Erik Melander

Disentangling gender, peace and democratization: the negative effects of militarized masculinity

This article investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the relationships between democratization, gender equality and peace. We argue that there is a need to scrutinize both the level of democracy as well as the level of masculine hegemony in societies. Methodologically, we use a combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses to support our argument. We employ regression analysis to show that the relationship between the extent of democracy and the representation of women in politics appears, at first glance, to be non-existent but turns out to be a curvilinear one. We also show that democracy can facilitate peace, but only in interaction with the level of political gender equality, so that more democratic societies are more peaceful only if there have been moves to gender equality. Our interpretation of these findings is illustrated by the contemporary politics of Thailand. Recent political violence in southern Thailand can be accounted for in the context of it being only partly democratized, where a culture of militarized masculinity persists alongside with, and even within, democratic institutions. Such a culture makes it both difficult for women to enter the political sphere, despite democratic elections, and fosters political violence.

Sequencing the Peace How the Order of Peace Agreement Implementation Can Reduce the Destabilizing Effects of Post-accord Elections

Once a set of civil war actors reach a final peace agreement, a number of different implementation sequences are possible as the negotiated provisions are put into practice. We focus on a key but threatening stepping stone in the post-accord period—the holding of the first post-accord election—which has the capacity to be a stabilizing or destabilizing force. We identify effective accommodation provisions that civil war actors can negotiate and implement before the first post-accord election to reduce the chances of renewed violence. Utilizing new longitudinal data on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2012 and a series of survival models, we find that if the first post-accord election is preceded by the implementation of accommodation measures, elections can have a peace-promoting effect. However, in the absence of preelection accommodation measures, elections are much more likely to be followed by peace failure.