Mandy Hütter

Dissociating contingency awareness and conditioned attitudes: Evidence of contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning.

Whether human evaluative conditioning can occur without contingency awareness has been the subject of an intense and ongoing debate for decades, troubled by a wide array of methodological difficulties. Following recent methodological innovations, the available evidence currently points to the conclusion that evaluative conditioning effects do not occur without contingency awareness. In a simulation, we demonstrate, however, that these innovations are strongly biased toward the conclusion that evaluative conditioning requires contingency awareness, confounding the measurement of contingency memory with conditioned attitudes. We adopt a process-dissociation procedure to separate the memory and attitude components. In 4 studies, the attitude parameter is validated using existing attitudes and applied to probe for contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning. A fifth experiment incorporates a time-delay manipulation confirming the dissociability of the attitude and memory components. The results indicate that evaluative conditioning can produce attitudes without conscious awareness of the contingencies. Implications for theories of evaluative conditioning and associative learning are discussed.

Conditional reasoning in context: a dual-source model of probabilistic inference.

A dual-source model of probabilistic conditional inference is proposed. According to the model, inferences are based on 2 sources of evidence: logical form and prior knowledge. Logical form is a decontextualized source of evidence, whereas prior knowledge is activated by the contents of the conditional rule. In Experiments 1 to 3, manipulations of perceived sufficiency and necessity mapped on the parameters quantifying prior knowledge. Emphasizing rule validity increased the weight given to form-based evidence relative to knowledge-based evidence (Experiment 1). Manipulating rule form (only-if vs. if-then) had a focused effect on the parameters quantifying form-based evidence (Experiment 3). The model also provides a parsimonious description of data from the so-called negations paradigm and adequately accounts for polarity bias in that paradigm (Experiment 4). Relationships to alternative conceptualizations of conditional inference are discussed.

Applying processing trees in social psychology

ABSTRACT Processing tree models offer a powerful research framework by which the contributions of cognitive processes to a task can be separated and quantified. The present article reviews a number of applications of processing tree models in the domain of social psychology in order to illustrate the steps to be taken in developing and validating a given model and applying it to the measurement and comparison of processes across experimental and quasi-experimental conditions. Process dissociation models are discussed as special cases of processing tree models. Crucial assumptions of processing tree models are considered and methods to overcome violations of such assumptions are reviewed. In addition to the application of processing tree models for the analysis of social and cognitive processes, their value is also discussed for the elicitation of truthful responses to socially sensitive questions.

What is learned from repeated pairings? On the scope and generalizability of evaluative conditioning.

The investigation of evaluative conditioning (EC) has been mainly concerned with the conditioning of individual stimuli. Namely, a specific conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a positive or negative unconditioned stimulus and consequently acquires the valence of the unconditioned stimulus. In the present article, we expand the notion of EC to CS cues (e.g., gender) as distinguished from CS objects (e.g., an individual). We developed a conditioning paradigm that allows for the simultaneous investigation of both types of EC effects, evaluative identity conditioning and evaluative cue conditioning. The experiments demonstrate that EC has the potential to change attitudes not only toward CS individuals but also toward CS cues. We applied this twofold approach to both impoverished and more complex learning environments, demonstrating that evaluative identity conditioning is dependent on stimulus complexity while evaluative cue conditioning depends on the complexity of the stimulus context. The findings have distinct implications for the generalization of EC effects as well as for the investigation of EC.

Motivation Losses in Teamwork: The Effects of Team Diversity and Equity Sensitivity on Reactions to Free-riding

Team diversity may lead to a categorization of teammates as ingroup versus outgroup members. Therefore, the question arises whether there would be more permissiveness in reaction to ingroup free-riders than outgroup free-riders. To test this hypothesis, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two reward conditions (equity versus equality) and had to work with a partner who obviously underachieved and supposedly belonged to the same or a different group with regard to cognitive style. In addition, we assessed subjects’ individual sensitivity to equity norms, assuming that this would be a further moderator of the sucker effect. As expected, significant interaction effects on individual performance occurred for both variables.

