John Schwenkler

Perception and practical knowledge

According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agents knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being known “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative account of non-observational knowledge according to which it consists in the particular causal role of an agents self-awareness in bringing his intentional actions about.

Self-Knowledge and Its Limits

A philosophical account of self-knowledge should offer more than an epistemological explanation of first-personal privilege. It should also address the many cases where the first-person perspective is not so privileged, and account for the importance of self-knowledge to a person’s social and psychological well-being. Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans and John Doris’s Talking to Our Selves both emphasize the importance of these latter tasks, but neither author is wholly successful: Cassam’s argument rests on a gross distortion of the “Rationalist” picture he sets up as a foil, and Doris’s on a skeptical argument that stands in some questionable company.

Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

ABSTRACT We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.

Action, Knowledge, and Will, by John Hyman

tion and knowledge acquisition (for example, Pickav e and Shapiro [2012]). Especially when dealing with Locke, De Pierris would need to consider recent works in the history and philosophy of science that explicitly argue against her own view, in that they acknowledge Locke as an important proponent of Newtonianism who offered invaluable contributions to the establishment of a new experimental practice [Gaukroger 2009; Anstey 2011; Domski 2012]. Works that raise questions about Newton’s own metaphysical commitments and/or directly challenge De Pierris’s previously published works in which she defends a similar account are not discussed either (for example, Janiak [2007] and Biener and Schliesser [2014]). In general, the literature discussed and referenced in De Perris’s book is rather old, and debates flagged as recent are not recent at all. All of this leads to the impression that her account, which is in fact supposed to be presenting a novel reading of Hume, unfolds without taking on board important developments within the scholarly debate.