Franz M. Wuketits

Evolution as a Cognition Process: Towards an Evolutionary Epistemology

Recently, biologist and philosophers have been much attracted by an evolutionary view of knowledge, so-called evolutionary epistemology. Developing this insight, the present paper argues that our cognitive abilities are the outcome of organic evolution, and that, conversely, evolution itself may be described as a cognition process. Furthermore, it is argued that the key to an adequate evolutionary epistemology lies in a system-theoretical approach to evolution which grows from, but goes beyond, Darwins theory of natural selection.

Moral systems as evolutionary systems: Taking evolutionary ethics seriously

Abstract In this paper I propose an evolutionary ethics that goes beyond mere description. I argue that the fact that human behavior is biologically constrained can give us some ideas about how to establish moral norms, so that the fact/value distinction in its strict sense is no longer tenable. Taking evolutionary ethics seriously means, after all, looking for possibilities of human beings as a biological species. Biological evolution does not entail any values and moral norms, but in organizing our social life we are well-advised to consider those factors that have channeled our evolution—i.e., not just ask what humans ought to do, but what they are able to do. My vantage point is that moral systems are evolutionary systems.

Evolutionary theory in social science

Basic Structures in Human Action. On the Relevance of Bio-Social Categories for Social Theory.- I. The Problem.- II. Some Preconditions of Behavioural Patterns.- III. Taking Phenotypes Seriously: Critical Remarks on Sociobiology.- IV. Secondary Type Explanations do not Explain away Primary Type Explanations.- V. Biosociology: A Levels Model of Man.- VI. The Incest Taboo: A Biosociological View.- VII. The Human Biogram and the Role of Cultural Institutionsl.- VIII. Conclusion.- Notes.- Evolutionary Models and Social Theory. Prospects and Problems.- I. Introduction.- II. Social Darwinism.- III. Animal Sociobiology.- IV. Human Sociobiology.- V. The Evolution of Morality.- VI. The Status of Morality.- VII. Relativism?.- VIII. Relatives, Friends, and Strangers.- IX. Prospects.- X. Conclusion.- Evolution, Causality and Human Freedom. The Open Society from a Biological Point of View.- I. Introduction.- II. The Systems-Theoretic Approach to Evolution: Darwin and Beyond.- III. The Evolution of Man: Beyond Determination and Destiny.- IV. The Evolution of Man: Beyond Physicalism and Mentalism.- V. Evolution and the Open Society.- VI. Conclusion.- Notes.- Collective Action and the Selection of Rules. Some Notes on the Evolutionary Paradigm in Social Theory.- I. On the Genesis of the Social Theory of Evolution.- II. The Logical Structure of a Theory of Structural Selection.- III. An Action-Theoretical Interpretation of the Theory of Structural Selection.- IV. The Heuristics of the Theory of Structural Selection.- V. Conclusion.- Notes.- Learning and the Evolution of Social Systems. An Epigenetic Perspective.- I. Evolution and the Role of the Epigenetic System.- II. Epigenesis and Evolution in Sociological Theorizing.- III. Epigenetic Developments and Social Evolution.- IV. An Epigenetic Theory of the Formation of the State.- V. Conclusion.- Notes.- Evolution and Political Control. A Synopsis of a General Theory of Politics.- I. Introduction.- II. The Theoretical Problem.- III. Evolutionary Causation.- IV. Functional Synergism.- V. The Cybernetic Model.- VI. A General Theory of Politics.- VII. Some Theoretical Implications.- VIII. Conclusion.- Media and Markets.- I. Introduction.- II. The Selectionist Program.- III. Money and Language: Two Models for General Media of Interaction.- IV. The Institutionalization of the Media Codes: Structural Requirements.- V. Communities, Hierarchies and Markets.- VI. Political, Socially Intergrative and Scientific Markets.- VII. Concluding Remarks: Media Between Inflation and Deflation.- Notes.- The Self as a Parasite. A Sociological Criticism of Poppers Theory of Evolution.- I. Introduction.- II. Dualism, Trialism or Pluralism ?.- III. Descarters1 Problem.- IV. Propensities as Collective Social Forces: Durkheim.- V. The Self as a Parasite.- VI. Epistemology and the Knowing Subject.- Notes.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.

