Ezio Marchi

Quasipolyhedral sets in linear semiinfinite inequality systems

Abstract This paper provides an extension to linear semiinfinite systems of a well-known property of finite linear inequality systems, the so-called Weyl property, which characterizes the extreme points of the solution set as those solution points such that the gradient vectors of the active constraints form a complete set. A class of linear semiinfinite systems which satisfy this property is identified, the p-systems. It is also shown that any p-system contains an equivalent minimal subsystem.

About extreme equilibrium points

Abstract Some characterizations for the equilibrium points of the n -person games introduced by Marchi and Quintas (1983) are given. These obtained using some results given by Kuhn (1961).

PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION

Partitioning games and games with restricted cooperation are general games which include large classes of different and important cooperative games. In this paper we combined both concepts and prove a generalization of the theorem of Quint [1991] which characterizes the core of the game by means of an appropriate linear program.

Perturbation theory of a nonlinear game of von Neumann

Von Neumann and others considered a two-person zero-sum game with nonlinear payoff function

E-Points In Extensive Games With Complete Information

x^T Ay/x^T By

The effective computation of equilibrium point for N -person games cyclic to the next person

, where A and B are

On the geometric dimension of the core of a TU-game

m times n

An extension of Peleg's inequality

matrices,

THE CENTIPEDE OF ROSENTHAL

x^T

The Complete Version Of The Gorriti Hat Game

is the row m-vector strategy of the maximizing player (player 1), and y is the column n-Vector strategy of the minimizing player (player 2). This game is defined to be completely mixed if every solution (or optimal strategy)