Jeff Collin

Complicity in contraband: British American Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in Asia

Objectives: To examine the complicity of British American Tobacco (BAT) in cigarette smuggling in Asia, and to assess the centrality of illicit trade to regional corporate strategy. Methods: Analysis of previously confidential documents from BAT’s Guildford depository. An iterative strategy combined searches based on geography, organisational structure, and key personnel, while corporate euphemisms for contraband were identified by triangulation. Results: BAT documents demonstrate the strategic importance of smuggling across global, regional, national, and local levels. Particularly important in Asia, contraband enabled access to closed markets, created pressure for market opening, and was highly profitable. Documents demonstrate BAT’s detailed oversight of illicit trade, seeking to reconcile the conflicting demands of control and deniability. Conclusions: BAT documents demonstrate that smuggling has been driven by corporate objectives, indicate national measures by which the problem can be addressed, and highlight the importance of a coordinated global response via WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

Breaking and re-entering: British American Tobacco in China 1979-2000.

Objectives: To analyse the strategy used by British American Tobacco (BAT) to re-enter the Chinese market from 1979 to 2000 after historically dominating the market before the 1950s. Design: Analysis of tobacco industry document files to date available only on-site at the Guildford Depository operated by BAT. An additional search of recent documents related to BAT, placed in the Minnesota Depository, was also carried out. Results: BAT has been committed to regaining its historically dominant position in China since the country reopened to foreign companies in 1979. Initially, BAT remained cautious relative to competitors in seeking joint ventures, finding market access hindered by bureaucratic complexity, restrictions on foreign investment and imports quotas, and later an advertising ban. Instead, the documents suggest BAT strongly relied on illegal imports to expand market presence of State Express 555 and other key brands. It was only when risks to contraband sales increased that the company made greater efforts to establish a legal presence in the country. Attempts to stress the long history of BAT in China and a proclaimed commitment to corporate social responsibility have been used to facilitate later negotiations. Conclusion: China has remained relatively closed to transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) during its transition to a market economy, maintaining a firm grip over foreign investment and imports. Nonetheless, BAT has circumvented such restrictions through illegal imports and exploitation of inconsistencies in the local enforcement of advertising bans. Governments need to understand and address the full range of market entry tactics by TTCs in order to ensure effective tobacco control.

If we can just ‘stall' new unfriendly legislations, the scoreboard is already in our favour: transnational tobacco companies and ingredients disclosure in Thailand

Objectives: To review the strategies employed by overseas cigarette manufacturers operating in Thailand to obstruct the passage and subsequent enforcement of national public health legislation, specifically the ingredients disclosure provision of the 1992 Tobacco Products Control Act. Methods: Analysis of previously confidential tobacco industry documents relevant to non-compliance with the ingredients disclosure legislation. Results: Requirement for disclosure of ingredients contained in cigarettes contained in the Tobacco Products Control Act was identified by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) not only as a significant threat to their operations in Thailand, but as a dangerous global precedent. Industry documents reveal a determined campaign to block, stall, or amend the proposed regulation during the legislative process. Industry representatives petitioned the Ministry of Health to revise the requirement from by brand disclosure to a more palatable by company submission. Strategies were adapted in the wake of the passage of the Act. Most significantly, the industry in concert with embassies in Bangkok threatened the Thai government with appeals to international trade bodies on the grounds of violation of international agreements. Industry documents also reveal that as submission of ingredient lists appeared unavoidable, leading companies operating in Thailand endeavoured to confound the disclosure requirement by disguising ingredients and reformulating brand recipes. Conclusions: The evidence presented highlights the importance of ingredients regulation and demonstrates how health policy can be transformed during its implementation. A greater understanding of trade agreements emerges as a priority for global tobacco control.

Tobacco industry attempts to undermine Article 5.3 and the “good governance” trap

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control1 (FCTC), which has now been ratified by 166 countries, is the first global public health treaty to be developed by the World Health Organization and represents a crucial milestone for tobacco control. In recognition of systematic, often covert tobacco industry efforts to undermine tobacco control policy, Article 5.3 of the FCTC specifically requires that, “in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law”.1 The impact of Article 5.3 depends on governments’ commitment to implementing the guidelines agreed in Durban, in November 2008.2 Given that tobacco industry success in undermining tobacco control to date has relied on its ability to influence policy,3 it is perhaps unsurprising that tobacco companies lobbied hard against the Article 5.3 guidelines and are now trying to undermine their implementation by claiming that they contravene existing commitments to “better regulation” and “good governance”.4 5 6 7 What the companies fail to acknowledge is that at least one major tobacco company, British American Tobacco (BAT), had a lead role in promoting these concepts. In the European Union and the United Kingdom the strategy being employed by major tobacco companies (both before and after the agreement of the Article 5.3 guidelines) is to claim that Article 5.3 contravenes existing official standards on consultation because it requires complete exclusion of the tobacco industry from policy discussions (in fact, it merely requires that consultation should be limited to that which is strictly necessary and should be transparent and accountable). Such claims are frequently framed within broader policy commitments to “better regulation” or “good governance”, as table 1 illustrates. View this table: Table 1 Tobacco industry attempts to undermine Article …

British American Tobacco and Formula One motor racing.

Internal documents show that British American Tobaccos racing team has been successful in promoting the companys products, especially in emerging countries. Tougher worldwide action is needed to counter the tobacco industrys influence in Formula One