Eitan Shamir

Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

Abstract ‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik)

Abstract The purpose of the current paper is to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in the US Army. This concept, developed by the Prussians, denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently and change it according to the emerging situation. The paper examines the US command approach prior to the adoption of mission command. It argues that it was heavily influenced by corporate management practices which inherently contradict mission command approach. It continues and investigates how the US Army endeavored to emulate the approach in its doctrine and in major operations. While it has officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. This state of affairs has to do with the cultural legacy of the managerial approach to command that still persist. Despite the partial success, the US Army has recently reaffirmed its commitment to this approach.

Mission Command Between Theory and Practice: The Case of the IDF

Mission command (or Auftragstaktik) is considered today the command philosophy best suited for war and military operations.This philosophy was originally developed by the Prussians as a means of countering the effects of “friction” in war. It is endorsed today by modern militaries as a cornerstone in their command and control doctrine. The practice of this philosophy is hindered, however, by a myriad of sociological, organizational and technological constraints that characterize today’s military operations. These reasons may limit or render mission command inapplicable despite its historical proven value.

Cognitive Aspects of Business Innovation

Increasing information richness and the changing sociopolitical environment in recent years have resulted in changes in corporate structure and organization. The growing challenges of organizational and technological complexities require the development of new organizational concepts. The effects of a combination of high complexity and high uncertainty have been recognized before in military settings. To take advantage of new technologies and manage information complexity, a theory of network-centric operations (NCO) was developed. Mission Command (MC) and NCO formulate organizational structure across functional domains (physical, informational, cognitive, and social), in a way that is also applicable in a business setting. In response to an increase in decision complexity and regulations, academia has developed risk assessment and multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) tools for use in military and industrial settings. We believe that the combination of military science with MCDA and risk assessment has the potential to dramatically improve the credibility, efficiency and transparency of strategic and tactical decisions in industrial settings. This paper summarizes the military concepts of MC and NCO, and links them with mental modeling, risk assessment, and decision analysis tools. Application of the combined framework to the pharmaceutical industry is also discussed.

The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy

ABSTRACT The special operations forces (SOF) of the industrial democracies have suddenly and rapidly grown in numbers and resources during the past decades. Most explanations for this growth focus on factors external to the armed forces. We argue that the enlargement of SOF is also the result of internal organizational dynamics. First, we compare SOF to other units and military appendages that have grown over the past 30 years in order to delineate what is unique to their development and the special adaptive potential they bring to the armed forces: generalized specialization, boundary spanning roles, and enlargement of military autonomy. Second, we analyze the actions of internal military entrepreneurs and their organizational mentors to show how they use this adaptive potential to “sell” the use of SOF to key policy-makers and decision-makers.

The Case for Israeli Ground Forces

Past and planned reductions in ground-force units are imperilling the Israel Defense Forces’ ability to provide for Israels security.

Israel’s post-heroic wars: exploring the influence of American military concepts on Israel’s adaptation of post-heroic warfare

ABSTRACT This article examines the role of American military influence on Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare. The main factors identified in the existing literature that have been identified to explain Israel’s transition to post-heroic warfare had to do with the changes in Israel’s strategic environment, changes in society and development of new military technology. This article sheds light on an intervening factor that further enables and shapes the transition to post-heroic war; the American military influence over the Israel Defence Forces. The strategic uncertainty and lack of professional direction encouraged Israel’s military establishment to turn to American military ideas. The US military is perceived by the IDF as a leading professional institution that is dealing with similar challenges and operating under similar constraints.

The rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF**

Abstract Mission command is a command philosophy that denotes decentralized leadership; it is a philosophy of command that requires and facilitates initiative in all levels of command and encourages subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to demonstrate initiative and exercise personal judgement. In its first decades of existence, military analysts portrayed the Israeli command system as such and termed it ‘optional control’. The primary objective of this article is to explore the rise and decline of ‘optional control’ in the IDF. The first part of the article follows the development of optional control in the IDF’s first decades of existence until the 1970s. The second part of the paper will describe its decline through the analysis of command in recent IDF military campaigns. The last part is analysis; explanation for the decline in mission command is attributed to four major factors: the changes in Israel’s society and thereof in civil‒military relations; the changes in character of military operations; the lack of appropriate military education; and the role and impact of new technologies on the IDF. The combined effect of these factors impedes the ongoing efforts of the IDF to re-establish mission command as its preferred command philosophy.