Fernando Casal Bértoa

Party systems and cleavage structures revisited : a sociological explanation of party system institutionalization in East Central Europe

Since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) published their seminal work on the importance of social cleavages for the ‘freezing’ of party systems more than forty years ago, much has been written on the field demonstrating or discrediting the original hypothesis. In the current article, I examine how cleavage formation and development have influenced the different levels of institutionalization in four new post-communist party systems (i.e. Visegrad). Analysing distinct hypotheses, I arrive at the conclusion that neither the number nor the type nor the strength of a cleavage is associated with the degree of party system institutionalization in East Central Europe. On the contrary, the main conclusion is that party system institutionalization in these democracies has been determined by the way cleavages are structured. In particular, the process of party system institutionalization is found to be hindered when cleavages cross-cut, while fostered in cases where they cumulate (i.e. coincide).

The world upside down: Delegitimising political finance regulation:

Political finance regulation is often praised in terms of its ability to introduce equality among political parties, to create more transparent political parties and to lower the influence of affluent donors on the political decision-making process. Little examination exists, however, of the effectiveness of this type of regulation. This article aims to fill this gap by addressing whether and to what extent different types of public funding regulation have improved the legitimacy of political parties by improving their image in terms of corruption. Towards this end, and focusing on both European and Latin American democracies, this article investigates whether a relationship indeed exists between the perceived corruption of political parties and the regulation of political finance. It finds such a relationship does exist, although not in the direction commonly stipulated by the advocates of party finance regulation.

Parties, regime and cleavages: explaining party system institutionalisation in East Central Europe

Party system institutionalisation has traditionally been viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the healthy functioning of democracy; yet the question of why some of these competitive party systems managed to institutionalise at the end of the second decade of party politics while others have not has not received the necessary attention. In order to begin to fill this gap, this article tackles the above-cited issue by trying to discover what have been the ‘causal mechanisms’ explaining the different levels of institutionalisation observed in East Central European party systems. In order to do so, and contrary to the predominant literature, it constitutes a serious attempt to bring together both institutional and sociological approaches.Party system institutionalisation has traditionally been viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the healthy functioning of democracy; yet the question of why some of these competitive party systems managed to institutionalise at the end of the second decade of party politics while others have not has not received the necessary attention. In order to begin to fill this gap, this article tackles the above-cited issue by trying to discover what have been the ‘causal mechanisms’ explaining the different levels of institutionalisation observed in East Central European party systems. In order to do so, and contrary to the predominant literature, it constitutes a serious attempt to bring together both institutional and sociological approaches.

Party regulation and party politics in post-communist Europe

Recent years have seen a considerable increase in the scope and magnitude of party regulations. Despite the increased propensity of the modern democratic states to intervene in the activities, organisation and behaviour of parties, the phenomenon of party regulation has received relatively little systematic and comparative scholarly attention. In order to fill part of the existing gap in the literature, we concentrate on the regulation of political parties in the post-communist democracies of East-Central and Southeast Europe. Our focus is on the formal rules as stipulated in Party Laws, finance laws and national constitutions, while we explore their impact on the party organisations and party systems.Recent years have seen a considerable increase in the scope and magnitude of party regulations. Despite the increased propensity of the modern democratic states to intervene in the activities, organisation and behaviour of parties, the phenomenon of party regulation has received relatively little systematic and comparative scholarly attention. In order to fill part of the existing gap in the literature, we concentrate on the regulation of political parties in the post-communist democracies of East-Central and Southeast Europe. Our focus is on the formal rules as stipulated in Party Laws, finance laws and national constitutions, while we explore their impact on the party organisations and party systems.

Party system closure and openness : conceptualization, operationalization and validation

The degree of closure of the governmental arena is a central aspect of the stabilization of party systems, and yet little systematic effort has been devoted to its operationalization. The article proposes a new index, examines its reliability and validity, and reports the ranking of 60 party systems. By redefining the units of measurement we suggest new indicators that are uniform and transparent in their logic of construction, can be applied both to specific government-changes and to time periods, and are sensitive to the degree of change. The article finds a hierarchy among the components of party system closure, dominated by coalition formula. While new and established democracies can both produced closed patterns, the analysis of inter-war European party systems shows that closed systems are less prone to authoritarian takeover. The article demonstrates the power of inertia: the completely closed configurations stand out as the most durable ones.

