Kenneth Mori McElwain

The Nationalization of Japanese Elections

The postwar electoral dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded on (1) strong incumbency advantage, which insulated its legislators from declining party popularity, and (2) the malapportionment of districts, which overvalued the electoral clout of the party’s rural base. The LDP’s demise in 2009 was due to the reversal of both factors, each of which was related to electoral reforms in the 1990s. First, I demonstrate that elections are becoming more “nationalized,” due to the growing weight that voters attach to the attractiveness of party leaders. Past performance has become a poorer predictor of incumbent reelection, giving way to large partisan swings that are increasingly correlated across districts. Second, malapportionment was reduced by almost half in 1994, meaning that rural votes are now worth fewer seats. As a result, parties that can attract swing voters nationally are better positioned for victory than those with a narrow regional base.

Constitutional Revision in the 2017 Election

The electoral salience of constitutional revision has grown since 2012, but this belies the widening gulf between the public-at-large and political elites on whether and how to amend the constitution. Public opinion polls show that voters are split evenly on the necessity of revisions, but that opponents are more mobilized on this issue, as seen by the surprising success of the CDP in the 2017 election. By contrast, surveys of election candidates show mounting support for amendment, with pro-revision parties collectively accounting for two-thirds in the Diet. However, there remain significant differences on the exact topic of revision, particularly between the LDP and its coalition partner, Kōmeitō. These divisions between the public and elites leave the fate of constitutional amendment uncertain, despite the LDP’s convincing victory in 2017.

What's Unique about the Japanese Constitution?: A Comparative and Historical Analysis

Japan has the oldest unamended constitution in the world. We examine the determinants of its longevity and recent proposals seeking its amendment. While traditional revision attempts have focused on ideological provisions such as Article 9 and the imperial system, changes to political institutions, particularly bicameralism and local governance, have become a focal point since 2005. Our comparative analysis demonstrates that the constitution’s enumeration of institutions is uncommonly vague, leaving room for significant reforms. However, we also show that the most recent (2012) amendment proposal by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) would not “fix” this lacuna, leaving the constitution an international outlier.