstration of the unbroken power of attraction exercised by the process of European unification’.3 In the same spirit, the Italian foreign minister, Mariano Rumor, sent his ‘warmest congratulations’ while his Dutch counterpart conveyed a similar welcome.4 The Irish side praised the Greek application as a historic event coming as it did a few days after the referendum in the UK.5