Eliran Halali

Between self-interest and reciprocity: the social bright side of self-control failure.

Despite the importance of reciprocity in many areas of social life, little is known about possible factors affecting it and its interplay with the self-interest motive to maximize ones own gains. In this study, we examined the role of cognitive control in reciprocal behavior to determine whether it is a deliberate and controlled act or whether the behavior is evoked automatically. In Experiment 1, depletion of cognitive control resources increased the rate of rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game despite associated financial loss. In Experiments 2A and 2B, using 2 depletion manipulations, we extended these results and showed that depleted participants returned more money in response to highly trusting investments during the trust game. These results suggest that reciprocity considerations are actively suppressed when attempting to maximize ones own gains. When cognitive control is limited, this suppression becomes difficult, and consequently reciprocity considerations prevail.

Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation

Significance Six experiments show that the mere possibility of third-party intervention increases cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup interactions, that third parties often fail to increase collective gains by withholding intervention, and that reducing the risk associated with intervention significantly increases peacemaking by self-interested third parties. These findings highlight the interdependence between disputants and third parties, thereby complementing existing models that solely focus on unidirectional influence of third parties on disputants. These findings underscore the role self-interest plays in shaping third parties’ intervention decisions and demonstrate that selfish third parties can promote peaceful conflict resolution by literally changing the game disputants are playing. Overall, we explain why, how, and when self-interested third parties intervene in others’ conflicts, to everyone’s benefit. The tremendous costs of conflict have made humans resourceful not only at warfare but also at peacemaking. Although third parties have acted as peacemakers since the dawn of history, little is known about voluntary, informal third-party intervention in conflict. Here we introduce the Peacemaker Game, a novel experimental paradigm, to model and study the interdependence between disputants and third parties in conflict. In the game, two disputants choose whether to cooperate or compete and a third party chooses whether or not to intervene in the conflict. Intervention introduces side payments that transform the game disputants are playing; it also introduces risk for the third party by making it vulnerable to disputants’ choices. Six experiments revealed three robust effects: (i) The mere possibility of third-party intervention significantly increases cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts; (ii) reducing the risk to third parties dramatically increases intervention rates, to everyone’s benefit; and (iii) disputants’ cooperation rates are consistently higher than third parties’ intervention rates. These findings explain why, how, and when self-interested third parties facilitate peaceful conflict resolution.

Keep it cool: temperature priming effect on cognitive control

Abstract The effect of physical temperature on cognition and behavior has been the focus of extensive research in recent years, demonstrating that embodied concepts are grounded in, and shaped by, sensorimotor physical experiences. Nevertheless, less is known about how experienced and perceived temperatures affect cognitive control, one of humans core executive functions. In the present work, we primed participants with cool versus warm temperature using a between participants manipulation of physical touch experience (Experiment 1), and a within participants manipulation of seeing landscape views associated with cool vs. warm temperatures (Experiment 2). In both experiments, cool compared to warm temperatures lead to improved performance on an anti-saccade task, an established cognitive control measure. Implications are discussed.

When Rationality and Fairness Conflict: The Role of Cognitive-Control in the Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game models social exchange in situations in which the rational motive to maximize gains conflicts with fairness considerations. Using two independent behavioral measurements, the authors tested two contradicting predictions: that the preference for fairness is a deliberative cognitive-controlled act or that it is an automatic act. In Experiment 1, participants whose cognitive-control resources were depleted rejected more unfair offers compared to control participants. In Experiment 2, it took longer to accept than to reject unfair offers. These results suggest that fairness considerations operate more automatically than rational considerations, and that the latter depend on the availability of limited cognitive control resources.

More for Us or More for Me? Social Dominance as Parochial Egoism:

Intergroup interactions allow members of advantaged groups to cooperate with in-group and out-group members alike (universal cooperation), cooperate with in-group members exclusively (parochial cooperation), or withhold cooperation altogether. These behaviors impact the intergroup hierarchy differently; therefore, individuals’ ideological support of intergroup hierarchy may predict their choices among them. Universal cooperation is inherently egalitarian and hence inconsistent with social dominance orientation (SDO). Although parochial cooperation strengthens the in-group relative to the out-group, and hence consistent with SDO, it is unclear to what extent members of advantaged groups higher in SDO are willing to pay the costs associated with participation in parochial cooperation. Studies conducted across three distinct intergroup contexts in the United States and Israel consistently find that SDO coincides with behavioral selfishness, a pattern we label parochial egoism. These findings illuminate a gap between individuals’ ideological worldview and their social behavior and elucidate the motivational meaning of SDO.