Ernesto Villanueva

The Distribution of Debt Across Euro Area Countries: The Role of Individual Characteristics, Institutions and Credit Conditions

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.

Estimating Compensating Wage Differentials Using Voluntary Job Changes: Evidence from Germany

The author develops a model predicting that in a labor market that attaches a wage premium to jobs with a disamenity (a compensating wage differential), the premiums upper bound will be defined by the average wage change of voluntary job movers whose consumption of the disamenity rises as a result of their move; its lower bound, by the wage change of those whose consumption of the disamenity falls. These predictions will not hold if, as predicted by a “segmented” labor market model, the labor market attaches a wage penalty to workplace disamenities. Using longitudinal data on job characteristics and wages in Germany in 1984–2001, the author estimates the market returns to four workplace disamenities: heavy workload, job insecurity, poor hours regulation, and a mismatch between skills possessed and skills required. The results broadly support the existence of compensating differentials in the German labor market.

The Marginal Propensity to Spend on Adult Children

We examine how much of an extra dollar of parental lifetime resources will ultimately be passed on to adult children in the form of inter vivos transfers and bequests. We infer bequests from the stock of wealth late in life. We use mortality rates and age specific estimates of the response of transfers and wealth to permanent income to compute the expected present discounted values of these responses to permanent income. Our estimates imply parents pass on between 2 and 3 cents out of an extra dollar of expected lifetime resources in bequests and about 2 cents in transfers. The estimates increase with parental income and are smaller for nonwhites. They imply that about 15 percent of the effect of parental income on lifetime resources of adult children is through transfers and bequests and about 85 percent is through the intergenerational correlation in earnings, although these estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the intergenerational earnings correlation, taxes, and the number of children. We compare our estimates to the implications of alternative computable benchmark models of savings behavior in order to assess the likely importance of intended bequests for the wealth/income relationship.

The Schooling Response to a Sustained Increase in Low-Skill Wages: Evidence from Spain 1989-2009

The response of human capital accumulation to changes in the anticipated returns to schooling determines the type of skills supplied to the labor market, the productivity of future cohorts, and the evolution of inequality. Unlike the US, the UK or Germany, Spain has experienced since 1995 a drop in the returns to medium and tertiary education and, with a lag, a drop in schooling attainment of recent cohorts, providing the opportunity to estimate the response of different forms of human capital acquisition to relative increases in low-skill wages. We measure the expected returns to schooling using skill-specific wages bargained in collective agreements at the province-industry level. We argue that those wages are easily observable by youths and relatively insensitive to shifts in the supply of workers. Our preferred estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the ratio of wages of unskilled workers to the wages of mid-skill workers increases the fraction of males completing at most compulsory schooling by between 2 and 5 percentage points. The response is driven by males from less educated parents and comes at the expense of students from the academic high school track rather than the vocational training track.

Parental Altruism under Imperfect Information: Theory and Evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family with the evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper provides a new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducing effort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive to the income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect information accounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

The effects of the introduction of tax incentives on retirement savings

This paper uses a Spanish panel of tax returns and another on household expenditure during the period 1985-1991 to examine the incidence of the introduction in 1988 of tax incentives to retirement savings on contributions to pension funds and on savings. We first identify the population cohorts who most used these incentives. Then we use data on the evolution of consumption of these cohorts to find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the response of household saving to tax incentives. Most contributions to pension funds are by older/high income individuals. While the overall amount of new saving we estimate is limited (at most 25 cents per euro contributed on average), saving responses differ substantially across age groups. In particular, we document very small consumption drops among the group of households between 56 and 65 years of age, the group that most actively contributed to the plan, while we find instead a larger decrease in consumption expenditures of the group of households between 46 and 55 years of age.

Employment risk and household formation: evidence from differences in firing costs

The rate of new household formation among young adults who live with their parents has decreased in the last twenty years, specially in Southern Europe. At the same time, exposure to the risk that a young adult loses his or her job has increased. We use differences in firing costs across contract types in the Spanish labor market to identify if there is a causal link between both developments. Our first identification strategy exploits a legally-induced sharp increase in firing costs 3 years after the starting of a fixed-term contract between 1987 and 1996. The second uses variation in regional incentives to promote high-firing cost contracts between 1997 and 2001. Both strategies fail to detect a causal impact of job insecurity on the probability of forming a new household. Tentative evidence supports the notion that lower job insecurity has an impact on the form of tenure of the first house of residence, favoring home-ownership over renting.

Contract Staggering and Unemployment During the Great Recession: Evidence from Spain

We study the impact of (widespread) downward wage rigidity on the fl ows from employment to non-employment at the onset of the Great Recession. Downward wage (growth) rigidity is due to the fact that sector-level collective agreements in Spain are automatically extended to all fi rms, setting wage minima for workers in the same province-industry-skill cell. We identify the impact of wage rigidity on employment because, unlike settled ones, newly bargained contracts can adjust to aggregate shocks. Using the exact dates of bargaining periods of all sector-level contracts in Spain, we fi nd that agreements reached after the fall of Lehman Brothers were for an average wage growth of 1.8%, while agreements signed before 15 September 2008 were for mean wage increases of 3.1%. Matching information on collective agreements with longitudinal Social Security records on workers, we document two fi ndings. Firstly, the probability of job loss between 2009 and 2010 was 1 percent higher among workers covered by agreements signed before the fall of Lehman Brothers than among workers covered by contracts signed afterwards. Secondly, the analysis of a subsample of contracts with information about the exact province-industry-skill level minimum wage suggests that the impact of date of contract signature on wage changes and employment losses is confi ned to workers whose pre-recession earnings were below 1.2 times the contract-specifi c minimum wage. Those fi ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that the staggering of contracts and the inability to renegotiate contracts amplify aggregate shocks. We end with a discussion of whether those results can be extrapolated to other sample periods.

Compensating Wage Differentials and Voluntary Job Changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain, job insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on the monetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market. We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics and wages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and opt for consuming more (less) disamenities, provides an upper (lower) bound on the market return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workers in the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and a lower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Consumption and Initial Mortgage Conditions: Evidence from Survey Data

Economic theory predicts that the consumption path of unconstrained homeowners responds to the interest rate, while the consumption path of credit constrained homeowners is determined by the size and timing of payments (mortgage maturity). We exploit the rapid expansion of mortgage markets during the last decade in Spain and a very detailed survey on household finances to estimate group-specific consumption responses to changes in the credit conditions. Our estimates suggest that the consumption of households headed by an individual with high school responds more to mortgage maturity than to the interest rate spread. The consumption of the rest of indebted households is insensitive to loan maturity. Those results are confirmed when we instrument loan maturity exploiting the fact that banks are reluctant to offer contracts with age at maturity above 65. An interpretation of those results is that households headed by middle education individuals, 8% of our sample, behave as credit constrained.