Florian Kutzner

The Long Way From α-Error Control to Validity Proper: Problems With a Short-Sighted False-Positive Debate.

Several influential publications have sensitized the community of behavioral scientists to the dangers of inflated effects and false-positive errors leading to the unwarranted publication of nonreplicable findings. This issue has been related to prominent cases of data fabrication and survey results pointing to bad practices in empirical science. Although we concur with the motives behind these critical arguments, we note that an isolated debate of false positives may itself be misleading and counter-productive. Instead, we argue that, given the current state of affairs in behavioral science, false negatives often constitute a more serious problem. Referring to Wason’s (1960) seminal work on inductive reasoning, we show that the failure to assertively generate and test alternative hypotheses can lead to dramatic theoretical mistakes, which cannot be corrected by any kind of rigor applied to statistical tests of the focal hypotheses. We conclude that a scientific culture rewarding strong inference (Platt, 1964) is more likely to see progress than a culture preoccupied with tightening its standards for the mere publication of original findings.

Money and Thinking: Reminders of Money Trigger Abstract Construal and Shape Consumer Judgments

The idea of money reminds consumers of personal strength and resources. Such cues have been found to increase the level of mental construal. Consequently, it was hypothesized and found in five experiments that reminders of money trigger abstract (vs. concrete) mental construals. Participants were primed with money or money-unrelated concepts. Money primes caused a preference for abstract over concrete action identifications (experiment 1), instigated the formation of broader categories (experiment 2), and facilitated the identification of global (vs. local) aspects of visual patterns (experiment 3). This effect extended to consumer judgments: money primes caused a focus on central (vs. peripheral) aspects of products (experiment 4) and increased the influence of quality of parent brands in evaluations of brand extensions. Priming with a little money (experiment 3) or expenditures (experiment 5) did not trigger abstract construals, indicating that the association between money and resources drives the effect.

Exploiting Attractiveness in Persuasion: Senders’ Implicit Theories About Receivers’ Processing Motivation

Previous research suggests a positive correlation between physical attractiveness and the expectation of positive outcomes in social interactions, such as successful persuasion. However, prominent persuasion theories do not imply a general advantage of attractive senders. Instead, the persuasion success should vary with the receivers’ processing motivation and processing capacity. Focusing on the perspective of the sender, the authors elaborate on lay theories about how attractiveness affects persuasion success. They propose that lay theories (a) match scientific models in that they also comprise the interaction of senders’ attractiveness and receivers’ processing characteristics, (b) guide laypersons’ anticipation of persuasion success, and (c) translate into strategic behavior. They show that anticipated persuasion success depends on the interplay of perceived attractiveness and expectations about receivers’ processing motivation (Experiment 1 and 2). Further experiments show that laypersons strategically attempt to exploit attractiveness in that they approach situations (Experiment 3) and persons (Experiment 4) that promise persuasion success.

What is learned from repeated pairings? On the scope and generalizability of evaluative conditioning.

The investigation of evaluative conditioning (EC) has been mainly concerned with the conditioning of individual stimuli. Namely, a specific conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus and consequently acquires the valence of the unconditioned stimulus. In the present article, we expand the notion of EC to CS cues (e.g., gender) as distinguished from CS objects (e.g., an individual). We developed a conditioning paradigm that allows for the simultaneous investigation of both types of EC effects, evaluative identity conditioning and evaluative cue conditioning. The experiments demonstrate that EC has the potential to change attitudes not only toward CS individuals but also toward CS cues. We applied this twofold approach to both impoverished and more complex learning environments, demonstrating that evaluative identity conditioning is dependent on stimulus complexity while evaluative cue conditioning depends on the complexity of the stimulus context. The findings have distinct implications for the generalization of EC effects as well as for the investigation of EC.

Nudge me if you can - how defaults and attitude strength interact to change behavior

ABSTRACTDefaults (i.e. preselected options that become effective without active choice) are becoming increasingly popular as the idea of nudging enters the political arena. Their interplay with individual attitudes is largely unknown. In two preregistered and highly powered experimental studies, we examined how defaults and attitudes interact to influence decision-making. In both studies, we manipulated the default electricity provider (gray versus green electricity sources) and measured environmental attitudes and attitude strength. The default manipulation and measures of attitude strength independently predicted people’s choices. Yet, we found no compelling evidence for an attenuated default effect for participants with strong preexisting attitudes. Implications for the concept of libertarian paternalism and the use of green defaults as a means for policymakers to foster pro-environmental choices are discussed.