The Carrot and the Stick: Party Regulation and Politics in Democratic Spain

Party regulation in new democracies in general, and in the Spanish political system in particular, has not been a matter of concern until very recently. In order to fill this gap, this article explores the way political parties have been regulated not only in the Constitution, but also in the main laws regulating party foundation, organisation, dissolution and, not least, funding: namely, the 1978 and 2002 Political Party Laws as well as the 1985 and 2007 Party Funding Laws. The empirical part explores the impact such regulation has had on the Spanish party system as well as on the life of its party organisations.

Regulating Polish politics: “cartel” parties in a non-collusive party system

In the first stage of democratic transition, like in most post-communist countries, Poland adopted a more laissez-faire stance towards the regulation of political parties. These regulations, like the one adopted in 1990, were a natural response to the former Communist system and represented a rejection of its restrictions and a fear of a one-party system that could harass the opposition. By the mid-1990s, however, Polish political elite started to recognise the importance of political parties in a modern democracy and the problems related to their functioning and funding. A new development in regulating political parties gradually came about in 1997 as a result of the approval of a new Constitution and Law on Political Parties. This is the story of such legislative change as well as how it has affected the development of both political parties and the party system since 1989.

Party Regulation in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective

Despite its increasing importance, the phenomenon of party regulation has hitherto received relatively little systematic and comparative scholarly attention. The contributions to this special issue fill part of this lacuna by evaluating the various dimensions of party regulation and their impact on the parties and the party systems in post-authoritarian Southern Europe. This introduction discusses the main sources of party regulation – Constitutions, Party Laws and Party Finance Laws – and provides some preliminary conclusions on the cartelisation of party organisations and party systems.Despite its increasing importance, the phenomenon of party regulation has hitherto received relatively little systematic and comparative scholarly attention. The contributions to this special issue fill part of this lacuna by evaluating the various dimensions of party regulation and their impact on the parties and the party systems in post-authoritarian Southern Europe. This introduction discusses the main sources of party regulation – Constitutions, Party Laws and Party Finance Laws – and provides some preliminary conclusions on the cartelisation of party organisations and party systems.

Regulating party politics in the Western Balkans: the legal sources of party system development in Macedonia

Party regulation in general and its systemic consequences in particular have not been a matter of concern for scholars until very recently. Despite recent efforts to study how political parties are regulated in post-authoritarian democracies and in conflict-prone societies, the question of how party legislation affects party formation and party system development in the Western Balkans still remains a mystery. Adopting a multi-disciplinary (that is, legal and political) approach, this article attempts to fill a gap in the literature by analysing how different party (finance) regulations shaped the party system in Macedonia, one of Europes most recent (and under-researched) democracies, while controlling for changes in electoral regimes. There are two main findings. On the one hand, registration requirements had the strongest impact on the party system format, even when the electoral system pushed in the opposite direction. On the other, public funding, rather than “cartelizing” the system, mainly facilitated the survival of (both big and small) parties. Finally, the article also points to the need to explore the role of shadow financing and corruption when analysing the effects of party finance in new democracies.

Institutionalization and De-institutionalization in Post-communist Party Systems:

This article is part of the special cluster titled Parties and Democratic Linkage in Post-Communist Europe, guest edited by Lori Thorlakson, and will be published in the August 2018 issue of EEPS In an article written in 1995 titled “What Is Different about Postcommunist Party Systems?” Peter Mair applied the method that he called “ex adverso extrapolation.” He matched his knowledge of the process of consolidation of party systems in the West with what was known at that time about Eastern European history, society, and the emerging post-communist party politics. Considering factors such as the existence of fluid social structures, the weakness of civil society, or the destabilizing impact of the so-called triple transition, his article predicted long-term instability for the region. In the present article, we evaluate the validity of Mair’s predictions, thereby also contributing to a lively debate in the current literature about the scale and nature of East–West differences and about the trajectories of the two regions. Going beyond the identification of cross-regional similarities and differences, we also differentiate between individual party systems, establish subgroups, and describe changes across time. Using four major dimensions (i.e., party system closure, party-level stability, electoral volatility, and fragmentation), the article finds that Mair’s predictions were largely, though not in every detail, right. Ironically, however, we also find that changes in the West tend to match over time the trajectory of the East.