Evan Thompson

Dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the spontaneous arising of thoughts in experienced mindfulness practitioners

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated with the early inception of a thought has proved challenging. Here we addressed this issue by taking advantage of the heightened introspective ability of experienced mindfulness practitioners to observe the onset of their spontaneously arising thoughts. We found subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited by spontaneous thought. In some of these regions, fMRI signal peaked prior to the spontaneous arising of a thought - most notably in the medial temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobule. In contrast, activation in the medial prefrontal, temporopolar, mid-insular, lateral prefrontal, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices peaked together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous thoughts peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention.

The Kantian brain: brain dynamics from a neurophenomenological perspective

Current research on spontaneous, self-generated brain rhythms and dynamic neural network coordination cast new light on Immanuel Kants idea of the spontaneity of cognition, that is, the minds capacity to organize and synthesize sensory stimuli in novel, unprecedented ways. Nevertheless, determining the precise nature of the brain-cognition mapping remains an outstanding challenge. Neurophenomenology, which uses phenomenological information about the variability of subjective experience in order to illuminate the variability of brain dynamics, offers a promising method for addressing this challenge.

Does Consciousness Disappear in Dreamless Sleep

Consciousness is often said to disappear in deep, dreamless sleep. We argue that this assumption is oversimplified. Unless dreamless sleep is defined as unconscious from the outset there are good empirical and theoretical reasons for saying that a range of different types of sleep experience, some of which are distinct from dreaming, can occur in all stages of sleep. We introduce a novel taxonomy for describing different kinds of dreamless sleep experiences and suggest research methods for their investigation. Future studies should focus on three areas: memory consolidation, sleep disorders, and sleep state (mis)perception. Our proposal suggests new directions for sleep and dream science, as well as for the neuroscience of consciousness, and can also inform the diagnosis and treatment of sleep disorders.

Is thinking really aversive? A commentary on Wilson et al.'s “Just think: the challenges of the disengaged mind”

Spontaneous thought, often colloquially referred to as “daydreaming” or “mind-wandering,” is increasingly being investigated by scientists (for recent reviews, see Christoff, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood and Schooler, 2014). In a recent article published in Science, Wilson et al. (2014) argue in support of the view (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) that such thinking is predominantly unpleasant, and even emotionally aversive. While we were impressed with the enormous wealth of data collected by Wilson et al. and by the number of experimental manipulations carried out, we found their interpretations surprising in light of prior research. We applaud Wilson et al.s detailed effort to investigate the content and affective qualities of “just thinking”—but upon examining their dataset, we find little support for their claims. n nWilson et al. make three central claims, as summarized in their articles abstract: (i) “participants typically did not enjoy spending 6–15 min in a room by themselves with nothing to do but think”; (ii) participants “enjoyed doing mundane external activities much more” than “just thinking”; and (iii) “many [participants] preferred to administer electric shocks to themselves instead of being left alone with their thoughts.” These claims were surprising to us because they contradict the findings from a substantial body of research on the affective qualities of thinking and daydreaming (Singer and McCraven, 1961; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011, 2013; Song and Wang, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Diaz et al., 2013; Ruby et al., 2013; Tusche et al., 2014; the results from these studies are summarized in Table S1 in our Supplementary Materials). n nAfter closely examining Wilson et al.s data, we found very little support for their first and third central claims—similar to other independent, critical examinations of their dataset (e.g., Jabr, 2014; Nelson, 2014). We did find their second claim to be supported by their data—but for external activities that were engaging, and tailored to participants personal interests, rather than “mundane.” Overall, we argue that it is impossible to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the “typical” affective qualities of spontaneous thought, given their enormous variability both within and across individuals (for a similar argument, see Gelman, 2014).

Strengthening emotion-cognition integration.

Pessoas (2013) integrative model of emotion and cognition can be strengthened in two ways: first, by clarification and refinement of key concepts and terminology, and second by the incorporation of an additional key neural system into the model, the locus coeruleus/norepinephrine system.

