Emily Pronin

Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others.

Important asymmetries between self-perception and social perception arise from the simple fact that other peoples actions, judgments, and priorities sometimes differ from ones own. This leads people not only to make more dispositional inferences about others than about themselves (E. E. Jones & R. E. Nisbett, 1972) but also to see others as more susceptible to a host of cognitive and motivational biases. Although this blind spot regarding ones own biases may serve familiar self-enhancement motives, it is also a product of the phenomenological stance of naive realism. It is exacerbated, furthermore, by peoples tendency to attach greater credence to their own introspections about potential influences on judgment and behavior than they attach to similar introspections by others. The authors review evidence, new and old, of this asymmetry and its underlying causes and discuss its relation to other psychological phenomena and to interpersonal and intergroup conflict.

The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others:

Three studies suggest that individuals see the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases much more in others than in themselves. Study 1 provides evidence from three surveys that people rate themselves as less subject to various biases than the “average American,” classmates in a seminar, and fellow airport travelers. Data from the third survey further suggest that such claims arise from the interplay among availability biases and self-enhancement motives. Participants in one follow-up study who showed the better-than-average bias insisted that their self-assessments were accurate and objective even after reading a description of how they could have been affected by the relevant bias. Participants in a final study reported their peer’s self-serving attributions regarding test performance to be biased but their own similarly self-serving attributions to be free of bias. The relevance of these phenomena to naïve realism and to conflict, misunderstanding, and dispute resolution is discussed.

Identity bifurcation in response to stereotype threat: Women and mathematics.

Abstract Three studies explored women’s bifurcation of feminine identity as a response to threatening stereotypes in the domain of mathematics. Study 1 demonstrated that women in a math class who previously had completed a large number of math courses disavowed “feminine characteristics” strongly associated with stereotypes about women’s potential for math success (e.g., flirtatiousness, planning to have children) but not characteristics perceived to be weakly associated with these stereotypes (e.g., empathy, nurturance), more than women who had completed fewer math courses. Studies 2 and 3 directly manipulated stereotype threat by presenting a scientific article reporting stereotype-consistent sex differences in math aptitude. As predicted, women strongly identified with mathematics responded to this threatening article by disavowing feminine characteristics strongly associated, but not those weakly associated, with the relevant negative stereotypes, while women not strongly identified with mathematics showed no such differentiation in response. Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

Temporal differences in trait self-ascription: when the self is seen as an other.

Seven studies exploring peoples tendency to make observer-like attributions about their past and future selves are presented. Studies 1 and 2 showed temporal differences in trait assessments that paralleled the classic actor-observer difference. Study 3 provided evidence against a motivational account of these differences. Studies 4-7 explored underlying mechanisms involving differences in the focus of attention of the sort linked to the classic actor-observer difference. In Study 4, people perceived past and future selves from a more observer-like perspective than present selves. In Studies 5 and 6, manipulating attention to internal states (vs. observable behavior) of past and future selves led people to ascribe fewer traits to those selves. Study 7 showed an inverse relationship for past and present selves between observer-like visual focus and salience of internal information.

Alone in a crowd of sheep : Asymmetric perceptions of conformity and their roots in an introspection illusion

The results of 5 studies showed that people see others as more conforming than themselves. This asymmetry was found to occur in domains ranging from consumer purchases to political views. Participants claimed to be less susceptible than their average peers to broad descriptions of social influences, and they also claimed to be less susceptible than specific peers to specific instances of conformity. These studies further demonstrated that this asymmetry is not simply the result of social desirability, but it is also rooted in peoples attention to introspective versus behavioral information when making conformity assessments. The participants displayed an introspection illusion, placing more weight on introspective evidence of conformity (relative to behavioral evidence) when judging their own susceptibility to social influence as opposed to someone elses. Implications for self-other asymmetries, implicit social influence, and interpersonal conflict are discussed.

