Gabriel G. Ramirez

Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence

Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing is a unique form of enhanced secured financing that is granted to firms filing for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Opponents of DIP financing argue that such financing can lead to overinvestment, i.e., excessive investment in risky, (even negative NPV) projects. Alternatively, DIP financing can allow funding for positive NPV projects. Related to this is the question of whether DIP financing is related to a quicker resolution of the bankruptcy process. We examine these issues empirically. Using a large sample of bankruptcy filings, we find little evidence of systematic overinvestment. DIP financed firms are more likely to emerge from the Chapter 11 process than non-DIP financed firms. Interestingly, DIP financed firms have a shorter reorganization period; they are quicker to emerge and also quicker to liquidate. The time spent in bankruptcy is even shorter when the DIP lender also has a prior lending relationship with the firm.

Resolution of Financial Distress : Debt Restructurings via Chapter 11, Prepackaged Bankruptcies, and Workouts

This paper examines empirically a comprehensive sample of firms undertaking Chapter 11 reorganizations, prepackaged bankruptcies, and workouts. We provide evidence that the restructuring decision depends on the degree of the firms leverage, the severity of its liquidity crisis, the extent of creditors coordination, and the magnitude of its economic distress. The results complement theoretical models of debt restructuring choices. We find that economically viable firms prefer workouts. Further, prepackaged bankruptcies are used by firms that are economically viable but face immediate liquidity problems.

Coercive Tender and Exchange Offers in Distressed High- Yield Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Analysis

This study empirically examines tender and exchange offers for a recent sample of 46 high-yield debt restructurings by financially distressed firms during 1989-1992. We find significant differences between tender and exchange offers. Firms using tender offers appear to be in less financial distress than firms using exchange offers and face a more severe holdout problem as revealed by the structure of targeted debt. We find a significant level of coercion in our sample where tender offers appear to be more coercive than exchange offers. An analysis of success rates and post-offer filings of Chapter 11 indicates that coercion is effective in alleviating the holdout problem. Tender offers also experience a positive stock and bond price response to announcements. Our analysis suggests that coercion is not detrimental to bondholders, and may benefit security holders by increasing the likelihood of a less costly, out-of-court restructuring. Finally, we find that the LTV decision did not render exchange offers ineffective in restructuring debt of financially distressed firms. Solicitation of exit consents in exchange offers has increased significantly after the LTV decision.

Information Opacity, Credit Risk, and the Design of Loan Contracts for Private Firms

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier. The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender, collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan characteristics.

Research Needs in Corporate Finance: Perspectives from Financial Managers

A profile of needed research in corporate finance is developed based on a survey of financial managers. Research needs are perceived to be the greatest in the areas of regulation and ownership. The area of long-term financing represents the third most important category. Alternatively, financial managers consider operational financing to be the least important area in terms of research needs. Write-in comments, in general, indicate a particularly strong need for research in two distinctive areas: the effects of globalization and the use of hedging tools to reduce financial risk.

The Existence of Corporate Bond Clawbacks (IPOCs): Theory and Evidence

Clawback provisions allow the issuer to partially redeem a bond issue often within three years of issuance using proceeds only from new equity issues. Empirical evidence indicates the clawback provision is rarely exercised. This poses an interesting dilemma as clawback provisions are an expensive source of funding, often commanding yields that are significantly higher than traditional corporate bonds. We develop a simple model that provides a rationale for the scarcity of call redemptions and the higher yields of clawback bonds. The model predicts a relation between issuance of clawback bonds, cash flow volatility and the probability of renegotiation of clawback debt contracts.

Lock-In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Dip Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass-through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor-inpossession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock-in effects using a sample of DIP loans. We first account for selectivity bias by using the inverse mills ratio form a first stage. Then, in a second stage, we jointly estimate the relationship between loan price and non-price terms accounting for selectivity bias. We find that the existence and intensity of prior lending relationships are associated with higher interest costs, longer maturities, and smaller DIP loans. Taken together, our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock-in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.