Gary Fooks

The Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility: Techniques of Neutralization, Stakeholder Management and Political CSR.

Since scholarly interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) has primarily focused on the synergies between social and economic performance, our understanding of how (and the conditions under which) companies use CSR to produce policy outcomes that work against public welfare has remained comparatively underdeveloped. In particular, little is known about how corporate decision-makers privately reconcile the conflicts between public and private interests, even though this is likely to be relevant to understanding the limitations of CSR as a means of aligning business activity with the broader public interest. This study addresses this issue using internal tobacco industry documents to explore British-American Tobacco’s (BAT) thinking on CSR and its effects on the company’s CSR Programme. The article presents a three-stage model of CSR development, based on Sykes and Matza’s theory of techniques of neutralization, which links together: how BAT managers made sense of the company’s declining political authority in the mid-1990s; how they subsequently justified the use of CSR as a tool of stakeholder management aimed at diffusing the political impact of public health advocates by breaking up political constituencies working towards evidence-based tobacco regulation; and how CSR works ideologically to shape stakeholders’ perceptions of the relative merits of competing approaches to tobacco control. Our analysis has three implications for research and practice. First, it underlines the importance of approaching corporate managers’ public comments on CSR critically and situating them in their economic, political and historical contexts. Second, it illustrates the importance of focusing on the political aims and effects of CSR. Third, by showing how CSR practices are used to stymie evidence-based government regulation, the article underlines the importance of highlighting and developing matrices to assess the negative social impacts of CSR.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Policy Elites: An Analysis of Tobacco Industry Documents

Gary Fooks and colleagues undertook a review of tobacco industry documents and show that policies on corporate social responsibility can enable access to and dialogue with policymakers at the highest level.

Exposing and Addressing Tobacco Industry Conduct in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries

The tobacco industrys future depends on increasing tobacco use in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), which face a growing burden of tobacco-related disease, yet have potential to prevent full-scale escalation of this epidemic. To drive up sales the industry markets its products heavily, deliberately targeting non-smokers and keeps prices low until smoking and local economies are sufficiently established to drive prices and profits up. The industry systematically flaunts existing tobacco control legislation and works aggressively to prevent future policies using its resource advantage to present highly misleading economic arguments, rebrand political activities as corporate social responsibility, and establish and use third parties to make its arguments more palatable. Increasingly it is using domestic litigation and international arbitration to bully LMICs from implementing effective policies and hijacking the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain, attempting to put itself in control of an illegal trade in which there is overwhelming historical evidence of its complicity. Progress will not be realised until tobacco industry interference is actively addressed as outlined in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Exemplar LMICs show this action can be achieved and indicate that exposing tobacco industry misconduct is an essential first step.

How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

Abstract Aim To systematically review, using a qualitative, narrative synthesis approach, papers examining alcohol industry efforts to influence alcohol marketing policy, and compare with those used by the tobacco industry. Methods Literature searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Papers were included if they: made reference to alcohol industry efforts to influence (a) policy debates concerning marketing regulations, (b) new specific marketing policies or (c) broad alcohol policy which included marketing regulations; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990–2013. Alcohol industry political activity was categorized into strategies/tactics and frames/arguments. Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author and 100% of the papers were fully second‐reviewed. Seventeen papers met the review criteria. Results Five main political strategies and five main frames were identified. The alcohol industry argues against marketing regulation by emphasizing industry responsibility and the effectiveness of self‐regulation, questioning the effectiveness of statutory regulation and by focusing on individual responsibility. Arguments relating to industry responsibility are often reinforced through corporate social responsibility activities. The industry primarily conveys its arguments through manipulating the evidence base and by promoting ineffective voluntary codes and non‐regulatory initiatives. Conclusions The alcohol industrys political activity is more varied than existing models of corporate political activity suggest. The industrys opposition to marketing regulation centres on claims that the industry is responsible and that self regulation is effective. There are considerable commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry political activity, with differences due potentially to differences in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.

“Working the System”—British American Tobacco's Influence on the European Union Treaty and Its Implications for Policy: An Analysis of Internal Tobacco Industry Documents

Katherine Smith and colleagues investigate the ways in which British American Tobacco influenced the European Union Treaty so that new EU policies advance the interests of major corporations, including those that produce products damaging to health.

