Gail M. Rosenbaum

Rapid acquisition but slow extinction of an attentional bias in space.

Substantial research has focused on the allocation of spatial attention based on goals or perceptual salience. In everyday life, however, people also direct attention using their previous experience. Here we investigate the pace at which people incidentally learn to prioritize specific locations. Participants searched for a T among Ls in a visual search task. Unbeknownst to them, the target was more often located in one region of the screen than in other regions. An attentional bias toward the rich region developed over dozens of trials. However, the bias did not rapidly readjust to new contexts. It persisted for at least a week and for hundreds of trials after the targets position became evenly distributed. The persistence of the bias did not reflect a long window over which visual statistics were calculated. Long-term persistence differentiates incidentally learned attentional biases from the more flexible goal-driven attention.

Guidance of spatial attention by incidental learning and endogenous cuing.

Our visual system is highly sensitive to regularities in the environment. Locations that were important in ones previous experience are often prioritized during search, even though observers may not be aware of the learning. In this study we characterized the guidance of spatial attention by incidental learning of a targets spatial probability, and examined the interaction between endogenous cuing and probability cuing. Participants searched for a target (T) among distractors (Ls). The target was more often located in one region of the screen than in others. We found that search reaction time (RT) was faster when the target appeared in the high-frequency region rather than the low-frequency regions. This difference increased when there were more items on the display, suggesting that probability cuing guides spatial attention. Additional data indicated that on their own, probability cuing and endogenous cuing (e.g., a central arrow that predicted a targets location) were similarly effective at guiding attention. However, when both cues were presented at once, probability cuing was largely eliminated. Thus, although both incidental learning and endogenous cuing can effectively guide attention, endogenous cuing takes precedence over incidental learning.

Interaction between scene-based and array-based contextual cueing

Contextual cueing refers to the cueing of spatial attention by repeated spatial context. Previous studies have demonstrated distinctive properties of contextual cueing by background scenes and by an array of search items. Whereas scene-based contextual cueing reflects explicit learning of the scene–target association, array-based contextual cueing is supported primarily by implicit learning. In this study, we investigated the interaction between scene-based and array-based contextual cueing. Participants searched for a target that was predicted by both the background scene and the locations of distractor items. We tested three possible patterns of interaction: (1) The scene and the array could be learned independently, in which case cueing should be expressed even when only one cue was preserved; (2) the scene and array could be learned jointly, in which case cueing should occur only when both cues were preserved; (3) overshadowing might occur, in which case learning of the stronger cue should preclude learning of the weaker cue. In several experiments, we manipulated the nature of the contextual cues present during training and testing. We also tested explicit awareness of scenes, scene–target associations, and arrays. The results supported the overshadowing account: Specifically, scene-based contextual cueing precluded array-based contextual cueing when both were predictive of the location of a search target. We suggest that explicit, endogenous cues dominate over implicit cues in guiding spatial attention.

Adolescent risk-taking is predicted by individual differences in cognitive control over emotional, but not non-emotional, response conflict

ABSTRACT While much research on adolescent risk behaviour has focused on the development of prefrontal self-regulatory mechanisms, prior studies have elicited mixed evidence of a relationship between individual differences in the capacity for self-regulation and individual differences in risk taking. To explain these inconsistent findings, it has been suggested that the capacity for self-regulation may be, for most adolescents, adequately mature to produce adaptive behaviour in non-affective, “cold” circumstances, but that adolescents have a more difficult time exerting control in affective, “hot” contexts. To further explore this claim, the present study examined individual differences in self-control in the face of affective and non-affective response conflict, and examined whether differences in the functioning of cognitive control processes under these different conditions was related to risk taking. Participants completed a cognitive Stroop task, an emotional Stroop task, and a risky driving task known as the Stoplight game. Regression analyses showed that performance on the emotional Stroop task predicted laboratory risk-taking in the driving task, whereas performance on the cognitive Stroop task did not exhibit the same trend. This pattern of results is consistent with theories of adolescent risk-taking that emphasise the impacts of affective contextual influences on the ability to enact effective cognitive control.

