Network


Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.

Hotspot


Dive into the research topics where Eric Marcus is active.

Publication


Featured researches published by Eric Marcus.


Australasian Journal of Philosophy | 2004

Why Zombies Are Inconceivable

Eric Marcus

I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess.


Synthese | 2006

EVENTS, SORTALS, AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM*

Eric Marcus

In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about objectidentity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal.


Dialectica | 2016

To Believe is to Know that You Believe

Eric Marcus

Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of ones belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say – i.e., authoritatively, yet not on the basis of evidence – that she believes that p. And anyone who is able to just say that she believes that p is able to act in light of the fact that she holds that belief. This ability to act, in turn, constitutes knowledge of the psychological fact. However, without a broader theory of belief to help us make sense of this result, this conclusion will be hard to accept. Why should being in a particular mental state by itself necessitate an awareness of being in that state? I sketch a theory that helps to answer this question: believing is a matter of viewing a proposition as what one ought to believe. I show how this theory explains (and entails) the thesis that to believe is to know that you believe.


Canadian Journal of Philosophy | 2018

Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

Eric Marcus; John Schwenkler

ABSTRACT We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.


Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | 2001

Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but not Unnatural

Eric Marcus


Philosophical Studies | 2005

MENTAL CAUSATION IN A PHYSICAL WORLD

Eric Marcus


The Philosophical Quarterly | 2006

INTENTIONALISM AND THE IMAGINABILITY OF THE INVERTED SPECTRUM

Eric Marcus


Journal of Philosophical Research | 2009

Why There Are No Token States

Eric Marcus


Analysis | 2013

On the Parallels between Theoretical and Practical Rationality: Reply to Setiya

Eric Marcus


Manuscrito | 2018

PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AS KNOWLEDGE OF A NORMATIVE JUDGMENT

Eric Marcus

Collaboration


Dive into the Eric Marcus's collaboration.

Top Co-Authors

Avatar

John Schwenkler

Mount St. Mary's University

View shared research outputs
Researchain Logo
Decentralizing Knowledge