Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

Greek Reformism and its Models: The Impact of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

U.S. criticism of the political and social system of Civil War Greece has often been cited as proof of the inadequacy of pro-Western voices in Greece as a whole. However, members of the new political forces that emerged in the country in the mid-1930s argued for far-reaching reforms along the lines of the New Deal. These new forces had rallied under the leadership of George Papandreou in 1944, but had been crushed under the weight of the civil strife of December 1944 and then by the eruption of full-scale Civil War in 1946. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan projected ideas very similar to those of the Greek reformers, marking a revival of these forces after their successive defeats in previous years. This was a side-effect of U.S. intervention in Greece, but would prove important, as members of these reformist groups played a major role in Greeces post-civil war history.

Cyprus at the Crossroads, 1959–63

Cyprus became independent in 1960, after a fierce dispute between Britain, Greece and Turkey; but the island did not find a way towards normal political development. After 1960, the Cyprus Republic, and mainly its President, Archbishop Makarios, could follow either the long-term option of implementing the 1959 Zurich–London agreements and integrating with the West; or the short-term option of trying to acquire unlimited independence and following a non-aligned policy. From late 1962, as disagreements with the Turkish Cypriots grew, Makarios oriented himself to extensive constitutional revision, and finally proposed this unilaterally in late 1963. It was then that the second Cyprus crisis erupted.

Negotiating with the enemy: the normalization of Greek–Bulgarian relations, 1960–1964

The conclusion of the 1964 Greek–Bulgarian agreements was an impressive example of an overall deal between members of opposing Cold War alliances: they covered economic and technical co-operation, trade, transport, communications, and the thorny issue of Bulgarian reparations. The 1964 agreements also led to the full normalization of diplomatic relations and to the exchange of ambassadors. The settlement came after a ten-year negotiation. Its conclusion was aided by the prevailing climate of detente, but should mostly be attributed to the desire of the two countries to normalize relations, rather than to superpower pressure or advice.

Out-of-area: NATO perceptions of the Third World, 1957–1967

This article discusses the reports of the NATO study groups on the situation in the Third World, from the aftermath of the Suez crisis until the 1967 reorganization of the alliance through the Harmel Report. These were the infamous ‘out-of-area’ issues which caused significant disagreements within the alliance. NATO analysis was dominated by the primacy of the Cold War: its major subject was ‘Soviet penetration’ of the periphery, rather than the problems of the global South as such. Arguably, this Cold War perspective prevented the NATO analysts from fully evaluating the dangers of the situation in the Third World.

Revisiting NATO’s stabilizing role in south-eastern Europe: the Cold War experience and the longue durée

Balkan post-war animosities involved the osmosis of Cold War cleavages with older regional/nationalist disputes. By providing for deterrence and for the integration of Balkan affairs in a global context, NATO played a major role in discouraging territorial claims between Greece and Turkey on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other. By the 1970s, the Cold War enemies of the Balkans were firmly on the path of détente. Ironically, NATO was less successful in facilitating a definite reconciliation between its two members, Greece and Turkey, although arguably it also contributed in averting a bilateral clash.

Heirs of the King-Makers: The British Embassy in Athens, 1951–61

This article examines the role and position of the British Embassy in Athens, as a test case of a diplomatic mission facing strains because of a bitter regional dispute, the Cyprus crisis. In the mid-1950s Whitehall decided that the retention of Cyprus was necessary for British policy in the Middle East, even at the cost of sacrificing relations with Greece. Thus the Embassys recommendations were constantly being ignored in Whitehall, while its relations with the Greek authorities were growing worse. After 1957, the new Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, focused on British cultural influence and on Britains role in tying Greece more solidly to the West. The 1959 Cyprus settlement and the 1961 visit of the Greek Prime Minister to London marked the most important successes of this more flexible approach.

The 1930 Greek‐Turkish naval protocol

This article focuses on an aspect of the Greek‐Turkish rapprochement which has not yet been extensively researched. The Protocol for Naval Armaments was annexed to the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1930 in Ankara; its conclusion displayed the sincerity of the newly initiated Greek‐Turkish friendship. The main factor which enabled the two countries to conclude the 1930 treaties, including the naval protocol, was the realization that both were conservative states, committed to the status quo in the Balkans. The article focuses on Greek, rather than Turkish policy, and suggests that the naval policy of Greece was directly connected with the financial priorities of the country, and the fundamentally defensive orientation of its foreign policy, after the conclusion of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

Greece and the Arabs, 1956-1958

AbstractIn the second half of the 1950s, Greek foreign policy was dominated by the Cyprus question, while in the Middle East the same period was marked by a series of crises. The developments in the Middle East were important to the Greek government partly because Cypruss fate depended primarily on British decisions – and these decisions were connected to Britains position in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the turbulence in the region endangered the Greek communities in it, mainly the large community in Egypt. Yet, it may be said that Athens was rather slow in making an approach to the Arabs, on whose votes the United Nations debates on Cyprus largely depended: such approach took place only in Spring 1956, after the British had deported the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, and after the new government of Constantinos Karamanlis had scored its first electoral victory.

CCMS: The Projects 1970–1975

Presents the CCMS projects of the years 1969–1975. The first wave of projects included, among others, disaster assistance, air pollution, open and inland water pollution and road safety. These ‘technical’ studies were the most successful; the socially oriented projects proved less successful. The chapter also discusses the more ‘focused’ intra-allied disagreements sparked by the examination of these issues. During the next phase of 1973–1975, the CCMS undertakings were exclusively technically oriented, and also included energy projects, which became particularly important after the first oil shock. In addition, the chapter presents the discussions in the CCMS of the development of cities and the Concorde; in the latter case, Britain and France took care to block a discussion of its environmental effects. By 1975, the early problems had been overcome, and the CCMS was working smoothly within the alliance structure.

The Balkans in the Cold War

Positioned on the fault line between two competing Cold War ideological and military alliances, and entangled in ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, the Balkan region offers a particularly interesting case for the study of the global Cold War system. This book explores the origins, unfolding and impact of the Cold War on the Balkans on the one hand, and the importance of regional realities and pressures on the other. Fifteen contributors from history, international relations, and political science address a series of complex issues rarely covered in one volume, namely the Balkans and the creation of the Cold War order; Military alliances and the Balkans; uneasy relations with the Superpowers; Balkan dilemmas in the 1970s and 1980s and the ‘significant other’ – the EEC; and identity, culture and ideology. The book’s particular contribution to the scholarship of the Cold War is that it draws on extensive multi-archival research of both regional and American, ex-Soviet and Western European archives.