Variation in strategy use across measures of verbal working memory

The working memory (WM) literature contains a number of tasks that vary on dimensions such as when or how memory items are reported. In addition to the ways in which WM tasks are designed to differ, tasks may also diverge according to the strategies participants use during task performance. The present study included seven tasks from the WM literature, each requiring short-term retention of verbal items. Following completion of a small number of trials from each task, individuals completed a self-report questionnaire to identify their primary strategy. Results indicated substantial variation across individuals for a given task, and within the same individual across tasks. Moreover, while direct comparisons between tasks showed that some tasks evinced similar patterns of strategy use despite differing task demands, others showed markedly different patterns of self-reported strategy use. A community detection algorithm, aimed at identifying groups of individuals based on their profile of strategic choices, revealed unique communities of individuals who are dependent on specific strategies under varying demands. Together, the findings suggest that researchers using common WM paradigms should very carefully consider the implications of variation in strategy use when interpreting their findings.

Task specificity of attention training: the case of probability cuing

Statistical regularities in our environment enhance perception and modulate the allocation of spatial attention. Surprisingly little is known about how learning-induced changes in spatial attention transfer across tasks. In this study, we investigated whether a spatial attentional bias learned in one task transfers to another. Most of the experiments began with a training phase in which a search target was more likely to be located in one quadrant of the screen than in the other quadrants. An attentional bias toward the high-probability quadrant developed during training (probability cuing). In a subsequent, testing phase, the target’s location distribution became random. In addition, the training and testing phases were based on different tasks. Probability cuing did not transfer between visual search and a foraging-like task. However, it did transfer between various types of visual search tasks that differed in stimuli and difficulty. These data suggest that different visual search tasks share a common and transferrable learned attentional bias. However, this bias is not shared by high-level, decision-making tasks such as foraging.

Peers influence adolescent reward processing, but not response inhibition

Most adolescent risk taking occurs in the presence of peers. Prior research suggests that peers alter adolescents’ decision making by increasing reward sensitivity and the engagement of regions involved in the processing of rewards, primarily the striatum. However, the potential influence of peers on the capacity for impulse control, and the associated recruitment of the brain’s control circuitry, has not yet been adequately examined. In the current study, adolescents underwent functional neuroimaging while they completed interleaved rounds of risk-taking and response-inhibition tasks. Social context was manipulated such that the participants believed they were either playing alone and unobserved, or watched by an anonymous peer. Compared to those who completed the tasks alone, adolescents in the peer condition took more risks during the risk-taking task and exhibited relatively heightened activation of the striatum. Activity within this striatal region also predicted individual differences in overall risk taking. In contrast, the presence of peers had no effect on behavioral response inhibition and had minimal impact on the engagement of typical cognitive control regions. In a subregion of the anterior insula engaged mutually by both tasks, activity was again found to be sensitive to social context during the risk-taking task, but not during the response-inhibition task. These findings extend the evidence that the presence of peers biases adolescents towards risk taking by increasing reward sensitivity rather than disrupting cognitive control.

The influences of described and experienced information on adolescent risky decision making

Adolescents are known to take more risks than adults, which can be harmful to their health and well-being. However, despite age differences in real-world risk taking, laboratory risk-taking paradigms often do not evince these developmental patterns. Recent findings in the literature suggest that this inconsistency may be due in part to differences between how adolescents process information about risk when it is described (e.g., in a description-based classroom intervention) versus when it is experienced (e.g., when a teenager experiences the outcome of a risky choice). The present review considers areas of research that can inform approaches to intervention by deepening our understanding of risk taking in described or experienced contexts. We examine the literature on the description-experience gap, which has generally been limited to studies of adult samples, but which highlights differential decision making when risk information is described versus experienced. Informed by this work, we then explore the developmental literature comparing adolescent to adult decision making, and consider whether inconsistencies in age-related findings might be explained by distinguishing between studies in which participants learn about decision outcomes through experience versus description. In light of evidence that studies using experience-based tasks more often show age differences in risk taking, we consider the implications of this pattern, and argue that experience-based tasks may be more ecologically valid measures of adolescent risky decision making, in part due to the heightened affective nature of these tasks. Finally, we propose a model to integrate our findings with theories of adolescent risk-taking, and discuss implications for risk-reduction messaging.