The Philosophy of Donald T. Campbell: A Short Review and Critical Appraisal

Aside from his remarkable studies in psychology and the social sciences, Donald Thomas Campbell (1916–1996) made significant contributions to philosophy, particularly philosophy of science,epistemology, and ethics. His name and his work are inseparably linked with the evolutionary approach to explaining human knowledge (evolutionary epistemology). He was an indefatigable supporter of the naturalistic turn in philosophy and has strongly influenced the discussion of moral issues (evolutionary ethics). The aim of this paper is to briefly characterize Campbell’s work and to discuss its philosophical implications. In particular, I show its relevance to some current debates in the intersection of biology and philosophy. In fact, philosophy of biology would look poorer without Campbell’s influence. The present paper is not a hagiography but an attempt to evaluate and critically discuss the meaning of Campbell’s work for philosophy of biology and to encourage scholars working in this field to read and re-read this work which is both challenging and inspiring.

Evolutionary epistemology: The non-adaptationist approach

Earlier versions of evolutionary epistemology were based on—or at least strongly informed by—the adaptationist paradigm. It is for this reason that advocates of evolutionary epistemology have been frequently criticized by those who have adopted an organismic perspective in evolutionary thinking. Evolutionists defending the view that any living system—including all its characters at the anatomical as well as the behavioral level—can be sufficiently explained in terms of adaptation, have neglected the (somehow trivial) fact that organisms are active systems that do not entirely depend on their respective environment(s). Meanwhile, however, a systems-theoretical approach to understanding living beings and their evolution has made clear that (1) organisms and their environment(s) have a common history and have not evolved independent of each other, (2) any living system and its environment(s) are linked together by a feedback principle, and (3) adaptability is not defined by the environment but the organism itself. This has serious consequences for evolutionary epistemology. In this paper, I outline a non-adaptationist version of this epistemology. I also briefly discuss its philosophical implications. The main focus is the problem of realism.

Synthetic and analytical thinking

SummaryIt is shown that scientific research is not a linear process of information gaining, of accumulating data and facts, but is rather to be characterized by a model showing the cyclic structure of data gathering and construction of theories, of inductive and deductive methods. Analytical and synthetic methods are linked together and are building inseparable components of the texture of science.

Evolution, cognition, and survival: Evolutionary epistemology and derivative topics

The meaning of evolution for the study of cognitive mechanisms in animals and, particularly, knowledge phenomena in humans is—and has been since more than a century—the focus of many controversies in different disciplines. By taking evolution seriously, many naturalists and some philosophers have extended the evolutionary paradigm to all epistemic activities including such specifically human activities as science. However, there has also been resistance to evolutionary models, and it has been argued that what is now called “evolutionary epistemology” is an unduly reductionistic research program and hardly apt to give sufficient explanations of complex mental processes in humans. Others have criticized the evolutionary theory of cognition/knowledge as a metaphysical theory which cannot transgress its own premises and thus remains confined in a vicious circle. The aim of the present review is to show todays status of evolutionary epistemology as a scientific theory based on results in different fields of b...

Evolution: Treibende Kräfte in Natur und Kultur

Vorbemerkung Der vorliegende Text ist sozusagen die Nachschrift meines im Dezember 2007 in Dresden gehaltenen Vortrags. Ich hielt den Vortrag im Wesentlichen in freier Rede, nur auf der Basis einiger Notizen, und schrieb den vollen Text danach. Dabei habe ich den Vortragsstil beibehalten. Allerdings habe ich nachtraglich manches hinzugefugt, den Beitrag mit ein paar Anmerkungen versehen und einiges an zwischenzeitlich erschienener Literatur berucksichtigt.

Wissenschaft: Zickzackkurs auf dem Weg zum Wissen

Die geistige Kraft ausert sich in der Bewegung und nicht in der Versteifung (Santiago Ramon y Cajal, Regeln und Ratschlage zur wissenschaftlichen Forschung, 1938).

Einleitung: Spinner oder Wegweiser?

Als Alfred Wegener Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts seine Theorie der Kontinentalverschiebung entwickelte, wurde er von vielen Geologen verspottet, als Fantast oder Spinner angesehen. Allgemeine Anerkennung fand die Theorie erst ab den 1960er-Jahren, was der 1930 wahrend einer Expedition in Gronland verstorbene Forscher freilich nicht mehr auskosten konnte. Heute ist Wegener aus der Geschichte der Geowissenschaften nicht mehr wegzudenken; er zahlt zu den Wegweisern in der Erforschung unseres Planeten und seines Werdens. Der Grat zwischen Spinnerei und bahnbrechender Forschung ist also mitunter sehr schmal.