Galen V. Bodenhausen

Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment

Four experiments examined the effects of happiness on the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgment. In each experiment, individuals who had been induced to feel happy rendered more stereotypic judgments than did those in a neutral mood. Experiment 1 demonstrated this phenomenon with a mood induction procedure that involved recalling life experiences. Experiments 2 and 3 suggested that the greater reliance on stereotypes evident in the judgments of happy individuals was not attributable to cognitive capacity deficits created by intrusive happy thoughts or by cognitively disruptive excitement or energetic arousal that may accompany the experience of happiness. In Experiment 4, happy individuals again were found to render more stereotypic judgments, except under conditions in which they had been told that they would be held accountable for their judgments. These results suggest that although happy peoples tendency to engage in stereotypic thinking may be pervasive, they are quite capable of avoiding the influence of stereotypes in their judgments when situational factors provide a motivational impetus for such effort. Discovering the conditions under which group stereotypes are likely to be applied in forming impressions of and making judgments about individuals has been an issue of perennial interest in social psychology. Factors such as information overload (Pratto & Bargh, 1991; Stangor & Duan, 1991) and task difficulty (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), for example, have been shown to increase the social perceivers reliance on stereotypic preconceptions (for a review, see Hamilton & Sherman, in press). In the present research, we investigated the role of emotion, specifically happiness, in the application of stereotypes during social information processing. Does being happy have any impact on the likelihood of stereotyping others? If so, what is the mechanism involved? It was these questions that we sought to address. Interest in the relationship between emotion and stereotyping is certainly not new. However, previous attempts to understand the role of affective experience in prejudice and stereotyping have focused almost exclusively on the impact of negative emotions. Conventional wisdom indicates that it is during times of stress, anxiety, or hostility that prejudice and stereotypes are most likely to emerge and exert their influence on social perception. Psychological research lends credence to the idea that anger, conflict, frustration, and anxiety are indeed associated with

Social Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of Task Complexity

Subjects read information about a defendant in a criminal trial with initial instructions to judge either his guilt (guilt judgment objective) or his aggressiveness (trait judgment objective). The defendant was either Hispanic or ethnically nondescript. After considering the evidence, subjects made both guilt and aggressiveness judgments (regardless of which type of judgment they were instructed to make at the time they read the information) and then recalled as much of the information they read as they could. Results favored the hypothesis that when subjects face a complex judgmental situation, they use stereotypes (when available and relevant) as a way of simplifying the judgment. Specifically, they use the stereotype as a central theme around which they organize presented evidence that is consistent with it, and they neglect inconsistent information. Subjects with a (complex) guilt judgment objective judged the defendant to be relatively more guilty and aggressive and recalled more negative information about him if he was Hispanic than if he was ethnically nondescript. In contrast, subjects with a (simple) trait judgment objective did not perceive either the guilt or aggressiveness of the two defendants to be appreciably different, and did not display any significant bias in their recall of the evidence. These and other results are discussed in terms of the information-processing strategies subjects are likely to use when they expect to make different types of judgments.

Effects of stereotypes on decision making and information-processing strategies.

In two experiments we investigated the effects of stereotyping on (a) reactions to a behavioral transgression and (b) the recall of information bearing on it. Subjects read a case file describing a transgression committed by a target (in Experiment 1, a job-related infraction; in Experiment 2, a criminal act). In some cases, the targets transgression was stereotypic of the targets ethnic group (conveyed through his name), and in other cases it was not. After reading the case file, subjects judged the likelihood that the transgression would recur and recommended punishment for the offense. These judgment data supported the hypothesis that stereotypes function as judgmental heuristics. Specifically, subjects used a stereotype of the target to infer the reasons for his transgression, and then based their punishment decisions on the implications of these inferences, considering other relevant information only when a stereotype-based explanation of the behavior was not available. However, recall data suggested that once a stereotype-based impression of the crime and its determinants was formed, subjects reviewed other available information in an attempt to confirm the implications of this impression. This led to differential recall of presented information, depending on whether its implications were consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to those of the stereotype.

Emotions, arousal, and stereotypic judgments: A heuristic model of affect and stereotyping.

Publisher Summary The heuristic view of stereotyping emphasizes that people use their oversimplified beliefs about social groups as a basis for responding to the members of those groups whenever they lack the desire or the ability to engage in more extensive thought about the individuals. The lack of such desire and/or ability may be common enough under most everyday life circumstances, and it appears that conditions of heightened emotional experience—in particular, anger, anxiety, and happiness—only serve to further reduce the motivation and/or processing capacity. This chapter presents the task of specifying the motivational and cognitive consequences of affective states for information processing. Drawing on the neurological, physiological, and cognitive literatures, Galen V. Bodenhausen develops the hypothesis that some affective states, but not others, produce simplified information processing. He draws out and tests the processing implications of a range of affective states for the use of stereotypic, rather than individuating, information in social perception tasks. The theoretical integration of affective and cognitive processes promises to yield important advances in social psychology generally, but no topic of study seems likely to profit from this reunification more than the study of stereotyping and discrimination.

