Friedrich Kratochwil

International organization: a state of the art on an art of the state

International organization as a field of study is where the action is. The analytical shifts leading up to the current preoccupation with international regimes have been both progressive and cumulative. And the field is pursuing its object of study in innovative ways that are bringing it closer to the theoretical core of more general international relations work. As we point out, however, the study of regimes as practiced today suffers from the fact that its epistemological approaches contradict its basic ontological posture. Accordingly, more interpretive strains, commensurate with the intersubjective basis of international regimes, should be included in the prevailing epistemological approaches. In addition, as a result of its enthusiasm for the concept of regimes, the field has tended to neglect the study of formal international organizations. Interpretive epistemologies can also help to link up the study of regimes with the study of formal international organizations by drawing attention to the roles these organizations play in creating transparency in the behavior and expectations of actors, serving as focal points for the international legitimation struggle, and providing a venue for the conduct of global epistemic politics.

The return of culture and identity in IR theory

In an examination of cultural change in the post-Cold War era, this work addresses a series of questions covering topics such as the lack of interest in culture and identity in IR theory, and the case for rethinking the contemporary theoretical reach of the concepts.

Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System

The author explores the changing functions of boundaries in territorially and nonterritorially based social organizations. By focusing on the exchanges that boundaries mediate, a fuller account can be given of the systems characteristics in which the units interact than is afforded by traditional systems theory. Two case studies demonstrate that imperial boundaries differ significantly from those in the state system. Boundaries are shown to be the major means for conflict management in the international system. The author also investigates shifts in the location of the boundary, characteristics of balance-of-power systems, and the restriction and expansion of the exchanges that boundaries allow through the bundling or unbundling of territorial rights. Most of the latter devices that gave rise to spheres of influence, buffer states, suzerainties, and so forth have been overtaken by events, but functional regimes and spheres of influence based upon tacit rather than explicit rules remain important.

On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology

This article moves from deconstruction to reconstruction in research methodology. It proposes pragmatism as a way to escape from epistemological deadlock. We first show that social scientists are mistaken in their hope to obtain warranted knowledge through traditional scientific methods. We then show that pragmatism has grown from tacit commonsense to an explicit item on the agenda of the international relations discipline. We suggest that a coherent pragmatic approach consists of two elements: the recognition of knowledge generation as a social and discursive activity, and the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge. To offer a concrete example of what pragmatic methodology can look like, we propose the research strategy of abduction. We assess various forms of research design to further elucidate how pragmatic research works in practice.

Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's `Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge

Assessing ‘progress’ in the scientific study of international politics faces several difficulties. There is initially the issue of the objects of study and how the subject matter shall be delineated. Subsequently, there is the issue of the criteria by which we can produce warranted knowledge. One position argues that true knowledge can only be gained by following a particular method. Popular since Descartes, this stance is nowadays best represented by the unity of science position whereby anything claiming to have scientific status has to follow a specified method. An alternative contention proposes that, first of all, ‘knowledge’ should not simply be identified with one mode of knowing, particularly since even within science there exist many different warrants that cannot be reduced to one criterion. The story told so far treads on familiar ground in that the first problem is one of ontology, while the second deals with problems of epistemology and method. Consequently, two solutions seem to exist. We can now either privilege ontology and assume that the world discloses itself by affecting our senses and that, therefore, we have to come to some primitive or basic observational statements which ‘tell it like it is’. Alternatively, we can take the sceptic’s objection to the reliability of sense data seriously—after all the oar is not broken when immersed in water and optical theory clearly shows why this ‘misperception’ occurs—and doubt the primacy of sense perception and even of ontology. In such a case, we would rely on method as our only hope for providing the necessary warrants. But whatever position we take, even this sketchy account suggests that matters are even more complicated since there are certain interaction effects between these two issues. Epistemological and ontological levels might not be that independent of each other, but are probably ‘tightly linked through the mediating lens of the linguistic/conceptual structure’ of the discourse in a field. These difficulties are further exacerbated when the objects of our theoretical inquiries are not the ‘things’ in the world, but when they are, as in the social sciences, characterised by recursivity. Social objects are not simply describable in

The embarrassment of changes: neo-realism as the science of Realpolitik without politics *

The fundamental change occasioned by perestroika , the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the reunification of Germany, and the end of the ‘Cold War’ has become a crucial test for the explanation of change provided by the established paradigm of international politics, neo-realism. In at least three respects, this approach was embarrassed by the chain of events.

