Francois Gourio

Credit Risk and Disaster Risk

Credit spreads are large, volatile, and countercyclical, and recent empirical work suggests that risk premia, not expected credit losses, are responsible for these features. Building on the idea that corporate debt, while fairly safe in ordinary recessions, is exposed to economic depressions, this paper embeds a trade-off theory of capital structure into a real business cycle model with a small, exogenously timevarying risk of economic disaster. The model replicates the level, volatility and cyclicality of credit spreads, and variation in the corporate bond risk premium amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations in investment, employment, and GDP.

Risk Management for Monetary Policy Near the Zero Lower Bound

As projections have inflation heading back toward target and the labor market continuing to improve, the Federal Reserve has begun to contemplate an increase in the federal funds rate. There is however substantial uncertainty around these projections. How should this uncertainty affect monetary policy? In many standard models uncertainty has no effect. In this paper, we demonstrate that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates implies that the central bank should adopt a looser policy when there is uncertainty. In the current context this result implies that a delayed liftoff is optimal. We demonstrate this result theoretically in two canonical macroeconomic models. Using numerical simulations of our models, calibrated to the current environment, we find optimal policy calls for 2 to 3 quarters delay in liftoff relative to a policy that does not take into account uncertainty about policy being constrained by the ZLB. We then use a narrative study of Federal Reserve communications and estimated policy reaction functions to show that risk management is a longstanding practice in the conduct of monetary policy.

Size‐dependent regulations, firm size distribution, and reallocation

In France, firms with 50 employees or more face substantially more regulation than firms with less than 50. As a result, the size distribution of firms is visibly distorted: there are many firms with exactly 49 employees. We model the regulation as the combination of a sunk cost that must be paid the first time the firm reaches 50 employees, and a payroll tax that is paid each period thereafter when the firm operates with more than 50 employees. We estimate the model using indirect inference by fitting the discontinuity of the size distribution. The key finding is that the regulation is equivalent to a combination of a sunk cost approximately equal to about one year of an average employee salary, and a small payroll tax of 0.04%. Our structural model fits well the discontinuity in the size distribution. Removing the regulation improves labor allocation across firms, leading in steady-state to an increase in output per worker slightly less than 0.3%, holding the number of firms fixed. However, if firm entry is elastic, the steady-state gains are an order of magnitude smaller.

Firm Entry and Macroeconomic Dynamics: A State-Level Analysis

Using an annual panel of US states over the period 1982-2014, we estimate the response of macroeconomic variables to a shock to the number of new firms (startups). We find that these shocks have significant effects that persist for many years on real GDP, productivity, and population. This result is consistent with simple models of firm dynamics where a “missing generation” of firms affects productivity persistently.

Uncertainty and International Capital Flows

In a large panel of 26 emerging countries over the last 40 years, aggregate stock market return volatilities, our measure of uncertainty, forecast capital flows. When the stock market return volatility increases, capital inflows decrease and capital outflows increase. We propose a simple decomposition of each countrys market return volatility into two components: countries differ by their exposure to systematic volatility, measured by their uncertainty betas, and by their country-specific volatility. Capital inflows respond to both systematic and country-specific shocks to volatility, and they respond more in high uncertainty beta countries. These results are all statistically significant. A simple portfolio choice model illustrates the impact of uncertainty on gross capital flows: in the model, foreigners are exposed to expropriation risk. When the probability of expropriation increases, foreigners sell the domestic assets to the domestic investors, leading to a counter-cyclical home bias.

Financing Investment with Long-Term Debt and Uncertainty Shocks

We extend the quantitative corporate finance framework of Hennessy and Whited (2005) by introducing long-term defaultable debt and stochastic volatility. These features lead to significantly lower leverage and higher default probabilities, and a stronger negative correlation of investment with credit spreads, consistent with the data.

Stochastic Volatility, Bond Yields, and the Q Theory of Investment

Recent empirical work using panel data documents that, while the correlation of investment and Tobin’s Q is low, the correlation of investment and credit spreads is high. We propose an explanation for these empirical findings, based on time-varying risk, i.e. stochastic volatility. In our model, firms finance investments using defaultable debt as well as equity issuance, and they are subject to standard profitability shocks as well as shocks to volatility. An increase in volatility leads to an increase in the probability of default and hence the credit spread, while reducing investment and increasing equity value. This shock hence generates a negative correlation between investment and credit spreads, and between investment and Q, helping the model match the data.

The Cross-Section of Labor Leverage and Equity Returns

Using a standard production model, we demonstrate theoretically that, even if labor is fully flexible, it generates a form of operating leverage if (a) wages are smoother than productivity and (b) the capital-labor elasticity of substitution is strictly less than one. Our model supports using labor share -- the ratio of labor expenses to value added -- as a proxy for labor leverage. We show evidence for conditions (a) and (b), and we demonstrate the economic significance of labor leverage: High labor-share firms have operating profits that are more sensitive to shocks, and they have higher expected asset returns.