Daniel M. Wegner

Ironic processes of mental control

A theory of ironic processes of mental control is proposed to account for the intentional and counterintentional effects that result from efforts at self-control of mental states. The theory holds that an attempt to control the mind introduces 2 processes: (a) an operating process that promotes the intended change by searching for mental contents consistent with the intended state and (b) a monitoring process that tests whether the operating process is needed by searching for mental contents inconsistent with the intended state. The operating process requires greater cognitive capacity and normally has more pronounced cognitive effects than the monitoring process, and the 2 working together thus promote whatever degree of mental control is enjoyed. Under conditions that reduce capacity, however, the monitoring process may supersede the operating process and thus enhance the persons sensitivity to mental contents that are the ironic opposite of those that are intended.

Transactive Memory: A Contemporary Analysis of the Group Mind

The most influential theory of group behavior that has ever been developed is currently in disfavor. This is the theory of the group mind. Social commentators once found it very useful to analyze the behavior of groups by the same expedient used in analyzing the behavior of individuals. The group, like the person, was assumed to be sentient, to have a form of mental activity that guides action. Rousseau (1767) and Hegel (1807) were the early architects of this form of analysis, and it became so widely used in the 19th and early 20th centuries that almost every early social theorist we now recognize as a contributor to modern social psychology held a similar view. McDougall, Ross, Durkheim, Wundt, and LeBon, to name just a few, were willing to assume that the group has a mental life that plays a part in the patterning of group behavior.

Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression

In a first experiment, subjects verbalizing the stream of consciousness for a 5-min period were asked to try not to think of a white bear, but to ring a bell in case they did. As indicated both by mentions and by bell rings, they were unable to suppress the thought as instructed. On being asked after this suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these subjects showed significantly more tokens of thought about the bear than did subjects who were asked to think about a white bear from the outset. These observations suggest that attempted thought suppression has paradoxical effects as a self-control strategy, perhaps even producing the very obsession or preoccupation that it is directed against. A second experiment replicated these findings and showed that subjects given a specific thought to use as a distracter during suppression were less likely to exhibit later preoccupation with the thought to be suppressed.

Transactive memory in close relationships

Memory performance of 118 individuals who had been in close dating relationships for at least 3 months was studied. For a memory task ostensibly to be performed by pairs, some Ss were paired with their partners and some were paired with an opposite-sex partner from another couple. For some pairs a memory structure was assigned (e.g., 1 partner should remember food items, another should remember history items, etc.), whereas for others no structure was mentioned. Pairs studied together without communication, and recall was tested in individuals. Memory performance of the natural pairs was better than that of impromptu pairs without assigned structure, whereas the performance of natural pairs was inferior to that of impromptu pairs when structure was assigned.

Levels of Personal Agency: Individual Variation in Action Identification

This research examined individual differences in action identification level as measured by the Behavior Identification Form. Action identification theory holds that any action can be identified in many ways, ranging from low-level identities that specify how the action is performed to high-level identities that signify why or with what effect the action is performed. People who identify action at a uniformly lower or higher level across many action domains, then, may be characterized in terms of their standing on a broad personality dimension: level of personal agency. High-level agents think about their acts in encompassing terms that incorporate the motives and larger meanings of the action, whereas low-level agents think about their acts in terms of the details or means of action. Research on the convergent, divergent, and predictive validity of this construct examined its implications for the individuals overall competence in action, for the individuals inclination toward planful versus impulsive action and for the degree to which the individuals actions are organized by and reflected in the self-concept. Some people think they can do big things. They set out to write a book, to make a fortune, or to win an election. There are others, however, who may undertake much the same tasks with far more meager aims in mind. They might get some ideas on paper, make a profit this week, or shake a few hands at the factory gate. Ultimately, the people who see their acts in big ways may find the same success as those who focus on the details. However, the two ways of identifying action are appropriate and effective in vastly different situations, and they promote radically distinct styles of action. This research was designed to test the reliability and validity of an instrument assessing this action identification dimension. High levels of personal agency represent the tendency to understand ones action in terms of its consequences and implications, whereas low levels of personal agency represent the tendency to see ones action in terms of its details or mechanics. The dimension of personal agency level is derived from action identification theory, a set of principles on the understanding

The hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts

The accessibility of suppressed thoughts was compared with the accessibility of thoughts on which Ss were consciously trying to concentrate. In Experiment 1, Ss made associations to word prompts as they tried to suppress thinking about a target word (e.g., house) or tried to concentrate on that word. Under the cognitive load imposed by time pressure, they gave the target word in response to target-related prompts (e.g., home) more often during suppression than during concentration

Google effects on memory: Cognitive consequences of having information at our fingertips

Owing to Internet search, we are more likely to encode “where” aspects of memory rather than “what.” The advent of the Internet, with sophisticated algorithmic search engines, has made accessing information as easy as lifting a finger. No longer do we have to make costly efforts to find the things we want. We can “Google” the old classmate, find articles online, or look up the actor who was on the tip of our tongue. The results of four studies suggest that when faced with difficult questions, people are primed to think about computers and that when people expect to have future access to information, they have lower rates of recall of the information itself and enhanced recall instead for where to access it. The Internet has become a primary form of external or transactive memory, where information is stored collectively outside ourselves.

Cognitive Interdependence in Close Relationships

This chapter is concerned with the thinking processes of the intimate dyad. So, although we will focus from time to time on the thinking processes of the individual—as they influence and are influenced by the relationship with another person—our prime interest is in thinking as it occurs at the dyadic level. This may be dangerous territory for inquiry. After all, this topic resembles one that has, for many years now, represented something of a “black hole” in the social sciences—the study of the group mind. For good reasons, the early practice of drawing an analogy between the mind of the individual and the cognitive operations of the group has long been avoided, and references to the group mind in contemporary literature have dwindled to a smattering of wisecracks.

The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will

We often consciously will our own actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however - the minds way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so might not reflect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action.

The suppression of exciting thoughts

We examined how the suppression of an exciting thought influences sympathetic arousal as indexed by skin conductance level (SCL). Subjects were asked to think aloud as they followed instructions to think about or not to think about various topics. Experiment 1 showed that trying not to think about sex, like thinking about sex, elevates SCL in comparison to thinking about or not thinking about less exciting topics (e.g., dancing). Experiment 2 revealed that the suppression of the thought of sex yielded SCL elevation whether or not subjects believed their think-aloud reports would be private or public, and it also revealed that the effect dissipated over the course of a few minutes. Experiment 3 found such dissipation again but showed that subsequent intrusions of the suppressed exciting thought are associated with further elevations in SCL over 30 min. Because such an association was not found when subjects were trying to think about the exciting thought, it was suggested that the suppression of exciting thoughts might be involved in the production of chronic emotional responses such as phobias and obsessive preoccupations.