Emmanuelle Gabillon

The benefits of central bank's political independence

This paper analyzes the relationship between a central banker and his partisan political principals. Incentive contracts for central bankers are not designed by social planners but by partisan political principals who obey to their own incentives.

Structure financière optimale et sensibilité informationnelle des titres

In an asymetric information framework, Myers and Majluf [1984] introduced the pecking order theory. This theory specifies a hierarchy beetween the different sources of corporate funds: firms prefer to rely on internal sources of funds and prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. According to this theory, there is no reason to issue equity. In this paper, I show that the firm has an incentive to issue equity when we allow investors to get information on the firm at some cost. Indeed, when the cost of information is not too high, the optimal financial structure includes both debt and equity.