Pseudocontingencies Logically Unwarranted but Smart Inferences

The ability to extract statistical contingencies (e.g., between cause and effect, between response and feedback) is commonly presupposed as a basic module of adaptive behavior. In reality, however, stimulus input rarely contains the complete sets of correlated attributes required to assess the actual contingencies. Instead, cognitive inferences often rely on a base-rate-driven pseudocontingency rule, which links the more (or less) frequent level of one variable to the more (or less) frequent level of the other variable. Empirical evidence shows that logically unwarranted pseudocontingency inferences override genuine contingencies across many research paradigms. Although pseudocontingencies can be severely misleading, they also provide a useful proxy that accurately predicts existing contingencies most of the time.The ability to extract statistical contingencies (e.g., between cause and effect, between response and feedback) is commonly presupposed as a basic module of adaptive behavior. In reality, however, stimulus input rarely contains the complete sets of correlated attributes required to assess the actual contingencies. Instead, cognitive inferences often rely on a base-rate-driven pseudocontingency rule, which links the more (or less) frequent level of one variable to the more (or less) frequent level of the other variable. Empirical evidence shows that logically unwarranted pseudocontingency inferences override genuine contingencies across many research paradigms. Although pseudocontingencies can be severely misleading, they also provide a useful proxy that accurately predicts existing contingencies most of the time.

Adherence to tactical choices mediates regulatory fit effects in table tennis

The present work examines how regulatory fit affects table tennis performance. We find a player’s adherence to their chosen tactic (offensive vs. defensive) to be a mediator of the observed fit effects. Expert table tennis players (N = 39) were given verbal instructions (i.e. regulatory frames), before they played 6 matches each; we created baseline, fit, and non-fit conditions with each player’s chronic regulatory focus. Results replicate previously found positive effects of regulatory fit on performance. We also find evidence for a novel mediator of this effect. Players under fit were more likely to adhere to their chosen tactic, which led to higher likelihood of winning the point.

Anomalies in the detection of change: When changes in sample size are mistaken for changes in proportions

Detecting changes, in performance, sales, markets, risks, social relations, or public opinions, constitutes an important adaptive function. In a sequential paradigm devised to investigate detection of change, every trial provides a sample of binary outcomes (e.g., correct vs. incorrect student responses). Participants have to decide whether the proportion of a focal feature (e.g., correct responses) in the population from which the sample is drawn has decreased, remained constant, or increased. Strong and persistent anomalies in change detection arise when changes in proportional quantities vary orthogonally to changes in absolute sample size. Proportional increases are readily detected and nonchanges are erroneously perceived as increases when absolute sample size increases. Conversely, decreasing sample size facilitates the correct detection of proportional decreases and the erroneous perception of nonchanges as decreases. These anomalies are however confined to experienced samples of elementary raw events from which proportions have to be inferred inductively. They disappear when sample proportions are described as percentages in a normalized probability format. To explain these challenging findings, it is essential to understand the inductive-learning constraints imposed on decisions from experience.

Inferring correlations: From exemplars to categories

Research and theorizing suggest a processing advantage of category-level correlations over exemplar-level correlations. That research has also shown that category-level correlations serve as a proxy for inferring exemplar-level correlations. For example, an individual may learn that the demand for a product category, like cheese, in one store predicts the demand for this category in another. The individual could then draw the unwarranted conclusion that the demand for an exemplar, like cheddar, would also predict the demand for this exemplar in the other store. This notion is supported by previous experiments demonstrating that the subjective exemplar-level correlation follows the implication of the category-level correlation. However, in virtually all previous experiments suggesting a processing advantage for category-level over exemplar-level correlations, the stimulus correlation at the category level was substantial, whereas the correlation at the exemplar level was weak. Here, we tested the hypothesis that individuals process the level that is most informative, either the exemplar or the category level. We presented participants with a zero correlation at the category level, but varied the correlation at the exemplar level. Participants presented with a zero correlation across exemplar products correctly reproduced a zero correlation across product categories. When presented with a substantial correlation at the exemplar level, however, they erroneously reproduced a similar correlation at the category level. These findings therefore imply that there is no general processing advantage for correlations at higher aggregation levels. Instead, individuals seemingly attend to the level that holds the most regular information. Findings are discussed regarding the role of covariation strength in correlation detection and use.

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations Xi and Yi about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(Xi,Yi) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.