How Does the Tobacco Industry Attempt to Influence Marketing Regulations? A Systematic Review

Background The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties’ development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments. Methods Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990–2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence. Results 56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions. Conclusions Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.

Is the increasing policy use of Impact Assessment in Europe likely to undermine efforts to achieve healthy public policy

European policymakers have recently become increasingly committed to using Impact Assessment (IA) to inform policy decisions. Welcoming this development, the public health community has not yet paid sufficient attention to conceptual concerns about IA or to corporate efforts to shape the way in which IA is used. This essay is a thematic analysis of literature concerning IA and associated tools and a related assessment of the European Unions (EU) new ‘integrated’ IA tool. Eight key concerns regarding IA are identified from the literature, many of which relate to the potential for undue corporate influence. Assessment of the EUs IA tool suggests that many of these concerns are valid. The findings raise crucial questions about the role of IA in public policy. By focusing mainly on the impact on the economy and business environment, the EUs current approach to IA may undermine healthy public policy. Those interested in public health need to acknowledge and respond to the problems associated with IA and evaluate the effects of ‘integrated’ IA tools on policy decisions affecting public health.

International trade law, plain packaging and tobacco industry political activity: the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Tobacco companies are increasingly turning to trade and investment agreements to challenge measures aimed at reducing tobacco use. This study examines their efforts to influence the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a major trade and investment agreement which may eventually cover 40% of the worlds population; focusing on how these efforts might enhance the industrys power to challenge the introduction of plain packaging. Specifically, the paper discusses the implications for public health regulation of Philip Morris Internationals interest in using the TPP to: shape the bureaucratic structures and decision-making processes of business regulation at the national level; introduce a higher standard of protection for trademarks than is currently provided under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and expand the coverage of Investor-State Dispute Settlement which empowers corporations to litigate directly against governments where they are deemed to be in breach of investment agreements. The large number of countries involved in the TPP underlines its risk to the development of tobacco regulation globally. The full article is published online only. To view please visit the journal online (http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050869)

A review of the impacts of tobacco industry privatisation: Implications for policy

State-owned tobacco companies, which still account for 40% of global cigarette production, face continued pressure from, among others, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to be privatised. This review of available literature on tobacco industry privatisation suggests that any economic benefits of privatisation may be lower than supposed, because private owners avoid competitive tenders (thus underpaying for assets), negotiate lengthy tax holidays and are complicit in the smuggling of cigarettes to avoid import and excise duties. It outlines how privatisation leads to increased marketing, more effective distribution and lower prices, creating additional demand for cigarettes among new and existing smokers, leading to increased cigarette consumption, higher smoking prevalence and lower age of smoking initiation. Privatisation also weakens tobacco control because private owners, in their drive for profits, lobby aggressively against effective policies and ignore or overturn existing policies. This evidence suggests that further tobacco industry privatisation is likely to increase smoking and that instead of transferring assets from state to private ownership, alternative models of supply should be explored.

Tobacco industry attempts to undermine Article 5.3 and the “good governance” trap

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control1 (FCTC), which has now been ratified by 166 countries, is the first global public health treaty to be developed by the World Health Organization and represents a crucial milestone for tobacco control. In recognition of systematic, often covert tobacco industry efforts to undermine tobacco control policy, Article 5.3 of the FCTC specifically requires that, “in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law”.1 The impact of Article 5.3 depends on governments’ commitment to implementing the guidelines agreed in Durban, in November 2008.2 Given that tobacco industry success in undermining tobacco control to date has relied on its ability to influence policy,3 it is perhaps unsurprising that tobacco companies lobbied hard against the Article 5.3 guidelines and are now trying to undermine their implementation by claiming that they contravene existing commitments to “better regulation” and “good governance”.4 5 6 7 What the companies fail to acknowledge is that at least one major tobacco company, British American Tobacco (BAT), had a lead role in promoting these concepts. In the European Union and the United Kingdom the strategy being employed by major tobacco companies (both before and after the agreement of the Article 5.3 guidelines) is to claim that Article 5.3 contravenes existing official standards on consultation because it requires complete exclusion of the tobacco industry from policy discussions (in fact, it merely requires that consultation should be limited to that which is strictly necessary and should be transparent and accountable). Such claims are frequently framed within broader policy commitments to “better regulation” or “good governance”, as table 1 illustrates. View this table: Table 1 Tobacco industry attempts to undermine Article …