Fabiana Machado

Decentralization and Accountability: The Curse of Local Underdevelopment

Decentralization of provision of public services has been an important item in the agenda of developing countries. While some scholars and practitioners argue that decentralization is associated with improvements in provision due to higher accountability, others note its potential pitfalls. In particular, decentralization to local communities characterized by poverty, low levels of education, and inequality may lead to low accountability and higher susceptibility to political capture. This paper explores these dynamics empirically, taking advantage of the fact that in Brazilian municipalities primary education is provided by schools under municipal as well as under state management. The performance of these two types of school in the same municipalities is compared in terms of their levels of inputs and the efficiency of service delivery using non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA). The results suggest that there are indeed drawbacks to decentralization in municipalities where inequality is higher and education and political participation are lower.

Does Inequality Breed Altruism or Selfishness? Gauging Individuals' Predispositions towards Redistributive Schemes

While decreasing inequality is generally considered desirable, and there is a growing understanding of which policies do and do not promote equality, much less is known regarding why these policies are adopted to varying degrees of intensity in different times and places. To explain this variation, the constituencies for different policies under various conditions must be identified. This paper explores that question using Brazilian public opinion data on preferences regarding taxation, conditional cash transfers, pension schemes and educations. It is found that disagreement across socio-economic groups arises on how government should address inequality rather than whether it should do so. While poorer respondents support cash transfers more than the rich, the rich are more likely than the poor to support expenditures on public education. Contrary to what is commonly assumed, inequality seems to breed altruism among the rich regarding the quintessential poverty reduction scheme of conditional cash transfers.

Inequality, Uncertainty, and Redistribution

For centuries it has been believed that the extension of the franchise in unequal societies would lead to relatively high levels of redistribution. According to international rankings, how- ever, among the fourteen most unequal countries in the world, nine have been democratic for at least the past fourteen years. A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. The prospects of such an outcome depend not only on candidates personal policy preferences and motivations, but also how they are perceived by voters. One important feature shared by highly unequal democracies is that they tend to be relatively young, with many new parties and candidates in the political scene. This means elections occur under a high degree of uncertainty about critical information voters need to chose their delegates. Thus, in this paper I develop a model of elections as a game of incomplete information to explore how uncertainty, candidates’ motivation (policy vs. office), and beliefs about their ideological inclinations affect what policy interests are likely to be represented in the political process. I explore the model’s assumptions and outcomes empirically using individual level data for each presidential election in Brazil since democratization.

Water and Sanitation Sector: A Colombian Overview

This report presents descriptive statistics from Colombian water and sanitation data, and corresponding public opinion data. The water and sanitation data are at the firm and municipality level and produced by several Colombian government agencies. The public opinion data are provided by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

The Political Economy of Pension Reform: Public Opinion in Latin America and the Caribbean

Countries around the world are facing important challenges to the sustainability of their pension systems. Changing policies, especially those of large scope and financial magnitude, is a political challenge. It takes a combination of willingness, capacity and enough political support to change the status quo and avoid costly subsequent reversals. Taking advantage of several waves of public opinion data in Latin America and the Caribbean, this paper aims to identify and analyze individual-level factors that are relevant to gauging political support for pension reform.

To Redistribute or Not: A Politician's Dilemma

A prerequisite for the adoption of redistributive policies in a democracy is that there be elected representatives who are either committed to or who have an incentive to advocate for such policies. To evaluate the prospects of such an outcome, this pa- per develops a theory exploring two fundamental factors at play during elections – the critical political stage where citizens choose their representatives. The first is the lack of information about the policy inclinations of candidates. The second refers to two motivations compelling candidates into politics (and possibly at odds with each other): the opportunity to implement one’s favored policies or to extract rents. Results indicate the existence of an equilibrium where high inequality and low redistribution can coexist. The theory’s assumptions and outcomes are explored empirically using individual-level data collected in presidential election years in Brazil.