Resource availability and explicit memory largely determine evaluative conditioning effects in a paradigm claimed to be conducive to implicit attitude acquisition

In three experiments, we investigated how preventing the explicit encoding of conditioned stimulus–unconditioned stimulus (CS–US) pairings by imposing a secondary task at learning influences evaluative conditioning (EC) effects in a paradigm claimed to be conducive to implicit EC. We additionally used a multinomial processing tree model to examine how the resource depletion manipulation affects explicit and implicit memory contributions to EC. In all experiments, the EC effect largely vanished when a secondary task was employed that severely reduced participants’ explicit memory for the CS–US pairings. Furthermore, no evidence obtained for an implicit memory contribution to EC effects. In conclusion, the present research yields evidence for explicit learning, but no support for the contribution of implicit processes to EC in a paradigm claimed to facilitate implicit EC.

Consequences, Norms, and Generalized Inaction in Moral Dilemmas: The CNI Model of Moral Decision-Making

Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions.

Does evaluative conditioning depend on awareness? Evidence from a continuous flash suppression paradigm.

The role of awareness in evaluative learning has been thoroughly investigated with a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches. We investigated evaluative conditioning (EC) without awareness with an approach that conceptually provides optimal conditions for unaware learning - the Continuous Flash Suppression paradigm (CFS). In CFS, a stimulus presented to one eye can be rendered invisible for a prolonged duration by presenting a high-contrast dynamic pattern to the other eye. The suppressed stimulus is nevertheless processed. First, Experiment 1 established EC effects in a pseudo-CFS setup without suppression. Experiment 2 then employed CFS to suppress conditioned stimuli (CSs) from awareness while the unconditioned stimuli (USs) were visible. While Experiment 1 and 2 used a between-participants manipulation of CS suppression, Experiments 3 and 4 both manipulated suppression within participants. We observed EC effects when CSs were not suppressed, but found no EC effects when the CS was suppressed from awareness. We relate our finding to previous research and discuss theoretical implications for EC.

The Symmetric Nature of Evaluative Memory Associations Equal Effectiveness of Forward Versus Backward Evaluative Conditioning

Changing attitudes by repeated co-occurrences of initially neutral stimuli (conditioned stimuli [CSs]) with affective entities (unconditioned stimuli [USs]) is called evaluative conditioning (EC). The vast majority of EC procedures in the literature are “forward” in nature, presenting the CS before the US. Scant empirical research into the issue has argued that forward procedures are more effective than backward procedures, but this research suffers from methodological issues while a meta-analysis indicated no difference. Two experiments show that backward conditioning procedures are equally effective in changing attitudes as forward conditioning procedures. Memory measures show that memory associations are equally strong from the CSs to the USs as from the USs to the CSs, irrespective of the presentation order (forward vs. backward) of the stimuli. Together the data support the proposition that the associations generated by EC are symmetric and bidirectional, rather than unidirectional, in nature.

Anomalies in the detection of change: When changes in sample size are mistaken for changes in proportions

Detecting changes, in performance, sales, markets, risks, social relations, or public opinions, constitutes an important adaptive function. In a sequential paradigm devised to investigate detection of change, every trial provides a sample of binary outcomes (e.g., correct vs. incorrect student responses). Participants have to decide whether the proportion of a focal feature (e.g., correct responses) in the population from which the sample is drawn has decreased, remained constant, or increased. Strong and persistent anomalies in change detection arise when changes in proportional quantities vary orthogonally to changes in absolute sample size. Proportional increases are readily detected and nonchanges are erroneously perceived as increases when absolute sample size increases. Conversely, decreasing sample size facilitates the correct detection of proportional decreases and the erroneous perception of nonchanges as decreases. These anomalies are however confined to experienced samples of elementary raw events from which proportions have to be inferred inductively. They disappear when sample proportions are described as percentages in a normalized probability format. To explain these challenging findings, it is essential to understand the inductive-learning constraints imposed on decisions from experience.