Francisco A. Gallego

COMPETENCIA Y RESULTADOS EDUCATIVOS: TEORIA Y EVIDENCIA PARA CHILE

Este trabajo presenta un modelo conceptual y estimaciones empiricas para estudiar los efectos de la competencia que enfrentan los colegios sobre la calidad de la educacion que ofrecen. Los resultados empiricos, obtenidos utilizando informacion para cerca de 5000 colegios entre 1994 y 1997 y estimaciones robustas a endogeneidad, apoyan las predicciones del modelo teorico y muestran un efecto positivo y economicamente relevante de la competencia en los resultados de los colegios chilenos subvencionados. Esos efectos son relativamente mayores para los colegios particulares subvencionados, que enfrentan incentivos mas directamente relacionados con su desempeno academico.

Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development?

Levels of development vary widely within countries in the Americas. We argue that part of this variation has its roots in the colonial era, when colonizers engaged in different economic activities in different regions of a country. We present evidence consistent with the view that “bad” activities (those that depended heavily on labor exploitation) led to lower economic development today than “good” activities (those that did not rely on labor exploitation). Our results also suggest that differences in political representation (but not in income inequality or human capital) could be the intermediating factor between colonial activities and current development.

Historical Origins of Schooling: The Role of Democracy and Political Decentralization

Why does schooling attainment vary widely across countries? Why are differences in schooling attainment highly persistent? I show that cross-country differences in schooling are related to political institutions, such as democracy and local democracy (political decentralization), which are affected by colonial factors. By using the number of native cultures before colonization as an instrument for political decentralization, I show that after controlling for the causal effect of income on schooling, the degree of democratization positively affects the development of primary education, whereas political decentralization has a positive and significant impact on more advanced levels of schooling.

School Choice in Chile: Looking at the Demand Side

How do parents choose among schools when they are allowed to do so? In this paper, we analyze detailed information of 70,000 fourth-graders attending about 1,200 publicly subsidized schools in the context of the Chilean voucher system. We model the school choice of a household as a discrete choice of a single school, based on the random utility model developed by McFadden (1974) and the specification of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which includes choice-specific unobservable characteristics and deals with potential endogeneity. Our results imply that households value some attributes of schools, with the two most important dimensions being test scores and distance to school. Interestingly, at the same time, our results suggest there is a lot of heterogeneity in preferences because the valuation of most school attributes depend on household characteristics. In particular, we find that while proximity to school is an inferior attribute, test scores is a normal attribute. We present evidence that our results are mainly driven by self-selection and not by school-side selection. As a nal check, we compute the average enrollment elasticity with respect to all school attributes and find that higher elasticities are correlated with higher supply of the attribute, especially in the case of test scores-enrollment elasticities for private schools.

Microeconomic Effects of Capital Controls: The Chilean Experience During the 1990s

This paper studies the experience with the use of capital controls in Chile during the 1990s. Rather than revisiting previous studies, it complements previous research by providing, for the first time, empirical evidence on some of the microeconomic effects of capital controls, in particular, the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR). By looking at financial statements for a group of 73 Chilean firms during 1986-2001, the paper attempts to identify the effects of the URR on the firms’ costs and ways of financing. Chilean firms are grouped by economic sector, size and access to international capital markets. Results show that the effects of the URR are firm specific; forinstance, there are striking differences in the response to the URR among firms of different size and those with or without access to international capital markets.

Building confidence intervals for band-pass and Hodrick-Prescott filters: an application using bootstrapping

This article generates innovative confidence intervals for two of the most popular de-trending methods: Hodrick–Prescott and band-pass filters. The confidence intervals are obtained using block-bootstrapping techniques for dependent data. GDP trend growth and output gap intervals for the G7 economies are used as examples. This new methodology increases the usefulness of these filters by overcoming the absence of confidence intervals.

When Does Inter-School Competition Matter? Evidence from the Chilean “Voucher” System

Abstract I investigate the effects of voucher-school competition on educational outcomes. I test whether voucher-school competition (1) improves student outcomes and (2) has stronger effects when public schools face a hard-budget constraint. Since both voucher-school competition and the degree of hardness of the budget constraint for public schools are endogenous to public school quality, I exploit (i) the interaction of the number of Catholic priests in 1950 and the institution of the voucher system in Chile in 1981 as a potentially exogenous determinant of the supply of voucher schools and (ii) a particular feature of the electoral system that affects the identity of the mayors of different counties (who manage public schools) as a source of exogenous variation in the degree of hardness of the public schools’ budget constraints. Using this information, I find that (1) an increase of one standard deviation of the ratio of voucher-to-public schools increases test scores by just around 0.10 standard deviations; and (2) the effects are significantly bigger for public schools facing more binding minimum enrollment levels.

Sudden stops, financial frictions, and labor market flows: Evidence from Latin America☆

Sudden stops and international financial crises have been a main feature of developing countries in the last three decades. While their aggregate effects are well known, the disaggregated channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, we study the sectoral responses that take place over episodes of sudden stops. Using job flows from a sectoral panel dataset for four Latin American countries, we find that sudden stops are characterized as periods of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous across sectors: we find that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on external financing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience significantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on external financing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions affects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results confirm the large labor market effects of sudden stops, and provide evidence of financial conditions being an important transmission channel of sudden stops within a country, highlighting the role of financial frictions in the restructuring process in general.

The Political Economy of School Size: Evidence from Chilean Rural Areas

Public schools in Chile receive a per-student subsidy depending on enrollment, and are managed by local governments that operate under soft budget constraints. In this paper, we study the effects of this system on per-student expenditures. Per-student expenditures on rural areas are 30% higher than in urban areas. We find that about 75% of this difference is due to the fact that rural public schools are significantly smaller and thus do not benefit from economies of scale. Besides, we also show that in our preferred estimates about 50% of the students in rural areas could be moved to schools that could exploit economies of scale – i.e., these students could attend bigger schools traveling at most an hour day a day in total. We show that even if we use conservative average speed rates or control for transportation, utility and infrastructure costs, there is a sizeable share of students that could be consolidated. We argue that local governments that have soft budget constraints do not consolidate these schools giving the existing potential because of political factors: closing schools is harmful for mayors in electoral terms. Consistent with this claim, we find that a decrease in the degree of political competition in areas with better access to non-voucher transfers from the central government (i.e. with softer budget constraints) decreases the extent of the inefficiency.

Parental Monitoring and Children's Internet Use: The Role of Information, Control, and Cues

This paper explores how asymmetric information between parents and children and direct parental controls can influence children’s internet use in Chile. We designed and implemented a set of randomized interventions whereby approximately 7700 parents were sent weekly SMSs messages with (i) specific information about their children’s internet use, and/or (ii) encouragement and assistance with the installation of parental control software. We separate the informational content from the cue associated with SMS messages and vary the strength of the cues by randomly assigning whether parents received messages in a predictable or unpredictable fashion. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, we find that messages providing parents with specific information reduce children’s internet use by 6?10 percent and help parents mitigate the problem of asymmetric information in the household. Second, we do not find significant impacts from helping parents directly control their children’s Internet access with parental control software. Third, the strength or salience of the cue associated with receiving a message has an independent impact on internet use.