Garland E. Allen

The social and economic origins of genetic determinism: a case history of the American Eugenics Movement, 1900–1940 and its lessons for today

Eugenics, the attempt to improve the genetic quality of the human species by ‘better breeding’, developed as a worldwide movement between 1900 and 1940. It was particularly prominent in the United States, Britain and Germany, and in those countries was based on the then-new science of Mendelian genetics. Eugenicists developed research programs to determine the degree to which traits such as Huntingtons chorea, blindness, deafness, mental retardation (feeblemindedness), intelligence, alcoholism, szhiophrenia, manic depression, rebelliousness, nomadism, prostitution and feeble-inhibition were genetically determined. Eugenicists were also active in the political arena, lobbying in the United States for immigration restriction and compulsory sterilization laws for those deemed genetically unfit; in Britain they lobbied for incarceration of genetically unfit and in Germany for sterilization and eventually euthanasia. In all these countries one of the major arguments was that of efficiency: that it was inefficient to allow genetic defects to be multiplied and then have to try and deal with the consequences of state care for the offspring. National Socialists called genetically defective individuals ‘useless eaters’ and argued for sterilization or euthanasia on economic grounds. Similar arguments appeared in the United States and Britain as well. At the present time (1997) much research and publicity is being given to claims about a genetic basis for all the same behaviors (alcoholism, manic depression, etc), again in an economic context — care for people with such diseases is costing too much. There is an important lesson to learn from the past: genetic arguments are put forward to mask the true — social and economic — causes of human behavioral defects.

Opposition to the Mendelian-chromosome theory: the physiological and developmental genetics of Richard Goldschmidt.

ConclusionWe may now ask the question: In what historical perspective should we place the work of Richard Goldschmidt? There is no doubt that in the period 1910–1950 Goldschmidt was an important and prolific figure in the history of biology in general, and of genetics in particular. His textbook on physiological genetics, published in 1938, was an amazing compendium of ideas put forward in the previous half-century about how genes influence physiology and development. His earlier studies on the genetic and geographic distribution of the various species and races of Lymantria contributed soundly to an understanding of the inheritance and development of sex, as well as the genetics of speciation. He was a curious mixture of the experimentalist, empiricist, and theorizer, who could grasp both the large and the small at once and wrap them into the same integrated and coherent package.In insisting on trying to relate genetics to development, Goldschmidt was continually forced to speculate and to forsake experimental fact for generalized theory. In refusing to reconcile a physiological and developmental conception with a corpuscular theory of the gene, he forced himself to substitute for a large body of experimentally verified evidence, vague and general speculations which did not lead in any precise direction. L. C. Dunn summarizes succinctly the effect of Goldschmidts thinking on the development of genetic theory: Although Goldschmidts ideas had a considerable influence in directing attention to the developmental processes intervening between genes and characters, they did not lead to the establishment of a general theory of development in genetical terms. In fact, at the end of the period, as signalized by Goldschmidts book of 1938 [Physiological Gentics] doubt remained whether there was a field with a defined problem which could be identified as developmental genetics.Yet the frequency with which Goldschmidt is cited by later writers suggests that there is a more positive side to his contribution than this. The early Mendelians had recognized the genic constitution of organisms and the Drosophila workers had uncovered in detail the chromosomal mechanism of heredity. These great discoveries were of classical character, solidly based on a multitude of well established facts. By themselves, however, they would not have been sufficient to place genetics in the central position within biology which it was to assume. Beyond the “static” analysis of gene transmission an insight was needed into the dynamic role of genes in cellular physiology, biochemistry, and development. Goldschmidt recognized this aspect and outlined in brilliant generalizations a physiological theory of genetics. Necessarily the prophetic nature of this achievement — romantic in the sense of Ostwalds classification of great scientists and their discoveries — transcended its factual basis. It was the audacity of the theoretician unimpeded by the still scanty data which gave a new focus to biological thought.Some have called Goldschmidt an “obstructionist” in the history of genetics—one whose efforts were largely directed toward useless and continual criticism — challenge for the sake of challenge. As this line of argument goes, time wasted answering Goldschmidts poorly conceived criticisms could have been better used to pursue new lines of thought within the classical gene theory. Sometimes historians are upbraided for studying the work of such “obstructionists,” or even the work of those whose ideas have later proved to be inadequate. This argument misses the point of history and the lessons which it can teach. Perhaps Goldschmidt did take the time of a number of the classical geneticists who tried to answer his objections to the gene theory; and perhaps many of his own ideas about genes were, by todays view, “wrong.” These are always easier judgments to make by hindsight than at the moment. But that is not the point. Goldschmidt had a considerable influence on his contemporaries, and to dismiss him as an obstructionist because his opponents later proved to be more nearly right, distorts history and obscures significant questions which we might well be asking. It might be valuable to know why Goldschmidt felt compelled to be an iconoclast —and how that impulse, psychological in orgin, led him to overlook critical items of evidence which his opponents considered more carefully. It might also be valuable to try and understand how a contemporary of Goldschmidt or. Morgan really viewed the gene theory — what were its strong and weak point? Such questions are not readily answered by studying the work of only those men who were correct by later standards.Answers to some of the above questions can be gleaned from this study of Goldschmidt — though the first, and most psychologically oriented, question is largely untouched here.On the one hand, Goldschmidt forced classical geneticists to reexamine the foundation of their ideas about the nature, inviolability, and even physical dimensions of genes. He also kept alive the very real problems of gene physiology and its relations to development — a relationship that was given less attention by the Drosophila school in their pursuit of the transmission process. On a broader level he emphasized to the biological community a principle that was in danger of being lost in the enthusiasm surrounding the expansion of the Mendelian-chromosome theory. The point was that all theories in science are transient, logical constructs which should not be held as sacred. Time and again, as the history of science has shown, theories become rigid structures which retard new modes of thought. From Goldschmidts perspective, the gene theory was in danger of performing just that function, for it was preventing workers from viewing the gene in a functional as well as a structural light.On the other hand, examining the work of critics (or even of outright “obstructionists”) gives the historian an opportunity to observe how the more established community of scholars at some point in time reacts to challenges of its cherished ideas. The fact that many workers in his own day (such as Beadle, Luria, Delbruck, Sturtevant, Bridges, and others), as well as most geneticists today, saw Goldschmidt as having been largely “obstructionist” is useful historical (and/or sociological) data. Clearly, as this paper has tried to show, Goldschmidts ideas were not all obstructionist, and his viewpoint that genes must be considered functionally was one which was clearly valid, premature as it may have been from an experimental and technique point of view. Perhaps Goldschmidts major fault was that he developed alternative theories which were not easily testable. Nonetheless, his challenge to a fundamental and established idea brought forth a reaction from many members of the genetic community which indicates how unwilling they were to reconsider the formalized theory on which their work was based. While many of Goldschmidts criticisms — and particularly his way of making them — arose out of his own idiosyncrasies, they were also a product of his times. His view of the nature of theory-construction, and his rejection of old-style reductionism and mechanism, were part of a growing awareness within the world scientific community that explanations based on reducing complex phenomena to ultimate particles or units were clearly inadequate. The success of the Mendelian-chromosome theory had obscured that fact for many geneticists, but to Goldschmidt it was a point that could not be allowed to pass unnoticed.

