Frank Cain

Exporting the Cold War: British Responses to the USA's Establishment of COCOM, 1947-51

This article casts a special light on the early years of Americas attempts to control East-West trade and on the responses to these measures by the UK, then heavily dependent on trade with the USSR. Britain at that time was rebuilding its internal economy and, more importantly, re-establishing the global sterling area trading network upon which much of its internal economy was based. Because of its heavy indebtedness to the US and Americas refusal to trade with it in other than the US dollar, Britain relied on its trade with the remainder of the world then regarded as soft currency areas, including the Russian rouble. But with its indebtedness, the strength of the dollar and its demand for US technologies, Britain could not afford to disregard the strategiceconomic measures being directed from Washington.1 Trading relations had existed between Britain and Russia from the 1850s, with the trade balance always in Russias favour. In 1870 British imports from Russia were ?16.1 million against ?2.9 million exported to Russia. Similar figures for 1880 were ?16 million and ?11 million, for 1890 ?24.8 million and ?8.8 million, for 1900 ?22 million and ?16.4 million, and for 1910 ?43.6 million and ?21.2 million; by 1920 they had fallen to ?2.7 million and ?3.4 million. However, by 1939 they had grown to ?19.5 million and ?17.4 million.2 Interwar trade was marked by several hiccups, such as the Arcos raid of 1927 and the resultant severing for a short time of diplomatic relationships, and by another severance in 1933. Much of colonial commodity exports for Russia passed through London in the form of Malayan tin and rubber, Australian wool and minerals and Indian tea and jute. This was paid for with Soviet exports to Britain of timber, agricultural products and basic manufactured goods such as matches.3 Other European countries

Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions on the Export of Computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China

The USA persuaded its European allies under the terms of the Marshall Plan to agree to embargo exports to the Soviet bloc in 1947 and to the PRC when it was established in 1949. This ban took the form of an East/West trade war and literally banned the export of everything from needles to anchors. As the West invented new technology such as coaxial telephone cable or scientific instruments, these were embargoed, although the Soviets were able to develop their own versions of those products. The Americans were early developers of the electronic computer, supported greatly by extensive sales to the military. The British looked to sell their computers in external markets, including the Soviet bloc and China. The Americans objected, but their officials did not wish to alienate the British from continuing to support the East/West trade embargo and allowed a small number to be sold. US support for such sales was important because the British machines contained some essential US equipment. The Wilson government sought to expand the development and export of British high technology, including computers. This article highlights the tension between Britain and the USA, particularly under the Nixon administration, over how the British computer firms struggled to obtain sales in the communist countries.

ASIO and the Australian Labour Movement: An Historical Perspective

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was established through administrative fiat in March 1949 by the Chifley government acting under subtle and not so subtle prompting from the British and American governments. Because ASIO was established by a Labor government it has always been argued by the non-Labor elements that ASIO should be supported in a bipartisan spirit. The labour movement has always denied this relationship and the history of the establishment of ASIO goes far towards an understanding of the years of tension that continued between ASIO and the labour movement. It is an understatement to say that uneasy relationships have always existed between the Australian labour movement and surveillance bodies. It is in the nature of both organisations to view each other with enmity. The role of surveillance bodies to preserve the state from attempts to change political structures and redistribute political power readily comes into conflict with the role of the labour movement in attempting to bring about such changes. Added to this is the fact that surveillance bodies have always been looked upon with favour by the anti-labour organisations in Australia. Despite assertions of bipartisan support for such bodies, it has therefore been the anti-labour forces that have defended and given increased powers and resources to them, and the labour movement which has attempted to check their powers and make them more publicly accountable. The very broadness of the labour movement has not stopped it from main taining a united front towards surveillance bodies. It has been the radical left of the movement such as Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the militant trade unions, the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), the anti-war elements, socialists and ethnic groups inspired by foreign Communist or socialist governments while supporting the ALP in Australia, who have attracted the attention of the surveillance bodies. In spite of internal conflicts between these various elements of the labour movement, the movement sees itself as encapsulating the real values and traditions of Australian nationalism and has come to resent any surveillance body compiling dossiers on it and its members. Those elements in ASIO concerned with watching radicals have traditions dating back to late in the nineteenth century when the police forces first began watching the more radical elements that made up the nascent labour movement of those years.1 The First World War saw surveillance procedures expanded to a full-time activity when the Commonwealth government had Military Intelligence pursue anti-recruiting and anti-war elements, particularly the IWW. The use of the Army and the War Precautions Act for this work contributed to the first split in the ALP in 1916 by raising the important and divisive question of the extent to which government departments should be used to suppress the left wing of the labour movement. At the end of the war non-labour forces were in little doubt over the value

Venona in Australia and its Long-term Ramifications

In March 1948, Sir Percy Sillitoe, Director-General of M15, flew to Australia to inform its Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, that a spy ring had been detected operating out of the Soviet embassy in Canberra. The details Sillitoe produced were vague and no suspect could be arrested. Then chaos broke out. The Pentagon banned all information flowing to Australia: Australian/British/US relations became strained: the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) was established under the aegis of M15, but it failed to placate the USA; and the Chifley government lost the subsequent elections. What was behind these espionage sensations? The defection of the KGB man in Canberra, Vladimir Petrov, in 1954 was expected to produce the insiders exposé on local spying and although suspected spies were paraded, nothing happened. Then in 1996, everything was made clear. The US National Security Agency (NSA) released the Australian Venona papers, comprising the decrypted Soviet cables detailing the operation of this 1940s spy ring. They had been sealed in the NSAs most secret archives for 50 years to avoid compromising all Sigint (Signal intelligence) work. The exploration of these events by Australian historians has hitherto been handicapped by a lack of knowledge about the detail of this missing intelligence dimension. The revealing of that secret now provides the opportunity for these disjointed events to be viewed in their proper Cold War perspective. This article analyses the events from the aspect of what was known before the Venona releases and what can now be known of those same events.

Australian liberalism and corporatism

George Brandis, Tom Harley and Don Markwell (eds), Liberals face the Future: Essays on Australian Liberalism, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 386,

Some aspects of Australian‐Soviet relations from 1800 to 1960

14.99 (paper) and Katharine West, The Revolution in Australian Politics, Melbourne, Penguin Books, 1984, pp. 116,

Intelligence writings in Australia

4.95 (paper). John Rickard, H.B. Higgins: the rebel as judge. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp.350.

The origins of political surveillance in Australia

29.95 (cloth). Stuart Macintyre, Militant: the life and times of Paddy Troy, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp.225.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organization: An Unofficial History

19.95 (cloth),

The US‐led trade Embargo on China: The origins of CHINCOM, 1947–52

9.95 (paper). Alan Metcalfe, In Their Own Right: The Rise to Power of Johs Nationals, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1984, pp.268.