Rongbing Huang

Testing Theories of Capital Structure and Estimating the Speed of Adjustment

This paper examines time-series patterns of external financing decisions and shows that publicly traded U.S. firms fund a much larger proportion of their financing deficit with external equity when the cost of equity capital is low. The historical values of the cost of equity capital have long-lasting effects on firms’ capital structures through their influence on firms’ historical financing decisions. We also introduce a new econometric technique to deal with biases in estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. We find that firms adjust toward target leverage at a moderate speed, with a half-life of 3.7 years for book leverage, even after controlling for the traditional determinants of capital structure and firm fixed effects.

Managing Underwriters and the Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings

Using a sample of 2,281 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1995 to 2004, we show that the marketing of securities is important to issuers. The number of managing underwriters for an SEO is negatively related to the offer price discount, especially when the relative offer size is large and the stock return volatility is high. Larger investor networks of comanaging underwriters also lower offer price discounts. We argue that the evidence is supportive of the marketing hypothesis: The underwriters’ marketing efforts can lower the offer price discount by shifting up and flattening the demand curve of an SEO.

Information Opacity, Credit Risk, and the Design of Loan Contracts for Private Firms

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier. The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender, collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan characteristics.

Private Equity Firms’ Reputational Concerns and the Costs of Debt Financing

A popular view is that private equity (PE) firms tend to expropriate other stakeholders of their portfolio companies. Bonds offered during 1992-2011 by companies after their initial public offerings (IPOs) do not reflect this view. We find that yield spreads on bonds offered by PEbacked companies are on average 70 basis points lower, holding other things constant. We also find that PE-backed companies have more conservative investment and dividend policies after bond offerings compared to non-PE-backed companies. These results suggest that PE firms’ reputational concerns dominate their wealth expropriation incentives and help their portfolio companies reduce the costs of debt.

Corporate governance and investor reactions to seasoned equity offerings

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study the role of corporate governance in abnormal returns around announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by publicly traded US firms from 2001 to 2004. Design/methodology/approach - Cross-sectional regression analysis was used to determine which variables are important to the markets reaction to the SEO, with a particular focus on corporate governance variables. Findings - It was found that investors react more positively for firms in which different people hold the CEO and board chairman positions. Limited evidence was found that investor reaction is more positive when the board has a greater representation of outside directors, the CEO has less ownership, and the board is not too large. These findings suggest that investors react more favorably to SEOs by firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms that reduce adverse selection or agency problems. Practical implications - This papers findings are evidence that stronger boards can reduce a firms cost of raising additional equity capital.

Corporate Cash Shortfalls and Financing Decisions

Immediate cash needs are the primary motive for net debt issuances and a highly important motive for net equity issuances. Net debt issuers immediately spend almost all of the proceeds, but net equity issuers save most of the proceeds. Conditional on issuing a security, corporate lifecycle, precautionary saving, market timing, and static tradeoff theories are important in explaining the debt versus equity choice, even for firms that are running out of cash.

Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors

Using a sample of syndicated loans to U.S. IPO companies, we examine how the relationship between the PE sponsor of a borrower’s IPO and the lead bank of the loan influences loan syndicate structure. We find that a stronger PE-bank relationship enables the lead bank to retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE-bank relationship also attracts greater foreign bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank’s relationship with a third-party financial sponsor of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.