Femke Van Esch

Behind the veil of budgetary discipline: The political logic of the budgetary rules in EMU and the SGP

The outcome of the 2003 compliance crisis showed once and for all that the nature of the stability and growth pact (SGP) is highly political. While the existing literature often presents the content of EMU and SGP as an unqualified triumph for the German financial elite, the available primary sources point in quite another direction.

Exploring the Keynesian–Ordoliberal Divide. Flexibility and Convergence in French and German Leaders’ Economic Ideas During the Euro-Crisis

The Euro-crisis is the most severe crisis the European Union has ever faced. Despite its scale and urgency, political and financial leaders have struggled to find its solution. Several observers have traced this inability back to the divide between states adhering to Ordoliberal and those advocating Keynesian policies, Germany and France in particular. Preceding the question of whether and how leaders’ policy ideas influenced decision-making, however, is the question to what extent such paradigmatic divide actually existed. To provide an in-depth and dynamic view of the French and German divide, this study uses the technique of Comparative Cognitive Mapping to explore the extent to which the views of Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and the German and French central bank presidents, Weber and Noyer, may be characterised as Ordoliberal or Keynesian. Moreover, the article analyses how the crisis affected these ideas. The study finds that in paradigmatic terms, leaders’ policy views are rather ambiguous ...The Euro-crisis is the most severe crisis the European Union has ever faced. Despite its scale and urgency, political and financial leaders have struggled to find its solution. Several observers have traced this inability back to the divide between states adhering to Ordoliberal and those advocating Keynesian policies, Germany and France in particular. Preceding the question of whether and how leaders’ policy ideas influenced decision-making, however, is the question to what extent such paradigmatic divide actually existed. To provide an in-depth and dynamic view of the French and German divide, this study uses the technique of Comparative Cognitive Mapping to explore the extent to which the views of Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and the German and French central bank presidents, Weber and Noyer, may be characterised as Ordoliberal or Keynesian. Moreover, the article analyses how the crisis affected these ideas. The study finds that in paradigmatic terms, leaders’ policy views are rather ambiguous and flexible. Moreover, it shows that the Euro-crisis actually fostered a convergence in views towards a more modest Ordoliberal view rather than a greater divide. Remarkably, this convergence moves the group consensus towards a more compromising position, away from the traditional position of the dominant partner, Germany.

the nature of the european leadership crisis and how to solve it

Observers of the European Union (EU) agree that it suffers from a leadership crisis. However, diagnoses of the precise nature of this crisis vary: some lament the lack of strong, visionary leaders, while others argue that the EU suffers from too much elite leadership. This article takes issue with both diagnoses and argues that the root of Europe’s leadership crisis lies in the misfit between the nature of EU leadership and the legitimating logic it is rooted in. All leadership implies inequality and therefore requires solid justification especially in the democratic European context. However, at the European level, the vectors of legitimacy that provide such justification are weak and contradictory, thereby tempting leaders to overstep the level of justification bestowed on them. Making use of ideological and identity leadership may help European leaders overcome the misfit between leadership and legitimacy that lies at the root of the leadership crisis.

Paradigm formation and paradigm change in the EU's Stability and Growth Pact

This article analyses whether the European Union’s (EU) Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been underpinned by a policy paradigm. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the debate on the existence and importance of paradigms in policy-making. It uses a causal mapping technique to reconstruct the beliefs behind three key policy documents in the SGP’s development, assessing to what extent these beliefs conform to two dominant economic policy paradigms. The analysis shows that the policy beliefs behind the SGP have been a mixture of economic policy paradigms, in which the emphasis placed on each paradigm has changed over time. This implies that internally coherent mixtures of policy paradigms are possible. This is likely also to be the case in many other areas of (EU) policy-making. Our findings have important implications for the debate on policy-change, as they suggest that paradigmatic change is likely to proceed more through gradual changes within mixes of paradigms than through radical paradigm shifts.

National culture trumps EU socialization: the European central bankers’ views of the euro crisis

The European Union (EU) response to the euro crisis brought new relevance to the debate on socialization through European institutions. While previous studies differ in their support for EU socialization, many have argued that the euro crisis revealed a far-reaching convergence of views among Europes leaders. Theoretically, the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular is expected to have the power to socialize its governors into a common worldview. The present article questions this proposition. Using the technique of cognitive mapping to provide an in-depth analysis of the views of five members of the ECB Governing Board, we find that even for ECB governors national culture generally trumps EU socialization. Only for ECB President Trichet significant evidence of EU socialization is found. The study also points to some new scope-conditions for socialization that may further our understanding of how European institutions may foster the sustainable socialization of views.ABSTRACT The European Union (EU) response to the euro crisis brought new relevance to the debate on socialization through European institutions. While previous studies differ in their support for EU socialization, many have argued that the euro crisis revealed a far-reaching convergence of views among Europes leaders. Theoretically, the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular is expected to have the power to socialize its governors into a common worldview. The present article questions this proposition. Using the technique of cognitive mapping to provide an in-depth analysis of the views of five members of the ECB Governing Board, we find that even for ECB governors national culture generally trumps EU socialization. Only for ECB President Trichet significant evidence of EU socialization is found. The study also points to some new scope-conditions for socialization that may further our understanding of how European institutions may foster the sustainable socialization of views.