The force of prescriptions

How do norms influence choices in social life? Conceptual distinctions among types of norms and suggestions in the work of Hobbes, Hume, and Durkheim help us investigate in greater detail the “woolly” concept of regimes in international relations. When we disaggregate the “set of explicit and implicit norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures” in a given issue area and focus on the conceptual links between rules, principles (norms), and actions, we gain an understanding of the role of norms in social life that is more comprehensive than the understanding provided by traditional accounts. Furthermore, placing the present regime discussion within wider philosophical traditions enables us to develop a more critical approach to the building of theory in the social sciences, since the use of norms as explanatory devices challenges the predominant positivist outlook in several important respects.

History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory:

This article raises the issue about the nature of knowledge in practical matters. Traditionally this question has been answered by pointing to ‘theory-building’ and to field independent epistemological criteria that are supposed to provide the knowledge warrants for the assertions made within a theoretical framework. In this context universality, i.e. generality and trans-historical reliability of the ‘data’, are particularly powerful criteria that establish the ‘truth’ of theoretical propositions through ‘tests’ and thus contribute to cumulative ‘knowledge’. But this ideal of ‘theoretical’ knowledge significantly misunderstands both the type of knowledge we need when we make practical choices and that of ‘history’ in constituting us as agents. In using Bull’s argument in the second debate as a foil, and in revisiting also the controversies concerning the democratic peace and the role of macro-historical studies I first elaborate on the nature of the ‘historicity’ and situatedness of all practical knowledge. In a second step, I attempt to clarify how the knowledge of the past relates to practical choices in that ‘history’ is not simply a storehouse of fixed data, but a product of memory, which in turn is deeply involved in our constructions of identity and of the political projects we pursue. In a third step I adumbrate the criteria for knowledge generation that are more appropriate when we face practical problems.

On the notion of “interest” in international relations

Since the notion of the “national interest†plays a pivotal role in the discourse of state action, its clarification as a normative term is historically as well as systematically important. Differing from the conventional approach, which defines the national interest according to genus and taxa, I shall argue that due to its function as a normative term the national interest cannot be understood in taxonomic categories; it necessitates an investigation of the logic of its use according to specified criteria. In this context the notion of the “public interest†is, for historical as well as systematic reasons, illuminating. As historical investigation shows, the term national interest is neither self-justificatory nor arbitrary within the conventions of the European state system until the late nineteenth century. Important changes in the international system can be traced by following the fundamentally changed usage of the term after 1870. A short comparison with and critique of Waltzs “systemic theory†of international relations concludes the article.

The Monologue of “Science”

The task of this forum is to further dialogue and synthesis regarding international relations theory. Although in agreement with the general idea behind this forum and grateful for the emphasis on concrete research driven by actual political problems, this author, nevertheless, believes that the questions providing the rationale for this forum are too narrowly focused on these ongoing debates and their concomitant pathologies. The thrust of the questions is that dialogue and synthesis are all of one cloth, that everything can be debated out, and that some integral new whole is likely to emerge to command our assent if we all do our homework. But considering how seldom debates establish such a consensus, it might be useful to take this experiential datum as a starting point and to inquire into the reasons why communication across, and often even within, different theoretical perspective is so difficult. To that extent, the remarks here will deal mainly with the first question of the convener, namely, the pros and cons of cross-paradigmatic dialogue and synthesis. Communication is made difficult by the traditional claims of “science,” particularly as understood by the mainstream in our field. After all, different from the arguments in a common-sense world, “scientific” assertions make more “fundamental” claims based on some form of “empiricism” (looking harder at the facts), on the stringency of deductive entailment (at the moment, again in fashion), or on the optimistic belief in science as a nearly automatic process of self correction (see Popper 1965). They all involve the conviction that there is a certain necessity and indubitability that distinguishes scientific statements from both idiosyncratic indications and commonly accepted lore concerning “reality.” To that extent, “science” serves as a trump because the assertions made under this heading are supposed to marshal universal assent. If the epistemological debate during …