The dissection of selection in person perception: inhibitory processes in social stereotyping.

Although people simultaneously belong to multiple social categories, any one of these competing representations can dominate the categorization process. It is surprising therefore to learn that only a few studies have considered the question of how people are categorized when multiple categorizations are available. In addition, relatively little is known about the cognitive mechanisms through which these categorization effects are realized. In the reported research, we attempted to extend recent ideas from work on selective attention to shed some light on these fundamental issues in social perception. Our basic contention was that following the initial identification of a persons applicable categories, the categorization process is driven by the interplay of both excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms. The results of 3 studies supported this contention. We discuss our findings in the wider context of contemporary issues in social stereotyping.

Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use

Two information-processing mechanisms that could potentially contribute to judgmental discrimination against the members of stereotyped social groups were examined in two experiments, using a mock juror decision-making task. Both postulated mechanisms involve biased processing of judgment-relevant evidence. The interpretation hypothesis asserts that the activation of stereotypic concepts influences the perceived probative implications of other evidence. The selective processing hypothesis asserts that stereotype-consistent evidence is processed more extensively than is inconsistent evidence. Judgment and memory data from the first experiment supported the general notion that stereotype-based discrimination emerges from biased evidence processing. The specific pattern of results supported selective processing rather than interpretation biases as the critical process underlying observed judgmental discrimination. The second experiment corroborated this conclusion by showing that a manipulation that prevents selective processing of the evidence effectively eliminated biases in judgments and recall pertaining to stereotyped targets. Implications for a general understanding of stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.

Facing Prejudice Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of Facial Threat

We propose that social attitudes, and in particular implicit prejudice, bias peoples perceptions of the facial emotion displayed by others. To test this hypothesis, we employed a facial emotion change-detection task in which European American participants detected the offset (Study 1) or onset (Study 2) of facial anger in both Black and White targets. Higher implicit (but not explicit) prejudice was associated with a greater readiness to perceive anger in Black faces, but neither explicit nor implicit prejudice predicted anger perceptions regarding similar White faces. This pattern indicates that European Americans high in implicit racial prejudice are biased to perceive threatening affect in Black but not White faces, suggesting that the deleterious effects of stereotypes may take hold extremely early in social interaction.

Social cognition: Categorical person perception

In attempting to make sense of others, perceivers regularly construct and use categorical representations (e.g. stereotypes) to streamline the person perception process. A debate that has dominated recent theorizing about the nature and function of these representations concerns the conditions under which they are activated in everyday life. The present article reviews this work and considers the automaticity of category activation in person perception.

The Associative–Propositional Evaluation Model: Theory, Evidence, and Open Questions

Abstract A central theme in contemporary psychology is the distinction between implicit and explicit evaluations. Research has shown various dissociations between the two kinds of evaluations, including different antecedents, different consequences, and discrepant evaluations of the same object. The associative–propositional evaluation (APE) model accounts for these dissociations by conceptualizing implicit and explicit evaluations as the outcomes of two qualitatively distinct processes. Whereas implicit evaluations are described as the outcome of associative processes, explicit evaluations represent the outcome of propositional processes. Associative processes are further specified as the activation of mental associations on the basis of feature similarity and spatiotemporal contiguity; propositional processes are defined as the validation of activated information on the basis of logical consistency. The APE model includes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay between associative and propositional processes, implying a wide range of predictions about symmetric and asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit evaluations. The current chapter reviews the conceptual and empirical assumptions of the APE model and evidence in support of its predictions. In addition, we discuss conceptual and empirical challenges for the APE model and various directions for future research on implicit and explicit evaluation.

Saying no to unwanted thoughts: self-focus and the regulation of mental life.

Drawing from models of mental control and cognitive self-regulation, it was hypothesized that heightened self-focus would promote the spontaneous suppression of social stereotypes. Participants who were induced to experience heightened self-focus indeed produced less stereotypic descriptions of social targets (Studies 1-4). Study 5 further demonstrated that self-focus produced reductions in stereotyping only among those participants whose personal standards dictated stereotype avoidance. A final study demonstrated that these spontaneous forms of stereotype suppression can produce a rebound effect, in which the magnitude of stereotyping increases markedly after a period of suppression. These findings are considered in the context of contemporary issues in mental control and social stereotyping.