Luis Guillermo Quintas

SHAPLEY VALUE IN A MODEL OF INFORMATION TRANSFERAL

In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a (n + 1)–person cooperative game.We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic.We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Muto et al. (1988)) and other limit cases.We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.

Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points

Abstract We construct bimatrix games with prefixed equilibrium points in the mixed extension. The uniqueness conditions are studied and we obtain a wide class of games with unique arbitrary prefixed equilibrium points.

About extreme equilibrium points

Abstract Some characterizations for the equilibrium points of the n -person games introduced by Marchi and Quintas (1983) are given. These obtained using some results given by Kuhn (1961).

Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation

Abstract We investigate the nature of the payoff discontinuity observed by Abreu and Rubinstein [ Econometrica 56 (1988) , 1259–1281]. We show that if we relax the assumption about the use of finite automata and refine the complexity measure then a “full” folk theorem holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C73.

Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.

Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Transferal Game

In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core. We analyze the relation of the Symmetrical Core with the Shapley value of a game modeling information transferal in a cooperative environment. This type of game was introduced by Galdeano et al. (Int Game Theor Rev 12(1):19–35, 2010) and it was also studied by Hou and Driessen (J Appl Math 2012:1–12, 2012). It consists of an information market game involving identical firms and an innovator having relevant information for the firms (e.g., a new technology).

Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation

This note focuses on the interrelation between the strategies supporting Nash equilibrium in standard repeated games and with (infinitesimal and non-infinitesimal) implementation cost. These results are particularly strong for two person games.