F. Gregory Gause

Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations

This article critiques four important works that use systems-level perspectives to explain the international politics of the Middle East, and suggests an alternative way of conceptualizing the Middle East international system. Its purpose is to show how insights from international relations theory can be used to explain the specificities of the Middle East, and therefore bridge the gap between international relations specialists who use the Middle East as a case study and Middle East area specialists. The article examines: (1) definitions of the Middle East regional system, (2) the independent and dependent variables and causal logics identified in the works under review, and (3) arguments about the uniqueness of the international relations of the Middle East. It concludes with a research program for students of the regions international politics.

The Gulf Cooperation Council : policies, problems, and prospects

In May 1981 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to facilitate cooperation, settle disputes, and strengthen security. This is the first English-language book to describe the GCC and assess its impact on the security and stability of the Gulf. It addresses four specific aspects of the GCC: a description of the basic charter and the United Economic Agreement; its structure and the policy of summitry; its achievements and the challenges before it; and the official, popular, and reformist views of its proper role.

British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1973

The West is now less dependent on Persian Gulf oil than at any time in the last decade. However, the area remains economically and strategically vital. The fact that the recent escalation of hostilities in the desultory Iran-Iraq war has attracted world-wide attention bears disturbing witness to the Wests continuing vulnerability in this region. This vulnerability stems, in part, from three crucial decisions—two made in London and one in Washington—during the years 1968 to 1973, Until then, the Persian Gulf was viewed, when it was considered at all, as something of an international anachronism—a sleepy outpost of the fast-dwindling British Empire where Britannia still ruled the waves and the ‘Pax Britannica’ applied as it had since the 1820s. In that six-year period the Labour government of Harold Wilson announced that Britain would end its historic role in the Gulf; the Conservative government of Edward Heath chose not to alter the Labour policy, despite indications that it would do so; and the Nixon administration decided not to ‘fill the vacuum’. This paper assesses these three cases in terms of decision making theory, testing the utility of various theoretical decision making paradigms. Developments in the Gulf itself are treated only in so far as they had an effect on the making of policy in London and Washington.

Pensée 3: Political Science and the Middle East

Over the past five years, from volume 37, number 1 (February 2005) to volume 41, number 3 (August 2009), IJMES published thirty-seven articles that deal with politics in the contemporary Middle East, broadly understood. This is my count, of course, and others might add or drop some articles. I define contemporary as post World War II and have a relatively expansive definition of politics. My count does not include short features, only full articles.

The United States and Egypt : an essay on policy for the 1990s

The relationship between the United States and Egypt has evolved over the years. From the mid-1950s through to the early-1970s the two countries were often at odds but, in a reversal of alignment, Egypt moved away from the Soviet Union and into the American orbit. By 1979, the US had helped engineer a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and, in the subsequent decade, Egypt became the second largest recipient of American economic and military assistance. In many ways the US - Egyptian relationship has been a successful one, but the two countries are not fully-fledged allies; a change of policy or a disagreement over a particular issue could threaten the relationship. As both countries look ahead, there is cause for concern. This book offers an analysis of the past relationship and makes recommendations for the future.

Saudi Perceptions of the United States since 9/11

There is no bilateral relationship that was more affected by the 9/11 attacks than the Saudi-American relationship. On the American side, the reason is obvious: of the 19 hijackers of the 4 planes that crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in central Pennsylvania, 15 were from Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, the leader of the group behind the attacks, also is from Saudi Arabia. As Americans learned more about the hijackers, bin Laden, and the more general salafi movement, popular anger against Saudi Arabia grew. According to a poll by Zogby International, in January 2001, 56 percent of Americans polled viewed Saudi Arabia favorably and 28 percent unfavorably. In December 2001, those numbers had basically reversed, with only 24 percent viewing Saudi Arabia favorably and 58 percent unfavorably.1 Much of the American political and media elite, which had generally accepted the U.S.-Saudi relationship—an exchange of security for oil, to simplify—began to question the value for the United States of a close relationship with Riyadh. While the Bush administration has asserted since 9/11 that the relationship with Saudi Arabia remains solid, there is no question that the unprecedented public focus on Saudi Arabia (even greater than during the 1973–1974 oil embargo, I would argue) has shaken the foundations of the bilateral relationship.

J OSEPH A. K ECHICHIAN , Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Pp. 297.

In any monarchy, court gossip is the coin of the realm. Every observer of Saudi Arabia has his or her own theories of who is up and who is down, who is joining with whom and who has betrayed former allies, and who is with America and who is against America among the princes of the al-Saעud. Like most gossip, most court gossip is wrong. The safe rule regarding the family politics of the al-Saעud is that “those who know do not talk, and those who talk do not know.” Joseph Kechichian has therefore tackled the hardest question there is in the analysis of Saudi Arabian politics, and does as good a job as any outsider can hope to do. While those who talk usually do not know, Kechichian has talked to some who do know, including many members of the ruling family. His conclusions about future successions in Saudi Arabia, of necessity are speculative, but they are well informed.