Garry J. Schinasi
International Monetary Fund
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Featured researches published by Garry J. Schinasi.
Defining Financial Stability | 2004
Garry J. Schinasi
The main objective of this paper is to propose a definition of financial stability that has some practical and operational relevance. Financial stability is defined in terms of its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks, and absorb shocks. Moreover, financial stability is considered a continuum: changeable over time and consistent with multiple combinations of the constituent elements of finance. The paper also discusses several practical implications of the definition that should be considered when using it for policy analysis or developing an analytical framework.
Foreign Affairs | 2006
Garry J. Schinasi
Safeguarding Financial Stability explicates why financial stability matters, what it means, and the challenges in securing it, according to Gerard Caprio, Jr. from the World Bank. [It is] a thoughtful and thought-provoking volume that is a must read not just for central bankers but for all concerned with financial stability.
Responsibility of Central Banks for Stability in Financial Markets | 2003
Garry J. Schinasi
What is the role of central banks in ensuring financial stability? This paper addresses this controversial subject, in part by drawing on the experiences in Europe, Japan, and the United States, and by examining four questions. What is meant by financial stability? Do central banks have a natural role in ensuring financial stability? What does a central bank need to execute this role effectively? How far have central banks actually gone in safeguarding financial stability? The experience drawn on in the paper suggest that central banks: have a natural role to play; at times may require supervisory information to execute this natural role; and have incurred risks to their balance sheets to ensure financial stability.
Archive | 1997
Garry J. Schinasi; Alessandro Prati
This paper analyzes the structural implications of EMU for international capital markets. It discusses the potential size of euro capital markets and the existing roles of European currencies in international capital markets. The paper also examines the euro`s impact on international securities markets, including the role of the ECB, the evolution of EMU securities markets, and aspects of systemic risk management. The implications for wholesale and retail banking markets are also discussed, as are the broader implications of the introduction of the euro for changes in international capital flows, international portfolios, and by implication exchange rates.
The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market | 2006
Garry J. Schinasi; Pedro Gustavo Teixeira
This paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EUs financialstability architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one EU member state. The paper identifies challenges and possible ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture.
Research and Policy Notes | 2004
Garry J. Schinasi
This paper articulates a logical foundation-drawn from disparate literatures-for understanding why safeguarding financial stability is an important economic policy objective. The paper also explains why private aspects of finance provide broader social economic benefits and have the characteristics of public goods. Unique aspects of finance are examined, as are the linkages between finance, money, and the real economy. Sources of market imperfections in finance are identified and their implications are analyzed. The arguments imply that reaping the full private and social economic benefits of finance requires both private-collective and publicpolicy involvement as well as a delicate balance between maximizing the benefits of positive externalities (and public goods) and minimizing the costs (including potential instabilities) of other sources of market imperfections in finance.
Princeton Studies in International Economics | 1999
Alessandro Prati; Garry J. Schinasi
ifo DICE Report | 2004
Maria J. Nieto; Garry J. Schinasi
Documentos ocasionales - Banco de España | 2007
María J. Nieto; Garry J. Schinasi
Archive | 2005
Garry J. Schinasi