Gabrielle Lynch

Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment

Over two decades have passed since the ‘third wave’ of democratization began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. The introduction to this collection provides an overall assessment of the (lack of) progress made in democratization processes in Africa from 1990 to 2010. It highlights seven areas of progress and setbacks: increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional transfers of power, but realities of democratic rollback and hybrid regimes; democratic institutionalization, but ongoing presidentialism and endemic corruption; the institutionalization of political parties, but widespread ethnic voting and the rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) politics of belonging; increasingly dense civil societies, but local realities of incivility, violence and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and uneven development; and the donor communitys mixed commitment to, and at times perverse impact on, democracy promotion. We conclude that steps forward remain greater than reversals and that typically, though not universally, sub-Saharan African countries are more democratic today than in the late 1980s. Simultaneously, we call for more meaningful processes of democratization that aim not only at securing civil and political rights, but also socio-economic rights and the physical security of African citizens.

Democracy and its discontents: understanding Kenya's 2013 elections

In the months leading up to Kenyas general election in March 2013, there was much concern – both within Kenya itself and internationally – that political competition would trigger a fresh wave of ethnic violence. However, the 2013 elections passed off largely peacefully, despite an unexpected presidential result and fact that the losing candidate, Raila Odinga, appealed the outcome to the Supreme Court. This article argues that Kenya avoided political unrest as a result of four interconnected processes. A dramatic political realignment brought former rivals together and gave them an incentive to diffuse ethnic tensions; a pervasive ‘peace narrative’ delegitimized political activity likely to lead to political instability; partial democratic reforms conferred new legitimacy on the electoral and political system; and a new constitution meant that many voters who ‘lost’ nationally in the presidential election ‘won’ in local contests. This election thus provides two important lessons for the democratization literature. First, processes of gradual reform may generate more democratic political systems in the long-run, but in the short-run they can empower the political establishment. Second, sacrificing justice on the altar of stability risks a ‘negative peace’ that may be associated with an increased sense of marginalization and exclusion among some communities – raising the prospects for unrest in the future.

The Fruits of Perception: ‘Ethnic Politics’ and the Case of Kenya's Constitutional Referendum

On 21 November 2005, the Kenyan electorate was invited to register its acceptance or rejection of a proposed new constitution, known as the Wako Draft. In the referendum, the symbol of a banana was used to indicate support for the draft, and an orange its rejection. Published in mid-August, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) disallowed referendum campaigning for, or against the Draft, until after 15 October. Nevertheless, from the day the Draft was published until polling day, and in direct contravention to the ECK’s ruling, Kenyans bore witness to grand political theatre, as politicians travelled the country, waving, eating and distributing oranges or bananas. [...]

Electing the 'alliance of the accused': the success of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya's Rift Valley

Against a history of a divided Kalenjin/Kikuyu vote and election-related violence, and a contemporary context of high levels of inter-communal mistrust and intervention by the International Criminal Court (ICC), this article explains the Jubilee Alliances success amongst Kalenjin and Kikuyu voters in the Rift Valley in the 2013 election. To do this, it examines the pre-election context, election results in Kalenjin- and Kikuyu-dominated areas, local political debates, and election campaigns to reveal how the ‘Uhuruto’ team persuaded local residents to support this seemingly unlikely political marriage in all six elections. It is argued that the alliance used existing and emergent communal narratives of justice and competition to recast socio-economic and political debates in a way that persuaded the majority of Kalenjin and Kikuyu to support Jubilee – and to vote against Raila Odinga and the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) – as a way to protect and further their individual and collective interests. In making this argument, particular attention is given to relations between community members, and to popular support and investment in peace; negotiations between Uhuru and Ruto, and Kalenjin ‘hosts’ and Kikuyu ‘guests’; the reinterpretation of the ICC as a performance of injustice; and successful presentation of ‘Uhuruto’ as a youthful team that could bring about peace and meaningful change as compared with an old, vengeful, incumbent Odinga Odinga.

Decentralisation in Kenya: the governance of governors

Kenyas March 2013 elections ushered in a popular system of devolved government that represented the countrys biggest political transformation since independence. Yet within months there were public calls for a referendum to significantly revise the new arrangements. This article analyses the campaign that was led by the newly elected governors in order to understand the ongoing disputes over the introduction of decentralisation in Kenya, and what they tell us about the potential for devolution to check the power of central government and to diffuse political and ethnic tensions. Drawing on Putnams theory of two-level games, we suggest that Kenyas new governors have proved willing and capable of acting in concert to protect their own positions because the pressure that governors are placed under at the local level to defend county interests has made it politically dangerous for them to be co-opted by the centre. As a result, the Kenyan experience cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralisation’ by the national government, or as one of the capture of sub-national units by ‘local elites’ or ‘notables’. Rather, decentralisation in Kenya has generated a political system with a more robust set of checks and balances, but at the expense of fostering a new set of local controversies that have the potential to exacerbate corruption and fuel local ethnic tensions in some parts of the country.

