Emily J. Ward

Language can boost otherwise unseen objects into visual awareness

Linguistic labels (e.g., “chair”) seem to activate visual properties of the objects to which they refer. Here we investigated whether language-based activation of visual representations can affect the ability to simply detect the presence of an object. We used continuous flash suppression to suppress visual awareness of familiar objects while they were continuously presented to one eye. Participants made simple detection decisions, indicating whether they saw any image. Hearing a verbal label before the simple detection task changed performance relative to an uninformative cue baseline. Valid labels improved performance relative to no-label baseline trials. Invalid labels decreased performance. Labels affected both sensitivity (d′) and response times. In addition, we found that the effectiveness of labels varied predictably as a function of the match between the shape of the stimulus and the shape denoted by the label. Together, the findings suggest that facilitated detection of invisible objects due to language occurs at a perceptual rather than semantic locus. We hypothesize that when information associated with verbal labels matches stimulus-driven activity, language can provide a boost to perception, propelling an otherwise invisible image into awareness.

Repetition Suppression and Multi-Voxel Pattern Similarity Differentially Track Implicit and Explicit Visual Memory

Repeated exposure to a visual stimulus is associated with corresponding reductions in neural activity, particularly within visual cortical areas. It has been argued that this phenomenon of repetition suppression is related to increases in processing fluency or implicit memory. However, repetition of a visual stimulus can also be considered in terms of the similarity of the pattern of neural activity elicited at each exposure—a measure that has recently been linked to explicit memory. Despite the popularity of each of these measures, direct comparisons between the two have been limited, and the extent to which they differentially (or similarly) relate to behavioral measures of memory has not been clearly established. In the present study, we compared repetition suppression and pattern similarity as predictors of both implicit and explicit memory. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we scanned 20 participants while they viewed and categorized repeated presentations of scenes. Repetition priming (facilitated categorization across repetitions) was used as a measure of implicit memory, and subsequent scene recognition was used as a measure of explicit memory. We found that repetition priming was predicted by repetition suppression in prefrontal, parietal, and occipitotemporal regions; however, repetition priming was not predicted by pattern similarity. In contrast, subsequent explicit memory was predicted by pattern similarity (across repetitions) in some of the same occipitotemporal regions that exhibited a relationship between priming and repetition suppression; however, explicit memory was not related to repetition suppression. This striking double dissociation indicates that repetition suppression and pattern similarity differentially track implicit and explicit learning.

Inattentional blindness reflects limitations on perception, not memory: Evidence from repeated failures of awareness

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of visual awareness is inattentional blindness (IB), in which a surprisingly salient event right in front of you may go completely unseen when unattended. Does IB reflect a failure of perception, or only of subsequent memory? Previous work has been unable to answer this question, due to a seemingly intractable dilemma: ruling out memory requires immediate perceptual reports, but soliciting such reports fuels an expectation that eliminates IB. Here we introduce a way of evoking repeated IB in the same subjects and the same session: we show that observers fail to report seeing salient events’ not only when they have no expectation, but also when they have the wrong expectations about the events nature. This occurs when observers must immediately report seeing anything unexpected, even mid-event. Repeated IB thus demonstrates that IB is aptly named: it reflects a genuine deficit in moment-by-moment conscious perception, rather than a form of inattentional amnesia.

Patterns in the human brain mosaic discriminate males from females

In their PNAS article, Joel et al. (1) demonstrate extensive overlap between the distributions of females and males for many brain characteristics, measured across multiple neuroimaging modalities and datasets. They pose two requirements for categorizing brains into distinct male/female classes: ( i ) gender differences should appear as dimorphic form differences between male and female brains, and ( ii ) there should be internal consistency in the degree of “maleness–femaleness” of different elements within a single brain. Based on these criteria, the authors convincingly establish that there is little evidence for this strict sexually dimorphic view of human brains, counter to the popular lay conception of a “male” and “female” brain. This … [↵][1]2To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: adam.chekroud{at}yale.edu. [1]: #xref-corresp-1-1

Neural Discriminability of Object Features Predicts Perceptual Organization

How does the neural representation of simple visual features affect perceptual operations, such as perceptual grouping? If the strength of feature representations in the brain is indicative of how the perceptual system partitions information into visual elements, then identifying the underlying neural representation may determine why things look the way they do. During functional MRI, participants viewed objects that varied along three feature dimensions: shape, color, and orientation. Afterward, participants performed an independent perceptual-grouping task outside the scanner to measure the strength of feature grouping. In lateral occipital cortex, neural feature discriminability, characterized using functional MRI multivariate pattern classification, positively predicted feature grouping strength: The more distinct the neural representations of a particular feature, the stronger the grouping was for that feature outside the scanner. Thus, variation in neural feature representation can be quantified to predict perceptual organization.

Stochastic or systematic? Seemingly random perceptual switching in bistable events triggered by transient unconscious cues.

What we see is a function not only of incoming stimulation, but of unconscious inferences in visual processing. Among the most powerful demonstrations of this are bistable events, but what causes the percepts of such events to switch? Beyond voluntary effort and stochastic processing, we explore the ways in which ongoing dynamic percepts may switch as a function of the content of brief, unconscious, independent cues. We introduced transient disambiguating occlusion cues into the Spinning Dancer silhouette animation. The dancer is bistable in terms of depth and rotation direction, but many observers see extended rotation in the same direction, interrupted only rarely by involuntary switches. Observers failed to notice these occasional disambiguating cues, but their impact was strong and systematic: Cues typically led to seemingly stochastic perceptual switches shortly thereafter, especially when conflicting with the current percept. These results show how the content of incoming information determines and constrains online conscious perception-even when neither the content nor the brute existence of that information ever reaches awareness. Thus, just as phenomenological ease does not imply a corresponding lack of underlying effortful computation, phenomenological randomness should not be taken to imply a corresponding lack of underlying systematicity.