Ruthie Pliskin

Emotion Regulation and the Cultivation of Political Tolerance: Searching for a New Track for Intervention

The goal of the current project is to integrate psychological research on emotion regulation with the study of democratic practices in general and political intolerance in particular. We hypothesized that the use of a well-established emotion regulation strategy, cognitive reappraisal, would be associated with lower levels of group-based negative emotions toward one’s least-liked group and lower levels of political intolerance toward that group. Preliminary data based on nationwide survey conducted among Jews in Israel show that the tendency to reappraise negative emotions during war is associated with more tolerant attitudes. In studies 1 and 2, we experimentally manipulated reappraisal, and this led to reduced levels of political intolerance toward Palestinian Citizens of Israel (study 1) and toward one’s least-liked group (study 2). These effects were transmitted via a decrease in negative emotions in both studies, as well as by an increase in support for general democratic values in Study 2.

Overcoming the Barrier of Narrative Adherence in Conflicts Through Awareness of the Psychological Bias of Naïve Realism

One significant socio-psychological barrier for peaceful resolution of conflicts is each party’s adherence to its own collective narrative. We hypothesized that raising awareness to the psychological bias of naïve realism and its identification in oneself would provide a path to overcoming this barrier, thus increasing openness to the adversary’s narrative. We conducted three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Studies 1 and 2, conducted among Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis, respectively, revealed that participants with hawkish political ideology reported greater openness to the adversary’s narrative when they were made aware of naïve realism bias. Study 3 revealed that hawkish participants at the baseline adhered to the ingroup narrative and resisted the adversary’s narrative more than dovish participants. They were also more able to identify the bias in themselves upon learning about it. This identification may explain why the manipulation led to bias correction only among hawkish participants.

Are Leftists More Emotion-Driven Than Rightists? The Interactive Influence of Ideology and Emotions on Support for Policies

Although emotions and ideology are important factors guiding policy support in conflict, their interactive influence remains unclear. Based on prior findings that ideological leftists’ beliefs are more susceptible to change than rightists’ beliefs, we tested a somewhat counterintuitive extension that leftists would be more susceptible to influence by their emotional reactions than rightists. In three laboratory studies, inducing positive and negative emotions affected Jewish–Israeli leftists’, but not rightists’, support for conciliatory policies toward an adversarial (Studies 1 and 3) and a non-adversarial (Study 2) outgroup. Three additional field studies showed that positive and negative emotions were related to leftists’, but not rightists’, policy support in positive as well as highly negative conflict-related contexts, among both Jewish (Studies 4 and 5) and Palestinian (Study 6) citizens of Israel. Across different conflicts, emotions, conflict-related contexts, and even populations, leftists’ policy support changed in accordance with emotional reactions more than rightists’ policy support.

When Ideology Meets Conflict-Related Content: Influences on Emotion Generation and Regulation

Do rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently choose differently how to regulate or cope with these emotions? Research has identified ideological differences in emotional processes, but it has yet to identify what types of content lead to ideological differences in emotional intensity or whether these content-dependent differences relate to differing preferences for engaging versus disengaging emotion-regulation strategies. We posited that right–left differences in experienced emotional intensity would be context-dependent, emerging mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, in accordance with the centrality of intergroup attitudes to ideological self-placement in conflict. Study 1 (N = 83) supported this hypothesis, with leftists (vs. rightists) experiencing outgroup harm (but not ingroup harm or conflict-irrelevant harm) with greater emotional intensity. Study 2 (N = 101), which replicated this finding, additionally examined whether behavioral differences in regulatory choice consequently emerge mostly regarding outgroup harm. We tested 2 competing hypotheses as to the nature of these differences: (a) the intensity hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would regulate their intensified reactions to outgroup harm through disengagement–distraction (vs. engagement–reappraisal) due to a documented greater preference for disengaging coping strategies as intensity increases, and (b) the motivation hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would prefer engagement–reappraisal (vs. disengagement–distraction), consistent with leftists’ documented greater preference for intergroup empathy. Results exclusively supported the intensity hypothesis, and the significance of both studies is discussed.

Why Is It So Difficult to Resolve Intractable Conflicts Peacefully? A Sociopsychological Explanation

Intensive and violent intergroup conflicts that rage in different parts of the world are real. These conflicts center over disagreements focusing on contradictory goals and interests in different domains and must be addressed in conflict resolution. It is well known, however, that the disagreements could potentially be resolved if not the powerful sociopsychological barriers which fuel and maintain the conflicts. These barriers inhibit and impede progress toward peaceful settlement of the conflict. They stand as major obstacles to begin the negotiation, to continue the negotiation, to achieve an agreement, and later to engage in a process of reconciliation. These barriers are found among both leaders and society members that are involved in vicious, violent, and protracted intergroup conflicts. They pertain to the integrated operation of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes combined with a preexisting repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs, worldviews, and emotions that result in selective, biased, and distorted information processing. This processing obstructs and inhibits the penetration of new information that can potentially contribute to facilitating progress in the peacemaking process. The chapter elaborates on the nature of the sociopsychological barriers and proposes preliminary ideas of how to overcome them. These ideas focus on the unfreezing process which eventually may lead to reduced adherence to this repertoire, which supports the conflict’s continuation and evaluation, and increased readiness to entertain beliefs that promote peacemaking.