Allowing Satan in? Moving Toward a Political Economy of Neo-Pentecostalism in Kenya

Neo-Pentecostalism provides African elites with an avenue for legitimation of authority and wealth and, to some extent, bolsters power and authority. Simultaneously, ordinary people look for control over their lives—realities that help explain the explosion of neo-Pentecostal beliefs across sub Saharan Africa that began in the 1980s. The political legitimacy provided is open to contestation and debate, liable to be rejected by some and questioned by others. Neo-Pentecostalism can offer defence mechanisms or strategies that assist with survival, but rarely socioeconomic or political change. Instead, it tends to detract from a class-based identification of and opposition to structural violence, inequality, corruption, and oppression, and often contributes to a general sense of uncertainty and insecurity regarding relevant and appropriate responses. The outcome is an unsteady reinforcement of unequal relations of power and wealth. This paper sets out these arguments with reference to Kenya, and more specifically the declarations and actions of both politicians and slum residents.

Moi: The Making of an African ‘Big-Man’

Abstract In December 2002, Daniel arap Moi – the longest sitting Member of the Kenyan Legislature (1955–2002), longest standing Vice-President (1967–78), and longest reigning President of the Kenyan Republic (1978–2002) – ‘retired’ from elected politics. This article analyses Mois political career from his entry into the Legislative Council in 1955 to his ascension to the Presidency in 1978. It is suggested that Mois initial leap from the classroom rested on the poor records of his predecessors, Mois network of relations with influential opinion brokers, and his reputation as a sober and hardworking individual. Once appointed, Moi gradually secured his position, strengthened and expanded his networks, and took a position that constituents understood and could identify with. By the early 1960s, these efforts, together with his canny politicking, relative political longevity, and early association with an expansive constituency, ensured that Moi was the pre-eminent Kalenjin politician at a critical historical juncture. Prominence, which together with Mois personal attributes and friendly relations with President Kenyatta, secured him appointments at the political centre. Moreover, Mois tenure as Minister for Home Affairs and Vice President, together with his manoeuvres to undermine and/or co-opt potential opponents (through the use of patronage and sanctions) and a carefully cultivated image of a populist and assistant of the people, ensured that his local pre-eminence was rarely questioned and instead gained the backing of time. In turn, Mois national position and apparent attributes together with the shortcomings of his antagonists, ultimately paved the way for his peaceful succession to the Presidency on Jomo Kenyattas death in 1978.

The Wars of Who Belongs Where: The Unstable Politics of Autochthony on Kenya's Mt Elgon

This paper examines the politics of belonging or autochthony on Mt Elgon in western Kenya, and associated occasions of inter- and intra-communal violence. The paper argues that divergent claims of ‘who is who’ and ‘who belongs where and why’ lie at the heart of these periods of violence, and suggests that the uncertainty of ‘belonging’ is due not just to the vagueness of the term and histories of migration, as is often argued, but to cross-cutting layers of ethnic appellations, which result from changes to administrative boundaries and ethnic terminology. Second, the paper argues that a violent politics of belonging has been exacerbated by a return to multi-party politics and larger global trends, but that it has not been caused by such developments. Instead, the case study suggests that the fundamental explanation of confrontation lies with the appeal and use of an inherently exclusive and unstable discourse of culturally distinct communities with discrete homelands that is then used by politicians and ordinary citizens in contexts of heightened competition, increased attention to the local, and uneven impact of ‘globalization’ and ‘development’. Finally, the case highlights the important role that new technologies play in contemporary public discussions and understandings of a collective self.

What's in a name? The politics of naming ethnic groups in Kenya's Cherangany Hills

ABSTRACT This article analyses the politics of names and naming among the Sengwer–Cherangany community from Kenyas Cherangany Hills. Two requests submitted to the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) by Sengwer and Cherangany leaders in 2013 in protest of alleged harms that resulted from a World Bank supported National Resources Management Project are the focus of the analysis. The requests articulated a dispute as to whether ‘locals’ were ‘indigenous peoples’, or ‘vulnerable and marginalised groups’, and whether they should be called ‘Sengwer’ or ‘Cherangany’. The struggle that ensued illustrates the local and extraversion strategies that are deployed to assert rights over cultural, socio-economic, ecological and political space through an insistence upon a specific ethnic label or brand. The case illustrates the extent to which names are imbued with cultural and legal meaning, and used to help legitimise certain engagements and interventions while delegitimising others. The analysis also highlights how bodies such as the WBIP can be used to protect and promote community interests through their recommendations and the production of ‘authoritative’ accounts or documentary archives.

The economic is political and the political is economic: protest, change, and continuity in contemporary Africa

On 16 August 2012, 34 workers from a Lonmin-owned platinum mine in Marikana, South Africa, were shot dead by police while participating in a wildcat strike. A month later, workers returned to work after accepting a 22% pay increase and one-off payment of ZAR2000 following ‘successful’ negotiations between the mine’s management, trade union officials, and delegates of striking employees. However, this agreement does not mark the end of South Africans’ struggles for higher wages, better working and living conditions, and socio-economic and punitive justice. On the contrary, since returning to work, mineworkers in Marikana have demanded justice for their dead colleagues and better living conditions, while wildcat strikes continue to trouble the country’s extensive mining sector. The Marikana strike and ‘massacre’ is also just one example – albeit the most deadly – of nationwide protests that have come to characterise the daily lives of working class, nonworking class, and under-employed South Africans. Thus, according to Peter Alexander: