Erwan Morellec

On the Debt Capacity of Growth Options

If debt capacity is defined as the incremental debt optimally associated with an additional asset, then the debt capacity of growth options is negative. The underinvestment costs of debt increase and free cash flow benefits of debt fall with additional growth options. Thus, if firm value increases with additional growth options, then not only does leverage decline but the firms optimal total debt level declines as well. This result implies a negative relation between book leverage and growth options and provides a new economic interpretation of book leverage regressions.

Asset liquidity, capital structure, and secured debt

This paper investigates the impact of asset liquidity on the valuation of corporate securities and the firms financing decisions. I show that asset liquidity increases debt capacity only when bond covenants restrict the disposition of assets. By contrast, I demonstrate that, with unsecured debt, greater liquidity increases credit spreads on corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage. The model also determines the extent to which pledging assets increases firm value and relates the optimal size of the pledge to firm and industry characteristics. Finally, I show that asset liquidity and security provisions may help explain leverage ratios and credit spreads observed in practice.

Irreversible Investment with Regime Shifts

Under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty, agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms’ growth prospects do not vary over time. This paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times. A value-maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firms investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift. Under this policy, investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q. Moreover, investment typically is very small but, in some states, the capital stock jumps. Implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined.

Financing Investment: The Choice Between Bonds and Bank Loans

We build a model of investment and financing decisions to study the choice between bonds and bank loans in a firms marginal financing decision and its effects on corporate investment. We show that firms with more growth options, with higher bargaining power in default, operating in more competitive product markets, or facing lower credit supply are more likely to issue bonds. We also demonstrate that, by changing the cost of financing, these characteristics affect the timing of investment. We test these predictions using a sample of U.S. firms and present new evidence that supports our theory. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2005 . This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Credit Supply and Corporate Policies

This paper develops a model of corporate investment and financing decisions that differs from previous contributions by recognizing that firms may face uncertainty regarding their future access to credit markets. We show that accounting for credit supply uncertainty is critical in understanding corporate policy choices and use the model to explain a key set of stylized facts in corporate finance. Notably, our model provides an explanation for the conservative debt policy puzzle. The model also explains why firms may appear to time the market when issuing common stock. Finally, the model explains why negative shocks to the supply of credit may hamper investment even if firms have enough financial slack to fund all profitable investment opportunities internally.

Capital Supply Uncertainty, Cash Holdings, and Investment

We develop a dynamic model of investment, financing, and cash management decisions in which investment is lumpy and firms face capital supply uncertainty. We characterize optimal policies explicitly, demonstrate that smooth-pasting conditions may not guarantee optimality, and show that firms may not follow standard Miller and Orr (1966) barrier policies. In the model, firms with high investment costs differ in their behaviors from firms with low investment costs, financing policy does not follow a strict pecking order, and the optimal payout policy may feature several regions with both incremental and lumpy dividend payments.

Product Market Competition and Option Prices

Most firms face some form of competition in product markets. The degree of competition a firm faces feeds back into its cash flows and affects the values of the securities it issues. Through its effects on stock prices, product market competition affects the prices of options on equity and leads to an inverse relationship between equity returns and volatility, generating a negative volatility skew in option prices. Using a large sample of U.S. equity options, we provide empirical support for this finding and demonstrate the importance of accounting for product market competition when explaining the cross-sectional variation in option skew. Received June 28, 2017; editorial decision October 23, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished supplementary Internet Appendices, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Agency Conflicts over the Short- and the Long-Run: Short-Termism, Long-Termism, and Pay-for-Luck

We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both short- and long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both over- and underinvestment in short- and long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. Exposure to long-run shocks introduces pay-for-luck in incentive compensation but only after sufficiently good performance due to incentive compatibility, thereby rationalizing the asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data. Correlated short- and long-run shocks to earnings and firm size lead to externalities in incentive provision over different time horizons.We develop a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls current earnings via short-term effort and firm growth via long-term effort and the firm is subject to both short- and long-run shocks. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce both over- and underinvestment in short- and long-term efforts compared to first best, leading to short- or long-termism in corporate policies. Exposure to long-run shocks introduces pay-for-luck in incentive compensation but only after sufficiently good performance due to incentive compatibility, thereby rationalizing the asymmetric benchmarking observed in the data. Correlated short- and long-run shocks to earnings and firm size lead to externalities in incentive provision over different time horizons.

Transitory Versus Permanent Shocks: Explaining Corporate Savings and Investment

Theory has recently shown that corporate policies should respond differently to permanent or transitory cash flow shocks. We devise a novel filter to decompose cash flow shocks into permanent and transitory components. The policy choices of large publicly traded U.S. firms, such as cash holdings, credit line usage, and equity issuance, are related to the characteristics of the shocks estimated by our filter, i.e., volatilities, correlation and drift rates of the permanent and transitory shocks, as predicted by theory. Moreover, the interaction between the permanent and transitory cash flow shocks is strongly related to a firm’s leadership status within its industry.