When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of Bias and the Escalation of Conflict

It is almost a truism that disagreement produces conflict. This article suggests that perceptions of bias can drive this relationship. First, these studies show that people perceive those who disagree with them as biased. Second, they show that the conflict-escalating approaches that people take toward those who disagree with them are mediated by peoples tendency to perceive those who disagree with them as biased. Third, these studies manipulate the mediator and show that experimental manipulations that prompt people to perceive adversaries as biased lead them to respond more conflictually—and that such responding causes those who engage in it to be viewed as more biased and less worthy of cooperative gestures. In summary, this article provides evidence for a “bias-perception conflict spiral,” whereby people who disagree perceive each other as biased, and those perceptions in turn lead them to take conflict-escalating actions against each other (which in turn engender further perceptions of bias, continuing the spiral).

Heuristics and Biases: Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives

Researchers in many subdisciplines of psychology have made their reputations cleverly documenting the various cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases that systematically distort human judgment and inference. In this chapter, we explore some of the interpersonal and intergroup consequences of such biases. In particular, we consider the role these biases can play in creating, exacerbating, and perpetuating conflict between individuals and between groups. One way in which biases contribute to conflict is obvious. When different peopleare subject tothe influenceof differentbiases, they are boundto thinkand feel differently about issues. And people who disagree with each other – indeed, even people who are reasonably like minded but attach different priorities to the problems they feel should be addressed or the actions they feel should be taken – are apt to frustrate each others efforts and ambitions. There is, however, a second way in which biases fuel enmity that is less direct, but not less important. People and groups who disagree about matters of mutual concern not only interact in conflictual ways; they also interpret , and frequently misinterpret , each others words and deeds. The nature of such misattributions, and their consequences, occupies most of our attention in this chapter. First, however, we begin by simply noting some well-studied cognitive and motivational biases and illustrating how they might foster interpersonal and intergroup enmity.

Thought Speed, Mood, and the Experience of Mental Motion

This article presents a theoretical account relating thought speed to mood and psychological experience. Thought sequences that occur at a fast speed generally induce more positive affect than do those that occur slowly. Thought speed constitutes one aspect of mental motion. Another aspect involves thought variability, or the degree to which thoughts in a sequence either vary widely from or revolve closely around a theme. Thought sequences possessing more motion (occurring fast and varying widely) generally produce more positive affect than do sequences possessing little motion (occurring slowly and repetitively). When speed and variability oppose each other, such that one is low and the other is high, predictable psychological states also emerge. For example, whereas slow, repetitive thinking can prompt dejection, fast, repetitive thinking can prompt anxiety. This distinction is related to the fact that fast thinking involves greater actual and felt energy than slow thinking does. Effects of mental motion occur independent of the specific content of thought. Their consequences for mood and energy hold psychotherapeutic relevance.

People believe they have more free will than others

Four experiments identify a tendency for people to believe that their own lives are more guided by the tenets of free will than are the lives of their peers. These tenets involve the a priori unpredictability of personal action, the presence of multiple possible paths in a persons future, and the causal power of ones personal desires and intentions in guiding ones actions. In experiment 1, participants viewed their own pasts and futures as less predictable a priori than those of their peers. In experiments 2 and 3, participants thought there were more possible paths (whether good or bad) in their own futures than their peers’ futures. In experiment 4, participants viewed their own future behavior, compared with that of their peers, as uniquely driven by intentions and desires (rather than personality, random features of the situation, or history). Implications for the classic actor–observer bias, for debates about free will, and for perceptions of personal responsibility are discussed.

Fast Thought Speed Induces Risk Taking

In two experiments, we tested for a causal link between thought speed and risk taking. In Experiment 1, we manipulated thought speed by presenting neutral-content text at either a fast or a slow pace and having participants read the text aloud. In Experiment 2, we manipulated thought speed by presenting fast-, medium-, or slow-paced movie clips that contained similar content. Participants who were induced to think more quickly took more risks with actual money in Experiment 1 and reported greater intentions to engage in real-world risky behaviors, such as unprotected sex and illegal drug use, in Experiment 2. These experiments provide evidence that faster thinking induces greater risk taking.