The reception of Mendelism in the United States, 1900-1930.

Scholars have differed on the question of why Mendels work was neglected between 1865 and 1900, and the (by contrast) relatively rapid acceptance of Mendelism in many countries after 1900. This paper focuses on two factors that have not been well explored in the debate. The first is that Mendelism fit perfectly into the atomistic philosophy associated with mechanistic materialism in western science, and thus was strongly promoted by a younger group of biologists around 1900 to raise the prestige of biology to the rigorous level of the physical sciences. The second factor was that Mendelian theory, with its experimental and predictive qualities, fit well into the new demands for industrialization of agriculture both to feed a growing urban population and to provide an arena for capital expansion. This paper proposes that the early promotion of Mendelian research, by both private and public funds, owed as much to economic and social as to biological causes.

“Culling the Herd”: Eugenics and the Conservation Movement in the United States, 1900–1940

While from a late twentieth- and early twenty-first century perspective, the ideologies of eugenics (controlled reproduction to eliminate the genetically unfit and promote the reproduction of the genetically fit) and environmental conservation and preservation, may seem incompatible, they were promoted simultaneously by a number of figures in the progressive era in the decades between 1900 and 1950. Common to the two movements were the desire to preserve the “best” in both the germ plasm of the human population and natural environments (including not only natural resources, but also undisturbed nature preserves such as state and national parks and forests). In both cases advocates sought to use the latest advances in science to bolster and promote their plans, which in good progressive style, involved governmental planning and social control. This article explores the interaction of eugenic and conservationist ideologies in the careers of Sacramento banker and developer Charles M. Goethe and his friend and mentor, wealthy New York lawyer Madison Grant. In particular, the article suggests how metaphors of nature supported active work in both arenas.

