Ezio Di Nucci

Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem

Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson’s argument to the empirical test by asking people what they should do in the new trilemma case in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson’s argument. But Thomson’s argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible – exactly what Thomson’s argument had predicted.Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson’s argument to the empirical test by asking people what they should do in the new trilemma case in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson’s argument. But Thomson’s argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible – exactly what Thomson’s argument had predicted.

Sexual rights and disability

This paper argues against Appels recent proposal—in this journal—that there is a fundamental human right to sexual pleasure, and that therefore the sexual pleasure of severely disabled people should be publicly funded—by thereby partially legalising prostitution. An alternative is proposed that does not need to pose a new positive human right; does not need public funding; does not need the legalisation of prostitution; and that would offer a better experience to the severely disabled: charitable non-profit organisations whose members would voluntarily and freely provide sexual pleasure to the severely disabled.

Frankfurt Versus Frankfurt: A New Anti-Causalist Dawn

There is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. Frankfurts counterexample to the Principle works only if we do not understand action as Frankfurt does in his guidance account. If, on the other hand, we understand agency in terms of the agents guidance, then his counterexample to the Principle fails because, then, counterfactual scenarios of Frankfurt-type counterexamples are such that what happens does not count as the relevant agents action. So Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not show that the agent could not have avoided acting as she did: so they fail to offer a scenario in which the agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have avoided acting as she did. Therefore, Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not challenge the Principle, according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the issue of coherence within Frankfurts philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm.There is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. Frankfurts counterexample to the Principle works only if we do not understand action as Frankfurt does in his guidance account. If, on the other hand, we understand agency in terms of the agents guidance, then his counterexample to the Principle fails because, then, counterfactual scenarios of Frankfurt-type counterexamples are such that what happens does not count as the relevant agents action. So Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not show that the agent could not have avoided acting as she did: so they fail to offer a scenario in which the agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not...

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Embryo loss and double effect

I defend the argument that if embryo loss in stem cell research is morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally problematic. According to a recent challenge to this argument, we can distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell research by appealing to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that this challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere unintended side effect while in vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the challenge by appealing to Michael Bratmans three roles of intention, the distinction is still unwarranted.

Fathers and Abortion

I argue that it is possible for prospective mothers to wrong prospective fathers by bearing their child; and that lifting paternal liability for child support does not correct the wrong inflicted to fathers. It is therefore sometimes wrong for prospective mothers to bear a child, or so I argue here. I show that my argument for considering the legitimate interests of prospective fathers is not a unique exception to an obvious right to procreate. It is, rather, part of a growing consensus that procreation can be morally problematic and that generally talking of rights in this context might not be warranted. Finally, I argue that giving up a right to procreate does not imply nor suggest giving up on womens absolute right to abort, which I defend.

Habits, nudges, and consent.

problem with informed consent is that it is messy, frustrating, and time-consuming, and that it allows people to choose freely but unwisely, what can one say except that informed consent is the worst possible way to make medical decisions, except for all the other ways? In this context, libertarian paternalism isn’t an oxymoron. It’s doublespeak. Ironically, although Cohen thinks he knows a potential clash of fundamental values when he sees one, he seems to have a blind spot where nudging and informed consent are concerned. If a picture is worth a thousand words, and if ever one should judge a book by its cover, the cover of Nudge, which depicts a large adult elephant “nudging” a small baby elephant along, says it all. It reveals what Cohen’s essay tries, but ultimately fails to conceal, which is that nudging is about nothing other than trying to surreptitiously resurrect the very asymmetry of knowledge/power that informed consent was—and arguably still is—supposed to be doing something about.

Priming Effects and Free Will

I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh - the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing so. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so called Buridan cases.I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh - the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing so. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so called Buridan cases.

Abortion: Strong’s counterexamples fail

This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Marquis’s argument against abortion fail. Strong’s basic idea is that there are cases—for example, terminally ill patients—where killing an adult human being is prima facie seriously morally wrong even though that human being is not being deprived of a “valuable future”. So Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential about the wrongness of killing an adult human being is that they are being deprived of a valuable future. This paper shows that whichever way the concept of “valuable future” is interpreted, the proposed counterexamples fail: if it is interpreted as “future like ours”, the proposed counterexamples have no bearing on Marquis’s argument. If the concept is interpreted as referring to the patient’s preferences, it must be either conceded that the patients in Strong’s scenarios have some valuable future or admitted that killing them is not seriously morally wrong. Finally, if “valuable future” is interpreted as referring to objective standards, one ends up with implausible and unpalatable moral claims.

Successful ageing: A study of the literature using citation network analysis

BACKGROUND Ageing is accompanied by an increased risk of disease and a loss of functioning on several bodily and mental domains and some argue that maintaining health and functioning is essential for a successful old age. Paradoxically, studies have shown that overall wellbeing follows a curvilinear pattern with the lowest point at middle age but increases thereafter up to very old age. OBJECTIVE To shed further light on this paradox, we reviewed the existing literature on how scholars define successful ageing and how they weigh the contribution of health and functioning to define success. METHODS We performed a novel, hypothesis-free and quantitative analysis of citation networks exploring the literature on successful ageing that exists in the Web of Science Core Collection Database using the CitNetExplorer software. Outcomes were visualized using timeline-based citation patterns. The clusters and sub-clusters of citation networks identified were starting points for in-depth qualitative analysis. RESULTS Within the literature from 1902 through 2015, two distinct citation networks were identified. The first cluster had 1146 publications and 3946 citation links. It focused on successful ageing from the perspective of older persons themselves. Analysis of the various sub-clusters emphasized the importance of coping strategies, psycho-social engagement, and cultural differences. The second cluster had 609 publications and 1682 citation links and viewed successful ageing based on the objective measurements as determined by researchers. Subsequent sub-clustering analysis pointed to different domains of functioning and various ways of assessment. CONCLUSION In the current literature two mutually exclusive concepts of successful ageing are circulating that depend on whether the individual himself or an outsider judges the situation. These different points of view help to explain the disability paradox, as successful ageing lies in the eyes of the beholder.