Paul 't Hart

Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making

Strategic issues and crises in foreign policy are usually managed by relatively small groups of elite policymakers and their closest advisors. Since the pioneering work of Irving Janis in the early 1970s, we have known that the interplay between the members of these groups can have a profound and, indeed, at times a pernicious influence on the content and quality of foreign policy decisions. Janis argued that groupthink, a term he used to describe a tendency for extreme concurrence-seeking in decision-making groups, was a major cause of a number of U.S. foreign policy fiascoes. And yet not all small groups suffer from groupthink; in fact many high-level bodies are handicapped by an inability to achieve consensus at all. Beyond Groupthink builds upon and extends Janiss legacy. The contributors develop a richer understanding of group dynamics by drawing on alternate views of small-group dynamics. The relevant literature is reviewed and the different perspectives are explored in detailed case studies. The contributors link the group process to the broader organizational and political context of the policy process and stress the need to develop a multi-level understanding of the collegial policy-making process, combining the insights drawn from micro-level theories with those derived from study of broader political phenomena. The contributors include Alexander George, Sally Riggs Fuller, Paul D. Hoyt, Ramon J. Aldag, Max V. Metselaar, Bertjan Verbeek, J. Thomas Preston, Jean A. Garrison, and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger. This book should appeal to political scienctists and international relations specialists, as well as researchers in social psychology, public administration, andmanagement interested in group decision-making processes. Paul t Hart is Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Leiden University and Scientific Director of of the Leiden-Rotterdam Crisis Research Center. Eric Stern is Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. Bengt Sundelius is Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University.

Crisis management in transitional democracies : The Baltic experience

In this article we open the black box of governance in the new democracies by examining episodes where these governments are confronted with urgent threats that require swift and decisive state responses. This provides a unique insight into how political and administrative decision-making actually takes place. It enables us to analyse and evaluate the performance of the new institutions at times when it matters most. Specifically, we discuss how three of these new democracies, the Baltic states, have dealt with risks and crises in vital societal and political domains such as health and safety, public order, economic management and foreign policy. All belong to the core of the classic state functions.

The Politics of Crisis Management: Meaning making: crisis management as political communication

Crisis communication as politics In the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly emphasized the clear and present danger posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the conflict with Iraq escalated, and skeptical voices were heard in the United Nations Security Council, presidential and prime ministerial rhetoric intensified. The two leaders assured that there was virtually no doubt that Iraq possessed such weapons and that only military intervention could guarantee that these illicit programs, which had allegedly eluded UN WMD inspectors, would be found. Both leaders staked their personal credibility on this claim and managed to drum up a considerable amount of political support at home for their position. However, both leaders quickly became the subject of increasingly bitter attacks from the opposition and from elements of their own parties when no evidence of ongoing WMD programs was turned up in the wake of the military intervention. In a crisis, authorities often lose control, if only temporarily, over the dramaturgy of political communication. They are literally overtaken by events. The mass media rapidly generate powerful images and frames of the situation, well crafted for mass consumption. The crisis turns into a “symbolic contest over the social meaning of an issue domain.”

Decision Making and Coordinating: Shaping the Crisis Response

The Myth of Top-Down Command and Control In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama presided over five national security meetings at the White House to go over plans for a military operation designed to kill the countrys nemesis, Osama Bin-Laden. A few weeks later, Obama gave the final order to strike. In the secure Situation Room deep within the White House, Obama and his most trusted aides watched the operation unfold in “real time” as U.S. Special Forces stormed the terror chiefs compound in Pakistan. A photograph released by U.S. officials captured the drama as the group watched the worlds most wanted terrorist finally meet his end. On July 7, 2005, the morning rush hour in London formed the backdrop for a series of suicide attacks. Four suicide bombers detonated one charge each, killing fifty-two people and injuring more than 700. Hundreds of rescue workers were engaged in the response. With the underground closed down and roads gridlocked, authorities faced a dilemma. The traffic situation affected the mobility of the rescue services as well as of citizens trying to get home from work. As long as the public transportation systems remained down, chaos would prevail in the city streets. But if there were more bombs placed on buses or trains, the consequences of a premature restart could be dire indeed. These very different examples of high-stakes decision making illustrate a classic notion of executive leadership: making the critical call when it matters most. Both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to such monumental decisions. This notion of crises as “occasions for decision making” is a dominant one in the scholarly literature on crisis management. How leaders make such high-impact decisions in turbulent circumstances has – for good reasons – been considered pivotal by generations of crisis researchers. Many studies of crisis management report an “upward” shift in decision making: the authority to make critical decisions is adjusted to the scale of the crisis. When a crisis strikes areas that extend over multiple administrative jurisdictions, responsibility for coordinating government responses typically shifts to regional, national, or, for some types of crises, transnational levels of authority. The same goes for crises that are local in geographical terms but whose depth and complexity exceed the coping capacity of local authorities.

