Joachim Vosgerau

Reputation as a sufficient condition for data quality on Amazon Mechanical Turk

Data quality is one of the major concerns of using crowdsourcing websites such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit participants for online behavioral studies. We compared two methods for ensuring data quality on MTurk: attention check questions (ACQs) and restricting participation to MTurk workers with high reputation (above 95% approval ratings). In Experiment 1, we found that high-reputation workers rarely failed ACQs and provided higher-quality data than did low-reputation workers; ACQs improved data quality only for low-reputation workers, and only in some cases. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings and also showed that more productive high-reputation workers produce the highest-quality data. We concluded that sampling high-reputation workers can ensure high-quality data without having to resort to using ACQs, which may lead to selection bias if participants who fail ACQs are excluded post-hoc.

Thought for Food: Imagined Consumption Reduces Actual Consumption

All in the Mind Pavlovs experiments, in which dogs salivate in anticipation of food, mirror our own imagined experience; that is, thinking about the future consumption of chocolate enhances our desire for it and our motivation to obtain it. After several bites, however, our appetite usually wanes and the offer of a second bar is less appealing than the first. Morewedge et al. (p. 1530) show that the decrease in hedonic response can also be induced by having imagined eating the first bar of chocolate. In comparisons of subjects asked to imagine the repetitive consumption of candy or cheese, they observed a specific drop in the amount consumed when subjects were actually offered the previously imagined foods to eat. Imagining eating a food caused subsequent actual consumption of that food to decline. The consumption of a food typically leads to a decrease in its subsequent intake through habituation—a decrease in one’s responsiveness to the food and motivation to obtain it. We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.

Cognitive Inertia and the Implicit Association Test

The authors review the implicit association test (IAT), its use in marketing, and the methodology and validity issues that surround it. They focus on a validity problem that has not been investigated previously, namely, the impact of cognitive inertia on IAT effects. Cognitive inertia refers to the difficulty in switching from one categorization rule to another, which causes IAT effects to depend on the order of administration of the two IAT blocks. In Study 1, the authors observe an IAT effect when the compatible block precedes the incompatible block but not when it follows the incompatible block. In Studies 2 and 3, the IAT effect changes its sign when the order of the blocks reverses. Cognitive inertia distorts individual IAT scores and diminishes the correlations between IAT scores and predictor variables when the block order is counterbalanced between subjects. Study 4 shows that counterbalancing the block order repeatedly within subjects can eliminate cognitive inertia effects on the individual level. The authors conclude that researchers should either interpret IAT scores at the aggregate level or, if individual IAT scores are of interest, counterbalance the block order repeatedly within subjects.

Social Defaults: Observed Choices Become Choice Defaults

Defaults effects can be created by social contexts. The observed choices of others can become social defaults, increasing their choice share. Social default effects are a novel form of social influence not due to normative or informational influence: participants were more likely to mimic observed choices when choosing in private than in public (experiment 1) and when stakes were low rather than high (experiment 2). Like other default effects, social default effects were greater for uncertain rather than certain choices (experiment 3) and were weaker when choices required justification (experiment 4). Social default effects appear to occur automatically as they become stronger when cognitive resources are constrained by time pressure or load, and they can be sufficiently strong to induce preference reversals (experiments 5 and 6).

Framing Influences Willingness to Pay but Not Willingness to Accept

The authors show, with real and hypothetical payoffs, that consumers are willing to pay substantially less for a risky prospect when it is called a “lottery ticket,” “raffle,” “coin flip,” or “gamble” than when it is labeled a “gift certificate” or “voucher.” Willingness to accept, in contrast, is not affected by these frames. This differential framing effect is the result of an aversion to bad deals, which causes buyers to focus on different aspects than sellers. Buyers’ willingness to pay is influenced by the extent to which a risky prospects frame is associated with risk (Experiment 1) as well as the prospects lowest (but not highest) possible outcome (Experiment 2). Sellers’ willingness to accept, in contrast, is influenced by a prospects lowest and highest possible outcomes but not by the risk associated with its frame (Experiments 2 and 3). The framing effect on willingness to pay is independent of the objective level of uncertainty (Experiment 4) and can lead to the uncertainty effect. The findings have important implications for research on risk preferences and marketing practice.

