María J. Nieto

Determinants of domestic and cross-border bank acquisitions in the European Union.

This paper analyzes the determinants of bank acquisitions both within and across countries in the EU-25 over the period 1997-2004. The findings of this paper are broadly in line with those of the academic literature on the subject, which are mainly based on the US experience. Our results suggest poorly managed EU-25 banks (high cost to income) are more likely to be acquired by other EU-25 banks, in the same country. Nevertheless, this underperformance of target banks does hold for cross border bank acquisitions only if compared to the median of the market. Larger banks are more likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country. The probability of being acquired by another bank in the same market is larger for banks that are quoted in the stock market, which is consistent with the disciplinary character of listing in the stock markets. Finally, banks operating in more concentrated markets are less likely to be acquired by other banks operating within the same country but are more likely to be acquired by banks in other EU-25 countries.

Do European Primarily Internet Banks Show Scale and Experience Efficiencies

Empirical evidence shows that Internet banks worldwide have underperformed newly chartered traditional banks mainly because of their higher overhead costs. European banks have not been an exception in this regard. This paper analyses, for the first time in Europe, whether this is a temporary phenomenon and whether Internet banks may generate scale economies in excess of those available to traditional banks. Also do they (and their customers) accumulate experience with this new business model, allowing them to perform as well or even better than their peers, the traditional banks? To this end, we have generally followed the same analytical framework and methodology used by DeYoung (2001, 2002, 2005) for Internet banks in the USA although the limitations in the availability of data, as well as the existence of different regulatory frameworks and market conditions, particularly in the retail segment, in the 15 European Union countries have required some modifications to the methodology. The empirical analysis confirms that, as is the case for US banks, European Internet banks show technologically based scale economies, while no conclusive evidence exists of technology based learning economies. As Internet banks get larger, the profitability gap with traditional banks shrinks. To the extent that Internet banks are profitable, European authorities may encourage a larger number of consumers to use this delivery channel, by tackling consumers security concerns. This would allow Internet banks to capture more of the potential scale efficiencies implied in our estimations.

Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees

We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.

Is the Internet Delivery Channel Changing Banks' Performance? The Case of Spanish Banks

In spite of the conspicuous use of the Internet as a delivery channel, there is a relative dearth of empirical studies that provide a quantitative analysis of the impact of the Internet on banks´ financial performance. This paper attempts to fill this gap by identifying and estimating the impact of the adoption of a transactional web site on financial performance using a sample of 72 commercial banks operating in Spain over the period 1994-2002. The impact on banks´ performance of transactional web adoption takes time to appear. The adoption of the Internet as a delivery channel involves a gradual reduction in overhead expenses (particularly, staff, marketing and IT). This effect is statistically significant after one and a half years after adoption. The cost reduction translates into an improvement in banks´ profitability, which becomes significant after one and a half years in terms of ROA and after three years in terms of ROE. The paper also concludes that the Internet is being used as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, physical branches.

Financial governance of banking supervision

This article analyses the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country specific factors? We perform an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks´ prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). We conclude that supervisors in central banks are more likely publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. In general, we do not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.

What Role, If Any, Can Market Discipline Play in Supporting Macroprudential Policy?

This paper focuses on market discipline as a necessary condition to preserve the signaling content of balance sheet indicators and market prices as macroprudential tools. It argues that market discipline enhances the information content of market prices by reflecting the expected private cost of financial distress, including the systemic importance of particular firms. This paper also argues that three conditions are necessary for market discipline to be effective: adequate and timely information on financial institutions’ risk profiles; financial institutions’ creditors must consider themselves at risk; and the reaction to market signals needs to be observable. The paper relies on the existing financial literature and it is particularly timely because policymakers are considering structural measures of banks’ systemic importance as a benchmark for macroprudential policy.

Financial Supervision in the EU: Is There Convergence in the National Architectures?

Against the background of the debate on the advisability of further centralizing prudential supervision in the EU this paper develops a study of applied institutional economics, analyzing the financial supervisory architecture of each of the 27 EU countries and assesses their degree of institutional convergence. The paper investigate whether the recent wave of reforms are leading to a convergence of the national architectures. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G28, G38, E58.

Governance of the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Some Reflections

Since the inception of the Euro, European policy makers have been increasingly recognizing the ‘efficiency’ gaps in EU financial supervision against a background of a decentralized institutional architecture for regulation, supervision and financial stability. Recognition of this gap had led to tangible efforts to capture some of the potential efficiency gains through legally binding mechanisms and policy coordination mechanisms (i.e. European System of Financial Supervisors – ESFS). That ongoing iterative process of cooperation and coordination can be interpreted as having already internalized some of the EU´s potential negative externalities of cross border banking (Nieto and Schinasi, 2007).

Creating an EU-Level Supervisor for Cross-Border Banking Groups: Issues Raised by the U.S. Experience with Dual Banking

The European Union (EU) has been facilitating the growth of cross-border banking groups, but bank supervision remains the responsibility of national supervisors. This mismatch has long been recognized and various proposals have been offered to address this weakness. An alternative that would retain the most important advantages of full centralization is that of centralization only for those cross-border groups that are systemically important. All other banks would remain national responsibilities. To identify some of the issues (but not necessarily the best answers) raised by partial centralization in the EU, we look to the dual banking arrangements in the United States, which has long had both federal and state charters. One issue is that of who qualifies for and/or is required to adopt an EU charter. The U.S. policy of low-cost chartering changes encourages both good and bad competition among supervisors. A second issue is that of the potential mismatch between EU responsibility for prudential supervision of some banks and national provision of deposit insurance and lender of last resort services for all banks. A third potential issue is who should provide business conduct regulation.

The Insufficiency of Traditional Safety Nets: What Bank Resolution Fund for Europe?

This paper analyzes the rationale for Bank Recovery and Resolution Funds (BRRFs) in the context of the present European Union’s (EU) decentralized safety net. As compared to pure micro and macro prudential regulation, BRRF’s objective is to limit losses given financial institutions´ default while allowing for a balanced share of costs between private investors and tax payers. Most important, BRRFs contribute to shifting the government’s tradeoff between bailing out and restructuring in favor of restructuring, to the extent that there is also an effective bank resolution legal framework. In turn, banks´ contributions to BRRFs aim at discouraging their excess systemic risk creation particularly through financial system leverage. The paper makes some reflections on the governance aspects of BRRFs that would require minimum harmonization in the EU, emphasizing that BRRFs are only one institutional component of financial institutions´ effective and credible resolution regime. This paper focuses on depository institutions, but the rationale of BRRFs could be extended to other credit institutions.