Erik Martinez Kuhonta

Shadows from the Past: Party System Institutionalization in Asia

This article explains variation in levels of party system institutionalization in Asia by testing available data against several major hypotheses in the literature. The authors make three contributions to the literature on party system institutionalization. First, this study finds that historical legacies are a crucial variable affecting current levels of party system institutionalization. In particular, the immediate postwar period was the crucible from which institutionalized party systems in Asia developed. Second, the authors claim that for a significant number of institutionalized party systems, historical legacies are rooted in some element of authoritarianism, either as former authoritarian parties or as semidemocratic regimes. Third, precisely because authoritarianism has played an important role in the origins of institutionalized party systems, the authors argue that the concept of institutionalization needs to be strictly separated from the concept of democracy.

Walking a tightrope: democracy versus sovereignty in ASEAN's illiberal peace

Abstract Since 1967, ASEAN has established intramural relations that forsake war as a means for resolving conflict. While this is a remarkable achievement for the region, it must be balanced against a concomitant hindrance of democratic reform. I argue in this paper that ASEANs nascent security community must be seen as an ‘illiberal peace’. Underlying ASEANs peaceful community are the same principles that support illiberalism in the region, namely sovereignty and non-interference. While sovereignty has historically been a cherished norm for developing countries, ASEAN lags behind other regions, particularly Latin America, in attempting to reconcile tensions between democratic norms and the respect for sovereignty. This tension is most evident in ASEANs relations with Myanmar. Recent events indicate that ASEANs non-interference norm may no longer be sacrosanct, but the association is a long way from shunning illiberal politics for the sake of democratic values.

Thaksin Triumphant: The Implications of One-party Dominance in Thailand

The 2005 elections were a watershed in Thailands democracy. For the first time, one party, the Thai Rak Thai (TRT), achieved a landslide victory. This victory ensures that TRT can reign hegemonic over Parliament and govern without the need of coalition partners. The consequences for Thai democracy are significant. Above all, this victory legitimizes Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatras disdain of the need for democratic consultation. To assess the likely trajectory of the Thai polity under Thaksin, we examine the impact of this election in three areas: democracy, human rights, and the deep south. We conclude that the Thai polity may find its democratic fabric increasingly strained if Thaksin continues to govern as he did in his first term.

Institutionalized Succession and Hegemonic Party Cohesion in Singapore

Introduction The regime transition literature has found that apart from exogenous shocks, internal splits and leadership succession are the two most likely causes of single-party breakdown. Unlike hegemonic party systems in Mexico and Taiwan that experienced party alternation, Singapore has been governed by one party uninterruptedly for more than five decades. Under the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) rule, export-oriented Singapore has weathered a series of global financial crises. Even when the country posted a negative growth rate in 2001, the PAP government was able to garner an exceptional 75 percent vote share in the general election (GE) the same year. Now, apart from tackling rising inflation and income inequality, what appears to concern most people is the imminent death of the country’s strongman, Lee Kuan Yew. Will the PAP continue to rule and maintain order after the passing of its founding leader? This chapter focuses on the PAP’s leadership succession to highlight the key intraparty processes and mechanisms that have kept one of the world’s longest-serving political parties together. It argues that the PAP’s long-term survival will depend more on institutions than coercion, charisma, or ideological commitment. Indeed, the PAP’s incumbency advantage, coupled with an institutionalized leadership succession system, has facilitated self-renewal and kept the party together. Specifically, the elitist leadership selection model, based nominally on meritocracy, is well institutionalized and serves as an incentive distribution system that builds party loyalty and elite cohesion.

The Institutionalization of the Communist Party and the Party System in China

Introduction For years, China scholars have been debating the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, scholars have frequently predicted the fall of the CCP. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communism, Roderick MacFarquhar (1991) claimed that it was only a matter of time before China would go the same way as these regimes. It seems that more radical reforms and greater openness triggered by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 did not lead scholars to change such a deeply rooted mind-set. In 1994, Avery Goldstein (1994: 727) stated that “[a]lthough scholars continue to disagree about the probable life-span of the current regime, the disagreement now is usually about when, not whether, fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like.” Surprisingly, although the country has sustained three decades of reforms, more scholars tend to believe in the coming collapse of the communist rule. The issue of the sustainability of the CCP was raised in a recent debate on “Reframing China Policy,” organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank. In the debate, two leading China experts in the United States, MacFarquhar and Andrew Nathan, presented rebuttals of each other’s position, with MacFarquhar arguing that the CCP would not be able to sustain itself and Nathan taking the opposite view. According to MacFarquhar, The [Chinese] political system is fragile … Despite truly impressive progress in its economy, the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China] polity is in systemic crisis. VIP visitors to Beijing are exposed to an impressive panoply of power, but this is a fragile regime … The problems I shall analyze [in the debate] are likely to result in a breakdown in the communist regime in years rather than decades. Some other scholars seem to share MacFarquhar’s pessimistic view. For example, Susan Shirk (2007: 6–7) argued that “China may be an emerging superpower, but it is a fragile one. And it is China’s internal fragility, not its economic or military strength, that presents the greatest danger … Chinese leaders are haunted by fears that their days are numbered.”

Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Indonesia

Introduction In 2009, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat (PD) came seemingly out of nowhere to capture 150 seats in Indonesia’s parliament, almost tripling its previous tally. In recent years, nationalist parties have acquiesced to the passage of Islamic-inspired legislation at the center and at the regions, seemingly violating their own ideological bases. In addition, parties are widely excoriated in the media as self-seeking, corrupt, and devoid of ideology. Finally, many parties’ organizational structures slumber between elections. These phenomena reflect Indonesia’s relatively uninstitutionalized contemporary party system. Why does a party system become institutionalized or fail to do so? Why does it become institutionalized in the ways that it does and in the strength that it does? This chapter uses the ideas from Hicken and Kuhonta’s Introduction for this volume to examine independent Indonesia’s four distinct party systems. The chapter then analyzes the factors that explain the observed levels of party system institutionalization (PSI), with particular reference to the hypotheses Hicken and Kuhonta test for Asia as a whole in their introductory chapter. Based on Hicken and Kuhonta, the Indonesia cases do not point to the significance of the passage of time as a factor in institutionalization. Indonesia has gone through several upheavals in its party systems; even within the authoritarian New Order, volatility was high, then low, then rose again. Also, as a Third Wave democracy, Indonesia’s parties are relatively uninstitutionalized, as the period effect would predict, but the parties began life early, some as early as the 1920s, and were major actors in the country’s national liberation struggle. Despite this, they failed to institutionalize.

Response to Emmanuel Teitelbaum's review of The Institutional Imperative: The Politics of Equitable Development in Southeast Asia

Emmanuel Teitelbaum raises some very valuable points regarding my book. First, on the issue of regime type, I argued that the central variables that affect equitable development are the character of institutions, especially institutionalized political parties and cohesive state structures, and pragmatic ideology—not regime type. While one conclusion that emerges from the study is that illiberal regimes (Malaysia and Vietnam) have done better than liberal regimes (Thailand and the Philippines), I do not argue that illiberalism is a necessary variable for equitable development. The record across the developing world shows that many authoritarian regimes have very dismal economic outcomes. My argument hinges on the power, responsiveness, and capacity of institutions.