Gal Sheppes

Emotion-Regulation Choice

Despite centuries of speculation about how to manage negative emotions, little is actually known about which emotion-regulation strategies people choose to use when confronted with negative situations of varying intensity. On the basis of a new process conception of emotion regulation, we hypothesized that in low-intensity negative situations, people would show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by engagement reappraisal, which allows emotional processing. However, we expected people in high-intensity negative situations to show a relative preference to choose to regulate emotions by disengagement distraction, which blocks emotional processing at an early stage before it gathers force. In three experiments, we created emotional contexts that varied in intensity, using either emotional pictures (Experiments 1 and 2) or unpredictable electric stimulation (Experiment 3). In response to these emotional contexts, participants chose between using either reappraisal or distraction as an emotion-regulation strategy. Results in all experiments supported our hypothesis. This pattern in the choice of emotion-regulation strategies has important implications for the understanding of healthy adaptation.

Emotion Regulation and Psychopathology

Emotional problems figure prominently in many clinical conditions. Recent efforts to explain and treat these conditions have emphasized the role of emotion dysregulation. However, emotional problems are not always the result of emotion dysregulation, and even when emotional problems do arise from emotion dysregulation, it is necessary to specify precisely what type of emotion dysregulation might be operative. In this review, we present an extended process model of emotion regulation, and we use this model to describe key points at which emotion-regulation difficulties can lead to various forms of psychopathology. These difficulties are associated with (a) identification of the need to regulate emotions, (b) selection among available regulatory options, (c) implementation of a selected regulatory tactic, and (d) monitoring of implemented emotion regulation across time. Implications and future directions for basic research, assessment, and intervention are discussed.

Is Timing Everything? Temporal Considerations in Emotion Regulation:

It is often said that timing is everything. The process model of emotion regulation has taken this aphorism to heart, suggesting that down-regulating emotions before they are “up and running” is always easier than down-regulating emotions once they have gathered force (i.e., generic timing hypothesis). But does timing (i.e., emotion intensity) matter equally for all forms of regulation? In this article, the authors offer an alternative process-specific timing hypothesis, in which emotion-generative and emotion-regulatory processes compete at either earlier or later stages of information processing. Regulation strategies that target early processing stages require minimal effort. Therefore, their efficacy should be relatively unaffected by emotion intensity. By contrast, regulation strategies that target later processing stages require effort that is proportional to the intensity of the emotional response. Therefore, their efficacy should be determined by the relative strength of regulatory versus emotional processes. Implications of this revised conception are considered.

The temporal dynamics of emotion regulation: An EEG study of distraction and reappraisal

Distraction and reappraisal are two widely used forms of emotion regulation. The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) holds that they differ (1) in when they act on the emotion-generative process, and (2) in their impact on subsequent responses to regulated stimuli. We tested these two predictions by measuring electrocortical responses to neutral and emotional images during two phases. In the regulation phase, images were watched or regulated using distraction or reappraisal. During the re-exposure phase, the same images were passively watched. As predicted, during regulation, distraction reduced the late positive potential (LPP) earlier than reappraisal. Upon re-exposure, images with a distraction (but not reappraisal) history elicited a larger LPP than images with an attend history. This pattern of results suggests that distraction and reappraisal intervene at separate stages during emotion generation, a feature which may have distinct consequences that extend beyond the regulatory episode.

Emotion regulation choice: A conceptual framework and supporting evidence

Choice behavior is considered the fundamental means by which individuals exert control over their environments. One important choice domain that remains virtually unexplored is that of emotion regulation. This is surprising given that healthy adaptation requires flexibly choosing between regulation strategies in a manner that is responsive to differing situational demands. In the present article, we provide a broad conceptual framework that systematically evaluates the rules that govern the ways individuals choose between different emotion regulation strategies. This conceptual account is buttressed by empirical findings from 6 studies that show the effects of hypothesized emotional, cognitive, and motivational determinants of regulation choice (Studies 1-3) and illuminate the mechanisms that underlie choices between different emotion regulation strategies (Studies 4-6). Broad implications and future directions are discussed.

Better Late Than Never? On the Dynamics of Online Regulation of Sadness Using Distraction and Cognitive Reappraisal

Real-life emotion regulation often occurs at some point after an emotion-triggering event (ETE) has been introduced, but most previous research has involved regulation before or after the ETE. In a series of experiments, the authors examined online regulation via distraction and cognitive reappraisal by manipulating the strategy initiation point in sadness-evoking films. Distraction was effective even when initiated late, presumably because it involves diluting the ETE contents by mixing them with a nonsad input. By contrast, reappraisal was less effective when initiated late, suggesting a possible point of no return for this strategy: Adopting a detached view late in the ETE may be difficult because it involves continued focus on the ETE and hence requires overcoming a previously formed tendency of identifying with the emotional content.

Cognition and Emotion Lecture at the 2010 SPSP Emotion Preconference

One of the most fundamental distinctions in the field of emotion is the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation. This distinction fits comfortably with folk theories, which view emotions as passions that arise unbidden and then must be controlled. But is it really helpful to distinguish between emotion generation and emotion regulation? In this article, we begin by offering working definitions of emotion generation and emotion regulation. We argue that in some circumstances, the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation is indeed useful. We point both to citation patterns, which indicate that researchers from across a number of sub-areas within psychology are making this distinction, and to empirical studies, which indicate the utility of this distinction in many different research contexts. We then consider five ways in which the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation can be problematic. We suggest that it is time to move beyond debates about whether this distinction is useful to a more specific consideration of when and in what ways this distinction is useful, and in this spirit, we offer recommendations for future research.

Divergent cognitive costs for online forms of reappraisal and distraction.

The present study was set out to evaluate the cognitive costs of two major emotion regulation strategies under conditions of increased challenge. Previous studies have established that cognitive reappraisal (construing an emotional event in nonemotional terms) has no cognitive costs. However, in all of these studies, reappraisal was initiated at the emotional situation onset, before emotional response tendencies sufficiently evolved. In the present study, the challenge of regulation strategies was increased by initiating strategies online at a late time point in an emotional situation. Applying this procedure revealed for the first time a cognitive cost for reappraisal and also provided double dissociation between reappraisal and another major cognitive emotion regulation strategy--distraction (diverting attention from an emotional situation via producing neutral thoughts). Specifically, late reappraisal, relative to distraction, resulted in an expenditure of self control resources. Late distraction but not reappraisal impaired memory encoding of the emotional situation.

Sleep and emotions: Bidirectional links and underlying mechanisms

A growing body of literature suggests that sleep and emotions are closely linked, and that the relationship between these two domains is complex and bidirectional. This review synthesizes some of the most current empirical findings with regard to the effects of sleep (with an emphasis on sleep deprivation) on subsequent emotional state, and the effects of emotions on subsequent sleep. Furthermore, we review a selection of possible mechanisms underlying some of these associations. Finally, suggestions are made for future research as part of the effort to develop a more comprehensive theory for this emerging field.

Emotion Regulation Flexibility

How do people flexibly regulate their emotions in order to manage the diverse demands of varying situations? This question assumes particular importance given the central role that emotion regulation (ER) deficits play in many forms of psychopathology. In this review, we propose a translational framework for the study of ER flexibility that is relevant to normative and clinical populations. We also offer a set of computational tools that are useful for work on ER flexibility. We specify how such tools can be used in a variety of settings, such as basic research, experimental psychopathology, and clinical practice. Our goal is to encourage the theoretical and methodological precision that is needed in order to facilitate progress in this important area.