Erich Schanze

Contract, Agency, and the Delegation of Decision Making

Contract and Agency are viewed as separable patterns for structuring transactions in the process of the division of labor. Whereas ‘contract’ refers to a concept of discrete exchange with unrevealed individual choices, ‘agency’ relates to a concept of delegation of choice, and hence an explicit treatment of the rules of choice and preference formation. In this view agency is not a special case of a theory of contract incentives with interchangeable partners, but a concept of incentives to align the agent’s preference sets and future choices with that of a principal. In consequence, behavioral aspects like trust, loyalty, opportunism (which are irrelevant in the pure pattern of contract) are central in the concept of agency. The patterns of contract and agency overlap to a large degree in the real world. An agency relationship may be based on a contract, and a contract may contain agency features (“relational”, “expanded”, “idiosyncratic” contracting). For purposes of analysis, however, the properties and boundaries of the two patterns should be observed.

Security of tenure in conventional and flexible employment regimes: A neoinstitutional perspective

Security of tenure is discussed in this paper by contrasting conventional and recent hybrid so-called flexible employment regimes. These regimes will be analyzed in a neoinstitutional perspective—that is, within transaction cost and agency theory frameworks, including public choice considerations.We start from the premise that in a standard employment scenarioex ante hostages may not be taken and that limitedex post compensation payments are efficient. We then trace features of safeguarding employee investment in hybrid flexible regimes such as new independent contracting, franchising (and other relevantvariants of symbiotic contracting, capacity-oriented variable work time schemes, job sharing, and so on. We compare these new institutional creations in the labor market with standard regimes under the hypothesis that in an ideal scenario Pareto superior moves are feasible but that there is a systematic aberration from optimality caused by information asymmetries, search constraints (boundedness), and a lack of adaptive capacities of the regime users, particularly employees. This “regime deception factor∝ (RDF) needs theoretical and empirical scrutiny from both legal and economic perspectives.

Stellvertretung und ökonomische Agentur-Theorie — Probleme und Wechselbezüge -

Von der juristischen Theorie weitgehend unbeachtet hat sich in der Okonomie als wahrscheinlich wichtigste Handlungstheorie (in Erweiterung und Umwandlung der Preistheorie) die Agency-Theorie — Agentur-Theorie — herausgebildet1. Diese Theorie thematisiert Handlungsablaufe und EntScheidungsprozesse nach dem Grundmuster einer dem klassischen Handelsrecht entstammenden Konstellation: der Beziehung zwischen dem Kaufmann und seinem Vertreter: dem Prinzipal und dem Agenten. Prinzipal und Agent sind Partner einer hierarchischen Rollenverteilung: im Rahmen der arbeitsteiligen Spezialisierung bedient sich der Eigentumer/ Prinzipal zur Durchfuhrung von Aufgaben mehr oder weniger abhangiger Agenten. Dieses Hierarchiemodell steht im Kontrast zum herkommlichen Grundmodell okonomischer Erklarung, dem Vertragsmodell, welches von gleichgewichtigen, marktformig tauschenden Eigentumer/ Akteuren ausgeht. Die Agentur-Theorie ist in ihren modernen Anwendungen nicht auf die Erklarung des okonomischen Geschehens beschrankt, sondern thematisiert beispielsweise auch kybernetische und psychologische Fragestellungen2.

Manganese Nodule Mining Agreement

Whereas the Enterprise is willing to develop and to implement its competence in seabed mining, and is holding a mining option for the reserved Designated Area, and has submitted to the Authority a plan of work for the Designated Area; and

Scenario of the Agreement

The Manganese Nodule Mining Agreement proceeds on the hypothesis that the Law of the Sea Convention has been signed and ratified by the required number of states and has come into force. The Sponsoring State(s) of the Investor, the state in which the processing facility is to be located and the state of incorporation of the Operating Company (cf. 4.3.) have all become parties to the Convention.

Main Legal Features of the Agreement

Starting from the arrangement of institutions created by the Convention, there are three basic relations to be covered in an agreement concerning a joint venture between the Enterprise and a private investor for the exploitation of a reserved site.

Special Assumptions for the Draft Agreement

In the Draft Agreement it is foreseen that the joint venture operation will take place in a “reserved site” within the meaning of Annex III, Article 8 of the Convention. The underlying premise is that a truly parallel system of access for contractors and for the Enterprise will be established in the Convention. A parallel system of access promises to represent a workable compromise between the interests of the industrialized nations and those of developing states.