Is the brain a decomposable or nondecomposable system?: Comment on “Understanding brain networks and brain organization” by Pessoa

Pessoa’s review [4] casts new light on a deep and difficult question: is the brain a “decomposable” or “nondecomposable” system [1,5,7]? This question pertains to the functional organization of the brain as a cognitive system. In a decomposable system, each subsystem’s operation is determined by the subsystem’s intrinsic properties independent of the other subsystems, making the system’s organization strongly modular. Modularity decreases depending on how strongly the subsystems interact, especially through feedback and reentrant or recursive processes. If the subsystems are only weakly coupled, such that the causal interactions within a subsystem play a stronger role in determining its operation than do the causal interactions between it and other subsystems, then the system is “nearly decomposable.” If the subsystems are strongly coupled, then the functional organization of the system becomes less governed by the intrinsic properties of its subsystems and more governed by the ways the subsystems interact, making the system “minimally decomposable.” In a “nondecomposable” system, the coupling is such that the subsystems no longer have clearly separable operations apart from the larger context of their interdependent operation. (Note that such strong coupling can involve weak local connections, as Pessoa discusses in Section 9.1.) The current debate about whether cognitive functions can be localized to specific brain regions [2], or whether cognitive functions need to be mapped onto dynamic networks instantiated in shifting coalitions or assemblies of regions [3,6], can be regarded also as a debate about the extent to which the brain’s cognitive organization is decomposable (modular) or nondecomposable (nonmodular). Pessoa’s review [4] provides a wealth of conceptual tools and empirical data for sharpening this question specifically at the level of functional networks, in contrast to anatomical regions. Suppose, for example, that one rejects the idea of a one-to-one mapping between anatomical regions and cognitive functions, and hence the view that the brain can be treated as a cognitively decomposable system at the anatomical level. Nevertheless, the question remains

Can Tai Chi and Qigong Postures Shape Our Mood? Toward an Embodied Cognition Framework for Mind-Body Research

Dynamic and static body postures are a defining characteristic of mind-body practices such as Tai Chi and Qigong (TCQ). A growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that TCQ may be beneficial for psychological health, including management and prevention of depression and anxiety. Although a variety of causal factors have been identified as potential mediators of such health benefits, physical posture, despite its visible prominence, has been largely overlooked. We hypothesize that body posture while standing and/or moving may be a key therapeutic element mediating the influence of TCQ on psychological health. In the present paper, we summarize existing experimental and observational evidence that suggests a bi-directional relationship between body posture and mental states. Drawing from embodied cognitive science, we provide a theoretical framework for further investigation into this interrelationship. We discuss the challenges involved in such an investigation and propose suggestions for future studies. Despite theoretical and practical challenges, we propose that the role of posture in mind-body exercises such as TCQ should be considered in future research.

Affective neuroscience of self‐generated thought

Despite increasing scientific interest in self‐generated thought—mental content largely independent of the immediate environment—there has yet to be any comprehensive synthesis of the subjective experience and neural correlates of affect in these forms of thinking. Here, we aim to develop an integrated affective neuroscience encompassing many forms of self‐generated thought—normal and pathological, moderate and excessive, in waking and in sleep. In synthesizing existing literature on this topic, we reveal consistent findings pertaining to the prevalence, valence, and variability of emotion in self‐generated thought, and highlight how these factors might interact with self‐generated thought to influence general well‐being. We integrate these psychological findings with recent neuroimaging research, bringing attention to the neural correlates of affect in self‐generated thought. We show that affect in self‐generated thought is prevalent, positively biased, highly variable (both within and across individuals), and consistently recruits many brain areas implicated in emotional processing, including the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, insula, and medial prefrontal cortex. Many factors modulate these typical psychological and neural patterns, however; the emerging affective neuroscience of self‐generated thought must endeavor to link brain function and subjective experience in both everyday self‐generated thought as well as its dysfunctions in mental illness.