A Darker Side of Hope: Harmony-Focused Hope Decreases Collective Action Intentions Among the Disadvantaged

Hope is viewed as a positive emotion associated with the motivation to change existing conditions. As such, it is highly relevant for social change, particularly when considering disadvantaged groups. We propose that, in the context of unequal intergroup relations, hope may actually undermine motivation for change among disadvantaged group members. Specifically, we distinguish between hope targeted at harmony with the outgroup and hope targeted at social equality between groups. Drawing on insights regarding the consequences of positive intergroup interactions, we predict that hope for harmony with the outgroup can undermine the constructive tension that motivates the disadvantaged toward equality. Across four studies, involving different intergroup contexts, hope for harmony was negatively associated with disadvantaged group members’ motivation for collective action. We further found that high identifiers from the disadvantaged group were immune to this effect. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for the role of hope in social change.

Relational mobility predicts social behaviors in 39 countries and is tied to historical farming and threat

Significance Biologists and social scientists have long tried to understand why some societies have more fluid and open interpersonal relationships—differences in relational mobility—and how those differences influence individual behaviors. We measure relational mobility in 39 societies and find that relationships are more stable and hard to form in east Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East, while they are more fluid in the West and Latin America. Results show that relationally mobile cultures tend to have higher interpersonal trust and intimacy. Exploring potential causes, we find greater environmental threats (like disease and warfare) and sedentary farming are associated with lower relational mobility. Our society-level index of relational mobility for 39 societies is a resource for future studies. Biologists and social scientists have long tried to understand why some societies have more fluid and open interpersonal relationships and how those differences influence culture. This study measures relational mobility, a socioecological variable quantifying voluntary (high relational mobility) vs. fixed (low relational mobility) interpersonal relationships. We measure relational mobility in 39 societies and test whether it predicts social behavior. People in societies with higher relational mobility report more proactive interpersonal behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure and social support) and psychological tendencies that help them build and retain relationships (e.g., general trust, intimacy, self-esteem). Finally, we explore ecological factors that could explain relational mobility differences across societies. Relational mobility was lower in societies that practiced settled, interdependent subsistence styles, such as rice farming, and in societies that had stronger ecological and historical threats.

Speaking Out and Breaking the Silence

Even in the extreme context of intractable conflict, individuals sometimes risk sanctions and other negative outcomes when they reveal information. This chapter examines self-censorship as a barrier to conflict resolution in this unique context, focusing on the process involved in breaking the silence as the result of successfully overcoming this barrier. We examine under what circumstances and conditions people decide not to self-censor, instead speaking out when they have information that they believe is important for the group to know, despite possible negative implications for themselves and the group. We discuss different motivations for or against breaking self-censorship and delve into the process involved in the decision not to self-censor. We also review potential interpersonal differences in the likelihood of breaking the silence. These discussions are supported with examples for our claims from the experience of Israeli-Jewish soldiers in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, who either practice self-censorship or broke the silence and gave testimony on their experiences in the military to the organization ‘Breaking the Silence.’

Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation to the Ethos of Conflict in Israeli Society

People living in intractable conflicts tend to adopt a rigid Ethos of Conflict (EOC), guiding their everyday attitudes and behaviors with regard to the conflict. Group-based emotions, as potent motivators, may account for much of the influence the EOC has on such reactions to intermittent events and information. Furthermore, because emotions are both powerful and changeable, in their regulation they may also constitute an important key to overcoming barriers to conflict resolution. Therefore, it is important to first of all understand emotional processes fully so as to understand the psychology of life in conflict. Nonetheless, it is even more important to understand how these processes are shaped by the EOC, an overarching ideological belief system pervasive within societies in conflict and a central element of this unique context. The present chapter focuses on emotions and emotion regulation and their appearance in Israeli society and proposes how Daniel Bar-Tal’s notion of an EOC may shape emotions and their regulation. Specifically, we examine three important ways in which the EOC may impact these emotional processes in intractable conflict: by shaping the emotions Israelis experience, by shaping the political outcomes of these emotions, and by guiding Israelis’ attempts to regulate the emotions they experience in light of the conflict.