Frank Grundig

Marching at the Pace of the Slowest: A Model of International Climate-Change Negotiations

We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong bargaining position.

Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness: A further conceptual development of the Oslo-Potsdam solution

This paper develops the Oslo-Potsdam solution to measuring regime effectiveness further conceptually. I argue that the temporal domain of regime effectiveness is not adequately dealt with by the current measurement concepts and develop three amendments to the Oslo-Potsdam solution. First, I suggest to measure effectiveness over the time interval the regime is in operation in order to capture welfare gains over time. Second, I propose an amendment that takes the pre-regime phase into account and I suggest a way to assess the loss of potential welfare brought about by delays in negotiating the regime. Third, I take temporal externalities of regime policies into account. Dealing with these three aspects of the temporal domain of regime effectiveness is important for obtaining complete and unbiased measurements. Achieving this is important in itself but also for comparative research, the assessment of regime dynamics, and ultimately for advising on policy.