Eva C. Buechel

More Intense Experiences, Less Intense Forecasts: Why People Overweight Probability Specifications in Affective Forecasts

We propose that affective forecasters overestimate the extent to which experienced hedonic responses to an outcome are influenced by the probability of its occurrence. The experience of an outcome (e.g., winning a gamble) is typically more affectively intense than the simulation of that outcome (e.g., imagining winning a gamble) upon which the affective forecast for it is based. We suggest that, as a result, experiencers allocate a larger share of their attention toward the outcome (e.g., winning the gamble) and less to its probability specifications than do affective forecasters. Consequently, hedonic responses to an outcome are less sensitive to its probability specifications than are affective forecasts for that outcome. The results of 6 experiments provide support for our theory. Affective forecasters overestimated how sensitive experiencers would be to the probability of positive and negative outcomes (Experiments 1 and 2). Consistent with our attentional account, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications disappeared when the attention of forecasters was diverted from probability specifications (Experiment 3) or when the attention of experiencers was drawn toward probability specifications (Experiment 4). Finally, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications between forecasters and experiencers were diminished when the forecasted outcome was more affectively intense (Experiments 5 and 6).

A Lot of Work or a Work of Art: How the Structure of a Customized Assembly Task Determines the Utility Derived from Assembly Effort

Customized assembly occurs when a consumer makes customization decisions and participates in the construction or modification of a product. While customization increases satisfaction with the end-product, less is known about the utility derived from the assembly effort. Three studies show that the structure of the customized assembly task determines whether consumers derive negative or positive utility from the assembly effort. When customization decisions and assembly processes are segregated, consumers find the assembly process disagreeable. Consequently, more assembly effort leads to a lesser appreciation for the assembly experience. When customization decisions and assembly processes are integrated, consumers become creatively engaged in the assembly process. Consequently, more assembly effort leads to a greater appreciation for the assembly experience. In each case, the assembly experience influences the value of the materials that afforded the experience (i.e., the to-be-assembled product). The results have implications for repeat purchasing in product categories that allow for coproduction.

Motivated underpinnings of the impact bias in affective forecasts.

Affective forecasters often exhibit an impact bias, overestimating the intensity and duration of their emotional reaction to future events. Researchers have long wondered whether the impact bias might confer some benefit. We suggest that affective forecasters may strategically overestimate the hedonic impact of events to motivate their production. We report the results of four experiments providing the first support for this hypothesis. The impact bias was greater for forecasters who had chosen which of two events to attempt to produce than for forecasters who had yet to choose (Experiment 1). The impact bias was greater when forecasts were made while forecasters could (or perceived they could) influence whether an event was produced than when its production had been determined but was unknown (Experiments 2A and 2B). Finally, experimentally manipulating the extremity of affective forecasts for an event influenced the amount of effort that forecasters expended to produce it (Experiment 3). The results suggest that the impact bias may not be solely cognitive in origin, but may also have motivated underpinnings.

Impact bias or underestimation? Outcome specifications predict the direction of affective forecasting errors.

Affective forecasts are used to anticipate the hedonic impact of future events and decide which events to pursue or avoid. We propose that because affective forecasters are more sensitive to outcome specifications of events than experiencers, the outcome specification values of an event, such as its duration, magnitude, probability, and psychological distance, can be used to predict the direction of affective forecasting errors: whether affective forecasters will overestimate or underestimate its hedonic impact. When specifications are positively correlated with the hedonic impact of an event, forecasters will overestimate the extent to which high specification values will intensify and low specification values will discount its impact. When outcome specifications are negatively correlated with its hedonic impact, forecasters will overestimate the extent to which low specification values will intensify and high specification values will discount its impact. These affective forecasting errors compound additively when multiple specifications are aligned in their impact: In Experiment 1, affective forecasters underestimated the hedonic impact of winning a smaller prize that they expected to win, and they overestimated the hedonic impact of winning a larger prize that they did not expect to win. In Experiment 2, affective forecasters underestimated the hedonic impact of a short unpleasant video about a temporally distant event, and they overestimated the hedonic impact of a long unpleasant video about a temporally near event. Experiments 3A and 3B showed that differences in the affect-richness of forecasted and experienced events underlie these differences in sensitivity to outcome specifications, therefore accounting for both the impact bias and its reversal.

The (Relative and Absolute) Subjective Value of Money

Money is often used as a proxy for utility in economic and psychological research. Monetary sums are easily calculated and compared, and money is a stimulus with which almost all people are familiar. Even so, hedonic responses to monetary gains and losses are relatively insensitive to the absolute size of those gains and losses, and the subjective utility of gains and losses is surprisingly labile. We propose that the difficulty of evaluating the value of money stems from the abstract nature of its value and nearly infinite range. As a result, money is not evaluated on a single monetary scale, but instead on subscales composed of comparison standards that are generated at the time of judgment. Using a dual-process account, we describe how such monetary subscales are generated and when they result in more or less sensitivity to its absolute value. We identify factors that influence sensitivity to the value of money and bias its evaluation. We close with a discussion of implications for science and practice.

Mental Resources Increase Preference for Dissimilar Experiences

After having a utilitarian experience, consumers may prefer to have another utilitarian experience or a hedonic experience. Similarly, after having a hedonic experience, consumers may prefer to have another hedonic experience or a utilitarian experience. We propose that the cognitive processes involved in analyzing the benefits of an experience that differs on the hedonic-utilitarian dimension require mental resources. As a result, after having an initial experience, consumers who have (vs. do not have) a high level of mental resources are better able to identify the benefits of a dissimilar experience and show higher preference for this experience. This suggests that an initial utilitarian experience will lead to preference for a hedonic experience when consumers have a high level of mental resources available, but a utilitarian experience when they do not. These findings have implications for how consumers combine multiple experiences, seek pleasure, and exert self-control.