Efraim Inbar

Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada

This article analyzes Israels military response to the intifada. Beginning with a discussion of the attitude on the part of the main Israeli decision makers toward the use of force in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it goes on to analyze the crystallization of Israeli strategy to deal with the Palestinian uprising. It reviews the main stages in the developing Israeli response. The succeeding section focuses on how the Israeli Defence Forces adapted to waging a small war for which it was unprepared. The slow process is reviewed in terms of manpower policy, intelligence, training, operations, and equipment. The article concludes with a discussion of the question whether victory is possible and at what price.

Israel's Palestinian Challenge

Israel’s strategic environment improved after the end of the Cold War 1 as its international status was enhanced considerably, and the historic process of reluctant acceptance of Israel as a fait accompli within the Arab world continued. 2 While the chances for a large scale conventional confrontation dissipated, two clear security challenges remained at the beginning of the twenty-first century: the nuclear threat from Iran and the low intensity conflict (LIC) with the Palestinians. The repercussions of Iran becoming a nuclear power and the ways to address this existential threat are beyond the scope of this article and are addressed elsewhere. 3 This article, instead, focuses on the Palestinian challenge, which is much closer to home. The article first discusses the dim future of the Palestinian Authority (PA), subsequently the nature of the threat it poses, particularly after the electoral victory of Islamic Hamas in January 2006, and ends by examining Israel’s options in dealing with challenges emanating from a Hamas-ruled PA. The article is sceptical of the dominant two-state paradigm and advocates the adoption of an open-ended conflict management strategy.

Israeli National Security, 1973-96

This article focuses on the main Israeli decision makers, reviews their perceptions of the changing strategic environment, and analyzes the dilemmas and policies with respect to Israels main national security components. A review of the period shows much continuity: (1) the pattern of decision making remained highly centralized; (2) many of the Israeli leaders were socialized in the defense establishment; (3) Yitzhak Rabin was the towering figure for most of the period; (4) the main elements of Israeli strategic thinking (deterence, early warning, decisive victory, and self-reliance) remained constant; (5) Israel did not succumb to the temptation to adopt an open nuclear strategy; (6) the Israeli level of threat perception became lower primarily because of the emergence of a more benign international environment. We see in the 1990s a slight departure from past premises and policies, although all in all, it can be said that Israel has not fundamentally changed its security doctrine during the period reviewed here.

Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

Abstract ‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.

A taxonomy of Israel's use of military force

Abstract This article analyzes the spectrum of Israels use of military force. Employing a comparative theoretical framework, it offers a taxonomy of that experience based on three criteria: the character of envisaged political goals, the type of military strategy preferred, and the scope of forces engaged. The combination of those criteria produces eight individual modes of force, each of which is examined (with supplementary illustrations being provided from non‐Israeli instances). It is suggested that the terminology here used presents a more accurate depiction than has hitherto been available of the spectrum of the use of military force in world politics.

The changing Israeli strategic equation: Toward a security regime

Israel is situated in the Middle East, which is not a zone of peace but rather of turmoil. In contrast to the West where peace has become the norm, the Middle East exists in a different socio-political time zone. It is war-prone and the use of force still evokes remarkable popular support. The Middle East, similar to other Third World regions, displays a greater propensity for intra- and inter-state conflict as compared to the environments of the developed states. Therefore, the Middle East is not about to be transformed into what Karl Deutsch called a ‘security community’, where recourse to arms is not acceptable for the resolution of inter-state conflict.

Is Israel's Political Élite Becoming More Hawkish?

In May 1989, Israels National Unity government, the coalition of its main political parties Likud and Labour agreed on a peace initiative, a decision which was generally regarded as representing a more flexible Israeli position than hitherto. This government had been formed by Likud following the November 1988 elections. Even though Likud had secured the agreement of the religious and right-wing parties to enter into a coalition under its leadership and it could have governed Israel with a right-wing coalition, it preferred to make concessions to the Labour party in order to renew the grand coalition that had ruled Israel from 1984 to 1988. This decision was indicative of a trend towards moderation in Likud policies. Indeed, we would argue that since 1973 both the Likud bloc and the Labour party have gradually adopted more moderate positions on national security issues. The fall of the National Unity government in March 1990, primarily because of interand intra-party politics, and the formation of a right-wing coalition in June by an unenthusiastic Likud does not change this assessment. Conventional wisdom holds that the Israeli political system has moved over time in a hawkish direction on the dovish-

The Resilience of Israeli–Turkish Relations

Turkey was the first – and for decades the only – Islamic country to recognize the Jewish state, opening diplomatic relations in 1949. While Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, and Israel served during the Cold War as a Western ally to counter Soviet alliances in the Arab world, relations between the two states were low-key through the decades of wars fought between Israel and the Arabs. Yet Turkey never severed the relationship despite Arab pressure to do so. With the end of the Cold War, Israel and Turkey emerged as the most democratic and economically dynamic states in the region. Their foreign pro-Western orientation and their self-perception as bastions of democratic and free market values in an unruly neighbourhood placed them, as was the case during the Cold War years, in the same strategic boat. In the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, during a period when the Arab-Israeli peace process gained momentum, Israeli –Turkish relations also moved into high gear. Diplomatic ties were upgraded to embassy-level status, joint military exercises began and intelligence cooperation was expanded. In addition, economic relations boomed. Annual trade between the two nations grew to US

Islamic extremism and the peace process

2 billion in 2004, up from US

The decline of the Labour party

200 million in 1993, and since the mid-1990s Turkey has been the number one tourist destination for Israelis. The remarkable upgrading of relations with Israel was the result of the emergence of a evolving international constellation, following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent adoption of a new Turkish approach to a newly defined Greater Middle East. Turkey benefited only partially from the ‘peace dividends’ at the end of the Cold War, because it still found itself in a volatile strategic environment. While free to adopt a more assertive foreign policy than during the Cold War, 1 it also viewed itself as encircled by dangerous neighbours and surrounded by hotspots of instability. Thus, the main context for Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel was the reorientation of its foreign policy.