More Intense Experiences, Less Intense Forecasts: Why People Overweight Probability Specifications in Affective Forecasts

We propose that affective forecasters overestimate the extent to which experienced hedonic responses to an outcome are influenced by the probability of its occurrence. The experience of an outcome (e.g., winning a gamble) is typically more affectively intense than the simulation of that outcome (e.g., imagining winning a gamble) upon which the affective forecast for it is based. We suggest that, as a result, experiencers allocate a larger share of their attention toward the outcome (e.g., winning the gamble) and less to its probability specifications than do affective forecasters. Consequently, hedonic responses to an outcome are less sensitive to its probability specifications than are affective forecasts for that outcome. The results of 6 experiments provide support for our theory. Affective forecasters overestimated how sensitive experiencers would be to the probability of positive and negative outcomes (Experiments 1 and 2). Consistent with our attentional account, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications disappeared when the attention of forecasters was diverted from probability specifications (Experiment 3) or when the attention of experiencers was drawn toward probability specifications (Experiment 4). Finally, differences in sensitivity to probability specifications between forecasters and experiencers were diminished when the forecasted outcome was more affectively intense (Experiments 5 and 6).

You Call It “Self-Exuberance”; I Call It “Bragging” Miscalibrated Predictions of Emotional Responses to Self-Promotion

People engage in self-promotional behavior because they want others to hold favorable images of them. Self-promotion, however, entails a trade-off between conveying one’s positive attributes and being seen as bragging. We propose that people get this trade-off wrong because they erroneously project their own feelings onto their interaction partners. As a consequence, people overestimate the extent to which recipients of their self-promotion will feel proud of and happy for them, and underestimate the extent to which recipients will feel annoyed (Experiments 1 and 2). Because people tend to promote themselves excessively when trying to make a favorable impression on others, such efforts often backfire, causing targets of self-promotion to view self-promoters as less likeable and as braggarts (Experiment 3).

More Similar but Less Satisfying Comparing Preferences for and the Efficacy of Within- and Cross-Category Substitutes for Food

When people cannot get what they want, they often satisfy their desire by consuming a substitute. Substitutes can originate from within the taxonomic category of the desired stimulus (i.e., within-category substitutes) or from a different taxonomic category that serves the same basic goal (i.e., cross-category substitutes). Both a store-brand chocolate (within-category substitute) and a granola bar (cross-category substitute), for example, can serve as substitutes for gourmet chocolate. Here, we found that people believe that within-category substitutes, which are more similar to desired stimuli, will more effectively satisfy their cravings than will cross-category substitutes (Experiments 1, 2a, and 2b). However, because within-category substitutes are more similar than cross-category substitutes to desired stimuli, they are more likely to evoke an unanticipated negative contrast effect. As a result, unless substitutes are equivalent in quality to the desired stimulus, cross-category substitutes more effectively satisfy cravings for the desired stimulus (Experiments 3 and 4).

Selective Sensitization: Consuming a Food Activates a Goal to Consume Its Complements

Eating a food reduces the desire to eat more of that food. General-process theories of motivation posit that eating a food also increases the motivation to eat other foods—an effect known as cross-stimulus sensitization. The authors propose that eating a food selectively sensitizes consumers to its complements rather than to all foods. Eating a food activates a goal to consume foods that consumers perceive to be well paired with the consumed food. In five experiments, imagined and actual consumption of a food sensitized participants to complementary foods but not to unrelated or semantically associated foods. These findings suggest that cross-stimulus sensitization is more specific and predictable than previously assumed. The authors identify goal activation as the process through which cross-stimulus sensitization occurs and can be instilled.

Differential discounting and present impact of past information

How does information about a person’s past, accessed now, affect individuals’ impressions of that person? In 2 survey experiments and 2 experiments with actual incentives, we compare whether, when evaluating a person, information about that person’s past greedy or immoral behaviors is discounted similarly to information about her past generous or moral behaviors. We find that, no matter how far in the past a person behaved greedily or immorally, information about her negative behaviors is hardly discounted at all. In contrast, information about her past positive behaviors is discounted heavily: recent behaviors are much more influential than behaviors that occurred a long time ago. The lesser discounting of information about immoral and greedy behaviors is not caused by these behaviors being more influential, memorable, extreme, or attention-grabbing; rather, they are perceived as more diagnostic of a person’s character than past moral or generous behaviors. The phenomenon of differential discounting of past information has particular relevance in the digital age, where information about people’s past is easily retrieved. Our findings have significant implications for theories of impression formation and social information processing.