The Politics of Crisis Management: Sense making: grasping crises as they unfold

What the hell is going on? The 9/11 terrorist strike took America (and the rest of the world) by complete surprise. As the drama unfolded live on television screens across the globe, people found themselves watching in disbelief: “This cannot be happening.” This sense of collective stress soon gave rise to a pressing question, one that lingers on as we write this: how could this have happened? In hindsight, this question is less baffling than it seemed at the time. Commentators across the world were quick to point out that the United States had finally experienced on its own soil what many other countries had been forced to deal with for many years – terrorism. Outside the United States one would read and hear that American foreign policy had bred anti-Americanism; terrorist actions therefore were more or less to be expected. In the American media, Pearl Harbor analogies gave way to retrospectives of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the foiled plots involving exploding airliners and airport attacks. The 9/11 crisis events were shown to have roots. Americans then learned how the 19 terrorists had pulled it off: how they had entered the country and outlived visa requirements, took flight lessons, convened with other terrorists around the globe, walked through airport security armed with knives, and how they navigated their hijacked planes unhindered toward the unguarded core institutions of the country. Americans learned that foreign intelligence services had provided their American sister organizations with ominous and rather specific warnings.

Decision making: critical choices and their implementation

The myth of chief executive choice On July 14, 1958, US President Eisenhower woke up to the news of a coup in Iraq, overthrowing one of the few pro-Western leaders in the Middle East. In the light of the increasing Soviet dominance and the recent merger between Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic, with the strident Nasser as its president, the Iraqi coup meant a blow to the United States position in the Middle East. The sense of crisis in Washington, DC was heightened when the Lebanese president called for immediate US intervention, fearing that his country would be next. It was 9 am. After consulting with his advisers and his political counterparts on the Hill, President Eisenhower announced the decision to send in the Sixth Fleet at 2.30 pm. This long-forgotten example of presidential crisis decision making illustrates a classic notion of crisis leadership: making the critical call when it matters most. Both successes and failures of crisis management are often related to such monumental decisions. This notion of crisis as “occasions for decision making” is a dominant one in the scholarly literature on crisis management. The image of the command room, the tragic dilemma, and the decisive leader not only informs academics and Hollywood movies but also plays to a widespread expectation in times of crisis: leaders must govern. Many studies of crisis management report an “upward” shift in decision making: the scale of response is adjusted to the scale of the impact.

The Politics of Crisis Management: How to deal with crisis: lessons for prudent leadership

Introduction In this book we have presented a number of empirical claims about leadership in crisis management. These are based on the findings of several decades of crisis research in various corners of the social sciences. In this final chapter, we take the lessons that emerge from theories and research findings on crisis management and translate these into recommendations for improving crisis management practices. In the real world of crisis management, trade-offs must often be made among these various desirabilities. Policy makers face such challenges, make decisions, and have to live with the consequences of their actions or inactions. These consequences also matter to citizens who either suffer the results of governmental unpreparedness or reap the benefits secured by crisis-ready leaders and organizations. This chapter attempts to transfer knowledge from academia to the corridors of public power. These research findings should prove helpful to those who have or take the public responsibility to deal with crises. A deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the subject enables public leaders to think about and engage in crisis management in a more reflective and responsible fashion. Our recommendations do not tell policy makers what to do and decide when they face the leadership challenges that emerge during crises. They do offer ideas and suggestions about how prudent leadership in crises might be exercised and organized. Grasping the nature of crises Let us begin with the nature of the beast.