The Classical Gene: Its Nature and its Legacy

Much has been written in recent years by biologists, historians, and philosophers of biology about the gene concept and its evolving meaning over time (Burian, 1985; Darden, 1991; Falk, 1986, 1995; Kitcher, 1982; Portin, 1993; Gifford, 2000; Rheinberger, 2000). These studies have provided a useful review of the literature tracing the term through almost a century of its changing meaning (Portin, 1993) and various philosophical usages. The terms ‘classical gene,’ ‘developmental gene,’ ‘biochemical gene,’ and ‘molecular gene’ all have appeared in the recent historical and philosophical literature. But it has not always been clear how these terms differ from one another, whether they map onto specific chronological periods, or the extent to which they overlap in meaning (e.g., how similar or different are the ‘classical’ and the ‘developmental’ gene?). Few contemporary geneticists or historians/philosophers of science would deny that the concept of the ‘gene,’ referring to the material basis of heredity, has undergone significant changes in the course of its evolution during the past century. The key question is: what is the nature of that change? Is it quantitative or qualitative? Has there been divergence into competing gene concepts either in the past or in recent times? How can the history of gene concepts help to illuminate some of the current questions and problems scientific and ethical confronting modern researchers and policy makers about issues such as genetic manipulation, privacy rights, patenting of genes, and the medicalization of social behaviors that are claimed to have a “genetic” basis?

Eugenics and Modern Biology: Critiques of Eugenics, 1910-1945

Eugenics in most western countries in the first four decades of the 20th century was based on the idea that genes control most human phenotypic traits, everything from physical features such as polydactyly and eye colour to physiological conditions such as the A‐B‐O blood groups to mental and personality traits such as “feeblemindedness,” alcoholism and pauperism. In assessing the development of the eugenics movement—its rise and decline between 1900 and 1950—it is important to recognise that its naïve assumptions and often flawed methodologies were openly criticised at the time by scientists and nonscientists alike. This paper will present a brief overview of the critiques launched against eugenicists’ claims, particularly criticisms of the American school led by Charles B. Davenport. Davenports approach to eugenics will be contrasted to his British counterpart, Karl Pearson, founder and first editor of the Annals of Eugenics. It was not the case that nearly everyone in the early 20th century accepted eugenic conclusions as the latest, cutting‐edge science. There are lessons from this historical approach for dealing with similar naïve claims about genetics today.

Genetics, eugenics and the medicalization of social behavior: lessons from the past.

Grâce au genie genetique, il est possible de concevoir des molecules qui se substituent aux genes defectueux et permettent ainsi de demontrer que la genetique peut apporter les reponses a de nombreux maux de la societe

Essay review: History of agriculture and the study of heredity — a new horizon

In the spring of 1966 I had the privilege of interviewing L. C. Dunn (1893-1974), who became a graduate student in genetics under W. E. Castle at Harvard in 1914. 1 asked Dunn if the possibility of applying Mendelian genetics to agriculture had formed any part of his interest in the study of heredity. His answer was quick and emphatic: No! He entered the field to work on theory of heredity. I have no doubt than Dunns view was true enough for him and for many of his contemporaries: they were not directly and personally motivated to study genetics because of agricultural concerns. However, the prevailing view that agriculture had little to do with the development of Mendelian theory in the twentieth century, or that Mendelian theory had little impact on agricultural development, is a myth promoted largely by venerable denizens of classical genetics such as A. H. Sturtevant or Dunn himself. The three books reviewed here amply show the long and interconnected history shared by those who, on the one hand, sought to understand the theoretical basis of inheritance, and those who sought to improve agricultural productivity. Of the three works, Nicholas Russells is the most straightforward and least interpretive, serving more as the sixteenth-, seventeenthand eighteenth-century background for the other two works. Russell examines early attempts at inbreeding and crossbreeding, the various criteria by which desirable animals were selected (quite often mere size or appearance), and the gradual emergence of systematic record-keeping and breeding strategies.

Science, History and Social Activism

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The Changing Image of Biology in the Twentieth Century

The changing image of the life sciences in the twentieth Century can be charted as the conscious attempt to introduce rigorous experimental, analytical and reductionist methods from the physical to the biological sciences. This change brought biology from being a largely descriptive to an experimental science that included both the laboratory and field. Of all the natural sciences, biology underwent the most profound sequence of changes during the twentieth Century. (Biology is defined here initially in the nineteenth-century sense, as the study of the structure and function-including aspects of general physiology — of living Systems, excluding medicine and medically-related subjects such as pharmacology, epidemiology and public health.) During the first half of the nineteenth Century biology was dominated largely by issues of natural history: taxonomy, new discoveries relating to geographic distribution, fossils and extinction, and of course comparative anatomy. Physiology was largely separate from Lamarck’s general term of Biologie at the time, and was housed institutionally within medical schools and hospitals, as opposed to museums and botanical or zoological institutions. The connection of physiology to general biology was clearly recognized, but it shared a largely different intellectual and social base until at least the 1840s.