Erik Myin

The sensory-discriminative and affective-motivational aspects of pain.

What is the difference between pain and standard exteroceptive perceptual processes, such as vision or audition? According to the most common view, pain constitutes the internal perception of bodily damage. Following on from this definition, pain is just like exteroceptive perception, with the only difference being that it is not oriented toward publicly available objects, but rather toward events that are taking place in/to ones own body. Many theorists, however, have stressed that pain should not be seen as a kind of perception, but rather that it should be seen as a kind of affection or motivation to act instead. Though pain undeniably has a discriminatory aspect, what makes it special is its affective-motivational quality of hurting. In this article, we discuss the relation between pain and perception, at both the conceptual and empirical levels. We first review the ways in which the perception of internal damage differs from the perception of external objects. We then turn to the question of how the affective-motivational dimension of pain is different from the affective-motivational aspects that are present for other perceptual processes. We discuss how these differences between pain and exteroceptive perception can account for the fact that the experience of pain is more subjective than other perceptual experiences.

Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?

Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalism—empirical or commonsensical—we promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition.

Representation-hunger reconsidered

According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing of representations depends upon whether more basic forms of cognition require the positing of representations.

REC: Just radical enough

Abstract We address some frequently encountered criticisms of Radical Embodied/Enactive Cognition. Contrary to the claims that the position is too radical, or not sufficiently so, we claim REC is just radical enough.

Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!

The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Blocks original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-mans cognitive access.

The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors

Color experience is structured. Some “unique” colors (red, green, yellow, and blue) appear as “pure,” or containing no trace of any other color. Others can be considered as a mixture of these colors, or as “binary colors.” According to a widespread assumption, this unique/binary structure of color experience is to be explained in terms of neurophysiological structuring (e.g., by opponent processes) and has no genuine explanatory basis in the physical stimulus. The argument from structure builds on these assumptions to argue that colors are not properties of surfaces and that color experiences are neural processes without environmental counterparts. We reconsider the argument both in terms of its logic and in the light of recent models in vision science which point at environment-involving patterns that may be at the basis of the unique/binary structure of color experience. We conclude that, in the light of internal and external problems which arise for it, the argument from structure fails.

Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.

Radical Embodied Cognitive Science

There are many approaches in cognitive science that invoke embodiment. Clearly, however, the word ‘‘embodiment’’ is used in many senses on different occasions. One way to use ‘‘embodiment’’ is to emphasize the role of the particular properties of the body in shaping our cognitive capacities. Thus, to give a rather trite example, it could be argued that having ten fingers lies at the basis of the decimal system, so that even mathematics has a basis in the body. Clearly, such a use of the notion of embodiment is in no way incompatible with a traditional cognitive science approach, in which computations and internal representations are assigned a key role when it comes to providing an explanation of our cognitive capacities. In particular, one could conceive of the specifics of the body as constraining the form or content of our representations. In a quite different way, ‘‘embodied’’ can be used in a sense directly in contrast with ‘‘representational,’’ in a way in which to say that some capacity is embodied is to deny that it involves internal representations. One could argue, for example, that people embody the rules of their native language, to express that the rules are manifest, and only manifest in the utterances, or other practical dealings with language, of people. The structure of language then is implicit in the practices; it is spread out in time, not represented elsewhere in a punctuated form. Of course, one could not embody rules without having a body engaged in the relevant, rulemanifesting, activities, but the emphasis here lies not on the specifics of that body, but on what could be called the primacy of embodiment over representation. Chemero’s conception of a ‘‘radically embodied’’ cognitive science concerns the latter sense of ‘‘embodiment.’’ In fact, he uses the contrast with representationalism to define ‘‘radical embodied cognitive science’’ as ‘‘the scientific study of perception, cognition and action as necessarily embodied phenomena, using explanatory tools that do not posit mental representations’’ (p. 29). The science of cognition has to deal, then, with the ways cognitive creatures interact with their environments. Such interaction is inevitably dynamical, extended in time and continuously reciprocal (in the sense that environmental parameters continuously influence organismic